



Strategic Security Analysis

Doing Things Differently: Mediating in Mozambique

Catherine Turner and Julia Palmiano Federer





The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation that aims to advance global cooperation, security and peace. The foundation is supported by the Swiss government and governed by 55 member states. The GCSP provides a unique 360° approach to learn about and solve global challenges. The foundation's mission is to educate leaders, facilitate dialogue, advise through in-house research, inspire new ideas and connect experts to develop sustainable solutions to build a more peaceful future.

Strategic Security Analyses

The GCSP Strategic Security Analyses series publishes short papers that address a current security issue. These papers provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and challenges, and propose policy recommendations.

This series is edited by Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli, Head of Global and Emerging Risks.

About the authors

Dr Catherine Turner is Professor of International Law at Durham University, and Deputy Director of the Durham Global Security Institute, an Associate Fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a member of the Folke Bernadotte Academy International Working Group on Mediation and Dialogue and the NATO Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women Peace and Security (2023-2026 mandate). She is currently Chair of the Belfast based NGO Mediation Northern Ireland, with whom she has a 20 year association.

Dr Julia Palmiano Federer is a Fellow at the Geneva Center for Security Policy and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Collaboratory at the Harvard Kennedy School's Center for Public Leadership and a Laureate of the 2022 Women, Peace and Security Research Awards for her work on women, peace, security, and climate change.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Neha Sanghrajka, Fleur Heyworth, Aoife Murphy and Claire Dowling for their reviews of the text, Mariana Savka for her research assistance, Dr Mark Knight for his insights around the components of the mediation process that have informed this analysis, and Amb. Mirko Manzoni for his valuable contribution.

ISBN: 978-2-88947-322-9

© Geneva Centre for Security Policy, June 2024

The views, information and opinions expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect those of the GCSP or the members of its Foundation Council. The GCSP is not responsible for the accuracy of the information.

Cover photo: Peace Process Support



Key points

- The mediation and implementation of the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation (Maputo Accord) in Mozambique (signed in 2019) offer lessons on breaking with conventional and traditional approaches to peace processes in order to achieve success.
- The mediation of the Maputo Accord put Mozambican actors in the driving seat of the process. This approach foregrounded the agency of the parties through a human-centred process design that prioritised the dignity of Mozambican actors and the country itself.
- The mediation was underpinned by a flexible and agile approach built on networked dialogue, adaptive mediation, and incremental implementation based on trust and relationships between mediators and the Principals.¹
- The strategic leadership of the mediators was a core component of the success of the mediation process and emphasised the values of humility and empathy, and the centrality of working in a team.
- The process leading to the signing of the Maputo Accord was made possible by effective financial coordination between international actors such as donors, contact groups, and embassy staff that prioritised core trust-based funding over project-based short-term support.
- The process prioritised an approach of “bespoke inclusion” that was co-created with the parties.
- These flexible, agile, and creative approaches to mediation process design decentre mediation actors and centre the parties themselves. These principles can offer lessons for a mediation field characterised by fragmentation, mistrust and polarisation.



(The analysis)... demonstrates how being willing to “do things differently” from past processes and peace mediation conventions was key to success.

Introduction

In August 2019 the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation (Maputo Accord) was signed, ending decades of civil war and failed peace agreements in the southern African state of Mozambique.² The Maputo Accord and its subsequent implementation represents an increasingly rare example of internationally supported dialogue and mediation leading to peace. This historic achievement was the result of several years of negotiations between the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and the then-leaders of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, or Renamo), Afonso Dhlakama and his successor, Ossufo Momade.

The success of the Maputo Accord in addressing issues that had proved elusive in previous mediation attempts prompts the question of why these efforts succeeded. What did the mediators do differently and what are the lessons from this process for other conflicts? To answer these questions, this Strategic Security Analysis presents key insights from the Maputo Accord process as presented and discussed in a GCSP Geneva Security Debate.³ After comparing how the Maputo Accord process differed from past peace initiatives in Mozambique, the analysis focuses on how strategic leadership enabled a more flexible approach to mediation, embodied through the values and tools used by the mediation team to build an effective process. Ultimately, it demonstrates how being willing to “do things differently” from past processes and peace mediation conventions was key to success.

