















































































46. Russian Federation, National Report Submitted by the Russian Federation, 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 22 May 2015, p.2, <[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/48](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/48)>.
47. See T. Horlohe, "The Mysterious Case of the Russian INF Treaty Violation", *Sicherheit und Frieden*, Vol.33(2), 2015, p.103.
48. If we assume that Russia is fully aware of the details of the incriminating tests, it is currently playing for time – which, not least, is needed for decision-making. In parallel, Russia is attempting a kind of "fishing expedition" to learn what precisely the US knows and how the information was obtained (instead of attempting to resolve the dispute); see Rose Gottemoeller, US undersecretary for arms control and international security, in an interview: *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, "Impasse Over U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty Hardens as Washington Threatens 'Countermeasures'", 16 September 2015, <<http://www.rferl.mobi/a/27250064.html>>.
49. For information on all aspects of the Iskander system, see S. Forss, 2012.
50. It is ultimately common sense that problems regarding the range limit of 500 km (INF Treaty) or 350 km (Missile Technology Control Regime, especially in relation to exports) for missiles or cruise missiles, respectively, can be fairly easily overcome by means of modifications; in this context, it is unlikely that Russia has conducted Iskander tests in complete darkness in order to prevent observation by US satellites, as has been claimed; see S. Forss, 2012, p.16.
51. *Ibid.*, pp.16-18.
52. See T. Horlohe, 2015, p.102.
53. See the latest in-depth analysis by J. Lewis, "Russian Cruise Missiles Revisited", *Arms Control Wonk*, 27 October 2015, <<http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207816/russian-cruise-missiles-revisited/>>.
54. S. Forss, 2012; J. Lewis, "Sokov on Russian Cruise Missiles", *Arms Control Wonk*, 25 August 2015, <<http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7801/sokov-on-russian-cruise-missiles>>.
55. Among others, Podvig reiterates that such a test can be compliant with the INF Treaty according to the regulations if the ground-based launching systems only serve testing purposes, are fixed in position, and can be differentiated from a regular GLCM launcher; P. Podvig, "Cruise Missiles and INF – What about 9M729?", *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 23 June 2015, <[http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/cruise\\_missiles\\_and\\_inf\\_what.shtml](http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/cruise_missiles_and_inf_what.shtml)>; see also P. Podvig, "Sorting Fact from Fiction on Russian Missile Claims", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 22 June 2015, <<http://thebulletin.org/sorting-fact-fiction-russian-missile-claims8414>>. But this seems to be precisely the bone of contention for the US. The SLCM narrative "resurfaced in early October 2015, after Russia used its new Kalibr-NK sea-launched cruise missiles in its attacks against targets in Syria"; A. Woolf, 2015, p.13, referring to P. Podvig, "Syria Strikes, Kalibr-NK, and the INF Treaty", *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 7 October 2015, <[http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/10/syria\\_strikes\\_kalibr-nk\\_and\\_th.shtml](http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/10/syria_strikes_kalibr-nk_and_th.shtml)>. Referring to a tweet by K. Reif of 10 October 2015, Podvig updated his blog on 11 October 2015 as follows "the U.S. administration insists that my theory is wrong and that the INF culprit is not an SLCM", concluding, "I think everybody would win if the United States releases more details about the missile".
56. See A. Woolf, 2015, pp.12ff.
57. See T. Horlohe, 2015, p.100.
58. Cf. M. Schneider, Reports on Russian Violations of the INF Treaty, Fairfax, June 2012, <<http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Schneider-Info-Series-340.pdf>>.