Peace initiatives in Mozambique, 1992-2015

In 1992 a General Peace Accord (GPA) had brought an end to over a decade of violent conflict between the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo) government and the armed opposition group Renamo. Two years after Mozambique’s independence from Portugal, the armed conflict began in 1977 against a backdrop of contested regional and ideological politics within a post-independence nation-building context. After 15 years of conflict that resulted the deaths of over one million Mozambicans and upheaval affecting the country’s infrastructure and economy, the GPA was signed in 1992. It was brokered by the Rome-based Catholic lay organisation Community of Sant’Egidio and sought to end the hostilities that had devastated the Mozambican nation and its people.

For 20 years following the agreement, Mozambique was regarded as a successful example of a peace process and consequent stabilisation. In 2012, however, there was a resurgence of violence. In addition to local Mozambican politics and shifting conflict dynamics, there was dissatisfaction with elements of the previous agreement related to the distribution of political power, the allocation of state resources, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme that had left many ex-combatants ineligible for pensions.⁴ Violence and insecurity in Mozambique continued to increase in the years following 2012, leading to a number of both national and international initiatives attempting to broker peace.⁵

Between 2013 and 2015 there were no fewer than 114 rounds of talks facilitated by five mediators drawn from religious and academic institutions in Mozambique.⁶ A peace agreement signed in 2014 was short lived when election results were disputed, and violence erupted again in 2015. In 2016, following pressure from the European Union (EU), external mediators were invited to join the efforts. These were drawn from both states, including South Africa, and multilateral organisations such as the EU.⁷ These so-called



Avenida talks (named after the hotel in Maputo in which discussions took place) were convened by a set of international actors and sought to address key issues of the decentralisation of power, including a revision of the constitution, and military issues. However, the rushed and highly publicised nature of the process design, compounded by the diverging agendas of the mediators, undermined the trust of the parties and increased their frustration with the process. The use of the approach that had worked in 1992 failed to take account of the starkly changed context and internal complexities of Mozambique in 2016, such as elite bargaining and the extraction of concessions that worked towards a political and military stalemate, but against peace.⁸

The Maputo Accord process and its implementation, 2016 to the present

The mediation team needed to navigate the resulting risks and operational aspects carefully to maintain confidence when everything hung in the balance.

The Maputo Accord process emerged in December 2016 and took on a new approach, following the breakdown of previous mediation efforts. Direct and continued engagement between the two leaders (Principals), Afonso Dhlakama and President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, facilitated by a small mediation team that included Mirko Manzoni, then Swiss Ambassador to Mozambique, Neha Sanghrajka, then representing the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), and Jonathan Powell of Inter Mediate developed the talks to the point where in-person meetings of the Principals took place in 2017 and 2018. From 2017 the process was supported by a Peace Process Secretariat (PPS) led by the Swiss Ambassador and featured two small working groups with equal membership of the government and Renamo: one on decentralisation to craft legislation and necessary constitutional amendments, and the other on military affairs, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

In a complex political environment, the direct dialogues and consultations between the Principals continued in an unprecedented manner, with President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi and Afonso Dhlakama meeting in Renamo's military headquarters in Gorongosa in 2017 in a historic manner and agreeing to remain committed to the peace process. At this point, the process involved Manzoni, Sanghrajka and national mediator Eduardo Namburete, who together provided mediation and negotiation support.

In 2018, the unexpected death of Dhlakama, a central figure in Renamo, created upheaval in the process and delayed the agreement⁹ due to internal party discord, threats of violence, and the subsequent leadership transition. The mediation team needed to navigate the resulting risks and operational aspects carefully to maintain confidence when everything hung in the balance. The process continued as Renamo elected Ossufo Momade as its next leader, who communicated the organisation's continued commitment to the peace process. As constitutional amendments to deepen decentralisation were approved by Parliament and consensus on joint structures for the implementation of DDR was reached, the reinvigorated process resulted in the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Affairs, which was signed ahead of a formal peace accord. These successes helped to break a long-standing deadlock on the way to a conclusive peace agreement.

As the process continued to move forward, in July 2019 the UN Secretary-General António Guterres appointed Ambassador Mirko Manzoni as the Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Mozambique (UNPESG) to provide good offices to support the facilitation of dialogue between the government and Renamo, and towards the signing and subsequent implementation of a peace agreement. After Parliament had approved



The origins of the Maputo Accord lie in the willingness of the mediation team ... to simply facilitate dialogue between the main parties without seeking to insert themselves into a central role in these talks.

an amnesty bill in 2018, and with the DDR process beginning in Gorongosa district, Sofala province (a location of great significance to Renamo), the peace process culminated in the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation. The signing of the Accord was witnessed by the President of Namibia and President of the Southern African Development Community, Hage Geingob; the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame; the former Presidents of Mozambique (Joaquim Chissano) and Tanzania (Jakaya Kikwete); the UN PESG and President of the Contact Group, Mirko Manzoni; and the representative of the Community of Sant'Egidio, Matteo Zuppi, on 6 August 2019.

Key features of the mediation process

The Maputo Accord process is best read in the light of the shortcomings of previous peace initiatives in Mozambique. For instance, the Avenida process in particular represented in many ways a model of peace mediation dominated by an “outside-in” approach, in which international actors designed and delivered solutions that upheld the ideals of the international peacebuilding field and banked on the success of the 1992 agreement despite changes in the Mozambican context.¹⁰

Having watched the Avenida process, the team behind the Maputo Accord process identified a number of problems with previous attempts at peace that were central to shaping their own approach. While administrative support for the process was established in the form of the PPS, it is notable that it did not mushroom into a large international structure, but retained its character as facilitator (rather than director) of efforts to implement the Accord. The origins of the Maputo Accord lie in the willingness of the mediation team, led by Manzoni and Sanghrajka, to simply facilitate dialogue between the main parties without seeking to insert themselves into a central role in these talks. As a result, the Maputo Accord process developed along different lines, emerging more holistically from the relationship between the parties and the mediators rather than being designed from the outset.

The process unfolded in three phases: (1) a networked peace dialogue that began from the end of the Avenida process to the initial contact and communication between the principal actors; (2) mediation lasting from initial communication between the Principals to the signing of the Maputo Accord; and (3) implementation that began with the signing of initial formal and informal agreements and gained further traction with the signing of the Maputo Accord and increased efforts towards DDR and reconciliation activities after 2020.

Networked dialogue

The early phases of the Maputo Accord process focused on creating what could be understood as a *networked dialogue* that involved both national and international actors and focused on consensus seeking. For the mediation team, the interpretation of the conflict and the scope of mediation came from the parties, not from an outside or abstract analysis by international actors: this built trust and confidence between the parties. In terms of national actors, the mediators broke with convention to build trust with the Principals, for instance travelling thousands of miles to meet with Dhlakama in his headquarters in Gorongosa including at times of high tension, as well as cultivating trusted relationships with Nyusi. The mediators spoke of relentless dedication against a backdrop of external challenges (both personal and professional) to create the environment conducive to listening to the Principals without attempting to impose agendas.

In terms of international actors, the mediators created trusted relationships among governments and created a *basket fund* that would promote core



Rather than adopting a box-ticking approach, the mediators facilitated a gender-responsive approach that emerged organically from the process of co-creating the design of the mediation process with the parties.

funding. This approach allowed for flexibility and rejected the notion of short-term, activity-based funding designs. Furthermore, an international Contact Group, formed in 2017 and chaired by the Swiss Ambassador, was tasked with providing coordinated financial and technical assistance to the process.¹¹ These efforts required a large amount of trust between the mediators and the donor/government representatives throughout the process. The trust established among the mediators, Principals, and international actors established a foundation and generated consent for subsequent phases of the process.

This networked dialogue contrasted with previous peace initiatives in which agendas had been imposed by external actors. The Maputo Accord process focused on centring national buy-in, with national actors leading the process and international actors playing a supporting role. In a context of low trust, external challenges, and setbacks as described above, the mediators sought to prevent miscommunication and misunderstanding from occurring through building trust within the network and between the parties through confidence-building measures. The trust built over time during this phase formed a solid foundation for the subsequent phases.

There were several characteristics of the networked dialogue. It was comprehensive, involving both national and international actors. It consisted of genuine consensus seeking, meaning that the mediators did not attempt to impose a particular agenda, but were willing to be guided by the parties. The process was also, in the words of the mediators, relentless. There were no immediate returns on the time invested in confidence building, and the process suffered many setbacks along the way, including stalled decisions around the decentralisation bill in the Mozambican Parliament, the death of Dhlakama, and the outbreak of an offshoot group of Renamo known as the Renamo Military Junta. However, persistence in this phase laid the foundation for all subsequent dialogue and agreements because of the trust it generated within the network and among actors.