59. T. Horlohe, 2015, p. 101. Here it is emphasized that the sequence of steps concerns (as it so often does) US internal politics and the separation of powers. It was also important to take the new arms control agreement, New START, through Congress in 2010. In retrospect, as we know from the 2014 compliance report (US State Department, 2014, p.10), before the treaty violations since 2013 were officially stated, concrete consultations with Russia that lasted over a year had taken place; see US State Department, 2014.
60. Cf. J. Lewis, "Russian INF Compliance", Arms Control Wonk, 1 December 2013, <<http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7010/russian-inf-compliance>> and, extensively, M. Schneider, Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty, Fairfax, February 2014, <<http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Confirmation-of-Russian-Violations-of-the-INF-Treaty8.pdf>>.
61. See J. Lewis, 2013.
62. The 2015 compliance report continues to be cryptic about Russian GLCMs; US State Department, 2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 5 June 2015, pp.8-11, <<http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm>>.
63. According to O. Meier, 2015, p.3.
64. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Comments on the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments", 12 August 2014, <[http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/D2D396AE143B098144257D2A0054C7FD](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D2D396AE143B098144257D2A0054C7FD)>.
65. However, this ground-to-ground aspect also holds true for Russian defence systems, especially Moscow's A-135 system. M. Schneider (2014, p.18) therefore includes the Russian ABM and air defence systems in the list of accusations (it is stated that Russia likes to present its own intentions as those of its opponent). It is legally relevant, however, that the INF Treaty regime does not expressly include ground-to-air systems.
66. See A. Woolf, 2015, pp.20ff.; cf. also O. Meier, 2015, p.2.
67. See J. Thomas, 2014, p.6, footnote 15; this is also mentioned by A. Woolf, 2015, p.29.
68. The current US administration has stated that the RS-26 is compliant with the treaty. Podvig says that the US cannot bring a watertight charge against the new RS-26 and therefore concentrated on the GLCM problem in 2014 in order to at least do something; P. Podvig, "INF Treaty Compliance (Sort Of)", Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 7 June 2015, <[http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/inf\\_treaty\\_compliance\\_update\\_s.shtml](http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/inf_treaty_compliance_update_s.shtml)>.
69. See P. Podvig, "RS-26 Deployment Postponed until 2016", Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 25 December 2014, <[http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/rs-26\\_deployment\\_postponed\\_unt.shtml](http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/rs-26_deployment_postponed_unt.shtml)>.
70. The starting point for the development of the SS-20 was what was then the first road-mobile three-stage ICBM, the SS-16 Sinner (RS-14 or Temp-2S). For the new RS-26, as a "reincarnation" (Podvig) of the SS-20, the SS-27 is seen as a starting point. Against the background of measures against (N)MD, it would certainly be interesting to take another closer look at the development history of the SS-27 in terms of a hidden early "turnoff" towards a two-stage variant.
71. See A. Woolf, 2015, p.15, referring to the Sary Shagan missile defence test range, and D. Litovkin on the new missile: "Russia's Supersonic Trump Card Edges Closer to Reality", 23 October 2013, <[http://in.rbth.com/economics/2013/10/23/russias\\_hypersonic\\_trump\\_card\\_edges\\_closer\\_to\\_reality\\_30325.html](http://in.rbth.com/economics/2013/10/23/russias_hypersonic_trump_card_edges_closer_to_reality_30325.html)>.

72. See, in an overview, A. Woolf, 2015, pp.14ff.
73. See A. Woolf, 2015, p.11.
74. The very specific (legalistic) discussion to date about possible payload variations during the testing of the RS-26 cannot be extended at this point. US hardliners basically assume bad Russian intentions and believe that payload variations aim at disguising the primary intermediate-range character of the missile, which is non-compliant with the INF Treaty and is therefore an avoidance of the treaty; cf. “neutrally”, A. Woolf, 2015, pp.14-15. It remains to be seen whether inspections of the RS-26 can bring some fact-based illumination to the subject.
75. For a very critical assessment stressing the overall Russian threat to Europe, see Y. Fedorov, “A Looming Crisis of the INF Treaty: Sources and Consequences”, 31 August 2015, <<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=193277>>.
76. R.D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate*, New York, Random House, 2012.
77. For a good overview of the counter-options (politically and militarily), see A. Woolf, 2015, pp.21-31, which focuses on research projects that would still be compliant with the treaty.
78. For example, Thomas suggests that the production of Pershing IIs could restart or future intermediate-range ballistic missiles with trajectory shaping vehicles should be researched; J. Thomas, 2014, p.6, footnote 15.
79. Krepon suggests that asymmetrical conventional measures such as the scalable additional presence of ships (some of them with SLCMs) and aircraft in Europe could make a quickly realizable contribution that does not only send a clear signal of solidarity to Russia, but also to NATO partners; M. Krepon, “Responding to Treaty Violations”, *Arms Control Wonk*, 11 August 2014, <<http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4234/responding-to-treaty-violations>>. Acton focuses on cruise missile defence using tethered airships carrying radar and air defence interceptors capable of engaging cruise missiles, both of which could be permanently based in Eastern Europe; J. Acton, “How to Respond to Russia’s INF Treaty Violation”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 6 August 2014, <<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/08/06/how-to-respond-to-russia-s-inf-treaty-violation>>.
80. An aim according to F. Rose, currently assistant secretary of state for arms control in the US State Department, Berlin, 19 June 2015; see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 June 2015, p.4. Recently his undersecretary, Rose Gottemoeller, delivered the same message; see *Radio Free Europe*, *Radio Liberty*, 2015.
81. Cf. A. Woolf, 2015, p.24.
82. See T. Horlohe, 2015, p.105, who expressly recommends an appeal to this kind of self-interest.
83. See P. Podvig, 22 June 2015, footnote 55.
84. See e.g. *Missile Threat*, “White House Blocks Pentagon Report on Russian Treaty Breach”, George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes, 11 August 2015, <<http://missilethreat.com/white-house-blocks-pentagon-report-on-russian-treaty-breach/>>.