Adaptive mediation between the Principals

The Maputo Accord process was different from processes that had gone before in that it gave the parties more control over both the agenda and the timing of the process, and was highly adaptive to the context and the ongoing political realities at hand. Manzoni and Sanghrajka's adaptive mediation approach¹² prioritised direct and continuous engagement between the two leaders, minimising reliance on large committees¹³ and promoting confidence-building measures and trust-building mechanisms.¹⁴

For example, the process was notable for the way in which it approached the issue of inclusion. Rather than adopting a box-ticking approach, the mediators facilitated a gender-responsive approach that emerged organically from the process of co-creating the design of the mediation process with the parties. For instance, rather than following a standard pattern in terms of who should be included and when to comply with global normative frameworks, the mediators described how they balanced the need to include civil society against the need for discretion and confidentiality in the early days of the process. Holding closed talks in the first instance allowed the groundwork to be done, protecting the process in its infancy. Once basic agreements had been reached, civil society members were invited to participate. This approach was described as *bespoke inclusion*, where people were invited into the process as they were needed. This approach was clearly contrasted with the “process-based” structural approach, where the needs of the process are given greater weight than the needs of people.¹⁵

In terms of timing, rather than having the process determined by a set deadline for talks, the flexibility of the Maputo Accord process allowed for



It became really something very interesting to see two people who started from zero trust come to a point where they were sharing more than the process.

a “pause” in the process when required. For example, the team described how having the consent of the parties meant “having to be okay” with the unknown and not pushing in where one was not wanted. Rather than seeking to stick to a set timeline, it was necessary to acknowledge the human side of the parties, and to give people space and time for moods, events, deaths, births, and personal problems. This approach in turn generated confidence among the people constituting the parties – and their respective leaders in particular. As Eduardo Namburete noted during the Geneva debate:

Because we were 100% involved in the process, into that commitment, we believed that this one was different. The process would not stop because we were not available This time was different. At the end, when [the Principals] both really reached a point where they felt confident, they didn't need us all the time for them to communicate. It became really something very interesting to see two people who started from zero trust come to a point where they were sharing more than the process I believe it was an experience that we don't see every day.

Incremental implementation before agreement

In a break from previously linear approaches in which an agreement was reached before implementation began, the Maputo Accord process approached implementation on an *incremental basis*, including beginning the DDR of combatants before the final peace agreement had been reached.¹⁶ This decision to begin implementation required the continuation of political mediation and political will as well as the operational capacity and skills to implement the DDR process. The relationships created in the networked dialogue phase were tested, especially in the context of halting all DDR activities with the outbreak of COVID-19 and the political sensitivities around including a pension scheme for DDR beneficiaries, a key innovation in creating conditions for a lasting peace. This was a response to the need to build trust, which had been broken by previous failed attempts. Where structural processes had become rigid and unresponsive, focusing on the wrong people and the wrong priorities, a more flexible approach allowed greater freedom for mediators to co-design a process that met the needs of the parties and resulted in agreement.

Strategic leadership in mediation

The strategic leadership of the process was a major factor in the success of the Maputo Accord process. Leadership in this context is understood as consisting of social processes where success is defined by three key outcomes as identified by the Center for Creative Leadership: shared direction, alignment around roles, and a commitment by individuals to achieve the shared goals of the group over their own individual goals.¹⁷ Leadership in the context of the Maputo Accord process was specific, purposeful and invisible, and benefitted from supporting structures that allowed for risk-taking flexibility and commitment, and that were unique to this process. Underpinning this approach were two key themes: values, and the importance of diversity and teams in mediation processes.

Mediator values

The term “values” in this sense refers to the preconceptions that a mediator *her-/himself* has about the nature of her/his task. They shape how the mediator assesses, defines and approaches a conflict. Here mediation intersects with leadership in the way in which values, whether personal, professional or institutional, shape response to conflict. How the mediator both defines the problem and designs the process has a deep impact on the likelihood



of success. Too often mediation processes rely on high-profile mediators or “big names” being appointed. Too often these processes fail: the work is more effective where it does not rely on ego.

During the course of the debate the mediators reflected on the key values they felt they had brought to the role. Primary among these was humility. A key element in the success of the process as identified by the mediation team was the decision to keep both the mediators and the mediation efforts out of the public gaze. As Sanghrajka explained:

I've seen many times people go into a process with this attitude that the parties to the conflict should be grateful that they're there ... Honestly speaking, it's not about us, the international community, or the mediators or facilitators We should be grateful that they're allowing us into their very personal space. And that's what we had to learn in this process.

Key to this process was that the mediators continued to support implementation after the signing of the agreement.

The logical corollary of putting local parties at the centre of mediation is the de-centring of the mediator. Rather than the mediators seeking to pursue their own agenda or to claim the credit for leading a process, Manzoni drew the analogy with a “bridge” that allows communication to happen. The role of the mediator is to facilitate talking between the parties, acknowledging that the parties know what they want. Approaching the task with humility means that mediators and their teams should not be the central actors, but rather should be invisible in the background, offering support without seeking credit. This approach requires that the mediators and their teams be embedded in the community, and unconditionally committed to a locally driven approach, including being committed to being available to the parties on their terms and being ready to speak when they were, even when this required a lot of waiting.

By playing this invisible role, the mediators in the Maputo Accord process were able to gain the confidence of the parties. They were able to keep the process out of the eye of the press and media, and an emphasis was placed on the need for the mediators to be humble, to not be a distraction, and not to seek public recognition for themselves. The success of the process was supported by the quiet and informal practice of the mediators and their discretion throughout the process. In adopting this approach, Manzoni and Sanghrajka were responding to the breakdown in the parties' trust in previous actors, who were critiqued as being too concerned with their own importance in the process.¹⁸ The approach taken in the Maputo Accord process represents a successful example of a growing trend to rely on local actors in mediation rather than on diplomats flying in and out of the context.¹⁹ Key to this process was that the mediators continued to support implementation after the signing of the agreement. The appointment of Manzoni as Personal Envoy when the agreement was imminent but not yet signed and the continuation of the PPS – a lean office that included Sanghrajka as its co-leader – allowed the process to harness the institutional backing of the UN while enabling the continued sense of national ownership.

A second core value was empathy. By putting themselves in the position of the conflict parties, the mediators were able to understand some of the blockages in the process. Manzoni's analogy between the mediator and a doctor's role prioritises an empathetic approach that puts those most affected by conflict at its heart, illustrated with the following observation:

Imagine you are ill. You go to see the doctor, but when you are called in the room is full of other people. The doctor asks you to explain what it is that is wrong with you. You must describe your symptoms openly in front of them. The public nature of this event will naturally affect what you are willing to share.



People living in conflict are deeply and personally affected by it. A public process is a difficult environment for people to speak openly. People are being “talked about” in front of others with inevitable consequences for their trust in the process.

This is part of a broader commitment to dignity and humanity that underpinned the process. For instance, actively listening to the parties and the communities they represent (to both what is being said and what is not being said) was prioritised throughout, particularly in light of insider mediator Namburete’s reflection on what was at stake for the parties (as opposed to the mediators):

The Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, aptly asked: “what is your vision for this country? In two or three years, you pack and you go. And me, I will stay here in this country. I have nowhere to go. It’s not a job. It’s not a game, it’s not another line on my CV, it’s life”.

The diversity of team members’ perspectives and identities ... embodied the diversity of experience and expertise required to understand the needs of the process.

Mediation teams

In addition to the personal values referred to above, the mediators also reflected on the importance of the team. Where mediation was once the purview of diplomats facilitating dialogue between state actors, modern peace mediation requires engagement with a multitude of different actors with different motivations and operating in different physical and metaphorical spaces. The team-based approach adopted in Mozambique enabled a shared and collective approach to the task. The diversity of team members’ perspectives and identities, ranging from those of a male Ambassador from Switzerland, to a female mediator from Kenya, to a male mediator from Mozambique, embodied the diversity of experience and expertise required to understand the needs of the process. This in turn generated a strong sense of shared purpose and commitment that was vital to keeping the process on track through any difficult times. Sanghrajka noted how this team dynamic also helped build trust with the parties.