85. G. Evans et al. (eds), 2015, p.64.
86. M. Krepon, 2003, pp.103ff.
87. *Ibid.*, pp.105, 217ff. In a US attempt to claim space, Krepon sees the threat of a “hegemonic overstretch” that is globally perceived as such and which could only do more harm than good (p.223); cf. also G. Evans et al. (eds), 2015, pp.69-73.
88. Cf. J. Krause, 2003, p.40.
89. Cf. M. Gebauer and G.P. Schmitz, “Nato-Gipfel in Wales: Merkel muss mit Zorn der Putin-Gegner rechnen”, Spiegel Online, 3 September 2014, <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-krise-merkel-und-putin-bei-nato-gipfel-in-wales-a-989539.html>>, which describes a dispute over this issue between Germany (against) and Poland and the Baltic states (in favour).
90. Its chances of success remain open. The ABM tests that have been conducted in the US so far can hardly deal with such a challenging target as a modern Russian missile.
91. See H. Schmidt, *Die Mächte der Zukunft* (the powers of the future), Munich, Siedler Verlag, 2004, p.127.
92. Cf. e.g. K.-H. Kamp, “Nukleare Kompensation” (nuclear compensation), *Internationale Politik*, May/June 2015, pp.72-77.
93. Cf. Snyder’s statements on Eurasianism as an ideological source for current Russian developments; T. Snyder, “Eurasianism – What Kind of Ideology Is This?”, 3sat, 8 May 2014, <<http://www.3sat.de/mediathek/?mode=play&obj=43550>>, see also Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, pp.109ff. One thesis is that Russia had to become a revisionist power in the light of the “lost 1990s”; R.D. Kaplan, 2012, p.176 (paperback 2013). The crisis in Ukraine (*ibid.*, p.180ff.) shows the current relevance and explosiveness of this thesis.
94. Cf. N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls Limited Nuclear Strikes De-escalation”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 13 March 2014, <<http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation>>.
95. Cf. O. Thränert, “Missile Defense: A Valuable Tool to Defend against Current Threats”, *The European Security and Defence Union*, 2/2015, p.17.
96. On the other hand, paradoxically this now explains more clearly why Russia was and continues to be opposed to missile defence as such: it could/will limit its options, at least at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The US does not officially touch on this aspect. Sleepwalkers welcome.
97. See US Defense Department, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress*, April 2015, <[http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015\\_China\\_Military\\_Power\\_Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf)>.
98. See S.C.P. Hinz, “Zur Krise des INF-Vertrages im globalen Kontext“ (on the crisis of the INF Treaty in the global context), *Newsletter Verteidigung. Streitkräfte. Wehrtechnik*, No.145, Behörden Spiegel, 27 November 2015, p.2.

## Geneva Papers – Research Series

- No.1 – 2011 G. P. Herd, “The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence”, 34 p.
- No.2 – 2011 T. Tardy, “Cooperating to Build Peace: The UN-EU Inter-Institutional Complex”, 36 p.
- No.3 – 2011 M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, “The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda: Lessons in Post-September 11 Transnational Terrorism”, 39 p.
- No.4 – 2011 A. Doss, “Great Expectations: UN Peacekeeping, Civilian Protection and the Use of Force”, 43 p.
- No.5 – 2012 P. Cornell, “Regional and International Energy Security Dynamics: Consequences for NATO’s Search for an Energy Security Role”, 43 p.
- No.6 – 2012 M.-R. Djalili and T. Kellner, “Politique régionale de l’Iran : potentialités, défis et incertitudes”, 40 p.
- No.7 – 2012 G. Lindstrom, “Meeting the Cyber Security Challenge”, 39 p.
- No.8 – 2012 V. Christensen, “Virtuality, Perception and Reality in Myanmar’s Democratic Reform”, 35 p.
- No.9 – 2012 T. Fitschen, “Taking the Rule of Law Seriously”, 30 p.
- No.10 – 2013 E. Kienle, “The Security Implications of the Arab Spring”, 32 p.
- No.11 – 2013 N. Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare”, 75 p.
- No.12 – 2013 A. Guidetti et al., “World Views : Negotiating the North Korean Nuclear Issue”, 47 p.
- No.13 – 2013 T. Sisk and M.-M. Ould Mohamedou, “Bringing Back Transitology - Democratisation in the 21st Century”, 36 p.
- No.14 – 2015 H. J. Roth, “The dynamics of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, 35 p.
- No.15 – 2015 Dr. Gabriel Galice, “Les empires en territoires et réseaux”, 42 p.



- No.16 – 2015 Col (GS) Stefan C.P. Hinz, “The Crisis of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in the Global Context”, 36 p.
- No.17 – 2015 H. J. Roth, “Culture - An Underrated Element in Security Policy ”, 40 p.



**Photo captions**

President Reagan and  
General Secretary Gorbachev  
signing the INF Treaty in the  
East Room of the White House,  
December 1987

**Photo credit**

Front page  
© National Archives and  
Records Administration ARC  
Identifier 198588, courtesy  
Ronald Reagan Presidential  
Library

## Where knowledge meets experience

### **GCSP - Geneva Centre for Security Policy**

Maison de la paix  
Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2D  
P.O. Box 1295  
CH - 1211 Geneva 1  
T + 41 22 906 16 00  
F + 41 22 906 16 49  
[info@gcsp.ch](mailto:info@gcsp.ch)  
[www.gcsp.ch](http://www.gcsp.ch)