If we had different opinions, we would share it. There was no party talking. There was no speaking from talking points or a book. Just as we got to know each other they got to know us ... we were aligned, but we were also very honest. When something didn’t work, when we couldn’t do something or when we did not know what to do, we were honest and we just said, “we don’t know”. And this is the hardest thing. I very rarely hear people say, “I don’t know” ... because it’s an ego thing, right?

The success of this peace mediation project depended on the ability of mediators to adapt to changing circumstances and to demonstrate collective leadership and creative thinking in the face of complex challenges and pressures. The psychological safety within the team was evident in team members’ ability to question one another – even disagree with one another – share mistakes as well as ideas, and be curious about possibilities they had not considered from their own position and role within the process. This built a strong bond of trust among the mediation team that also enabled them to build trust with the parties and contributed to the credibility of the team as whole over that of a single individual. The dynamics among the mediators stand out as a clear example of the value of a team-based approach to mediation.



Conclusion

The Maputo Accord has succeeded in many areas where previous initiatives failed. Notably, throughout the process facilitated by the mediation team, a ceasefire remained intact. The agreement itself addresses key issues such as the historic decision to provide pensions for ex-combatants (an issue cited as having given rise to dissatisfaction in Renamo ranks in 2012), an amnesty law for ex-combatants, and a gender-responsive disarmament programme²⁰ that includes social provisions such as identification documents, health-care provision, and stipends for demobilised fighters. In particular, the Maputo Accord process is considered a success not only because an agreement was reached, but more specifically because of the successful implementation of the agreement – and the DDR process in particular.

While the process also faced many challenges and setbacks, an overall lesson emerging from the debate about the Maputo Accord process relates to the need for more humility, empathy and creativity in mediation. The willingness of the mediation team to reject the standard form of the internationally backed peace process was key in creating the flexibility that was required to really listen and respond to what the parties were saying. This approach can only succeed when a strong team is willing to engage in a process in which there are no certainties and no guarantees of success. It also requires strong backing from key actors, such as funding states. The trust, consistency, and flexibility of core groups of donors and institutional champions of the process and mediators also demonstrated the courage to allow the team to “do things differently” and, as a result, enabled a successful process. There is a key lesson in this: the Maputo Accord presents a new approach and lessons for the research, policy, and practice field of mediation.

An overall lesson emerging from the debate about the Maputo Accord process relates to the need for more humility, empathy and creativity in mediation.



Endnotes

- 1 The term “Principals” refers to the highest-level representatives of primary parties to a conflict; in this context the President of Mozambique, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and the leaders of Renamo, the late Afonso Dhlakama and Ossufo Momade.
- 2 While a thorough contextual analysis of the Mozambican civil war and conflict dynamics is beyond the scope of this piece, it is central to understand how the mediation process was conducted against a historical backdrop of post-independence political state formation, centre-periphery politics and strong regional influences. See, for instance, Vines, “Violence, Peacebuilding, and Elite Bargains in Mozambique since Independence”, in T. McNamee and M. Muyangwa (eds), *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp.321-342; M. Cahen, “*Não Somos Bandidos*”: *A vida diária de uma guerrilha de direita*; *A Renamo na época do Acordo de Nkomati (1983-1985)*, Lisbon, ICS-Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2019; J. Sumich and J. Honwana, “Strong Party, Weak State? FRELIMO and State Survival through the Mozambican Civil War: An Analytical Narrative on Statemaking”, Working Paper No. 23, Crisis States Research Centre, 2007.
- 3 In May 2023, four years after the signing of the Maputo Accord, the GCSP hosted a debate on the theme of “Doing Things Differently: Mediating in Mozambique”. The debate brought together in Geneva the mediators behind the Maputo Accord: Mirko Manzoni, personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Mozambique and former Swiss Ambassador to Mozambique; Neha Sanghrajka, senior advisor to the process; and Eduardo Namburete, a national mediator and Renamo MP. Jonathan Powell of InterMediate was also a mediator in the early stages of the process. At this debate, the mediators reflected on the factors that had enabled the success of the Maputo Accord process in the context of an international mediation field in decline, characterised by fragmentation and societal polarisation. A recording of the debate can be found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCRxoKE3mTU>.
- 4 A. Vines, “Lessons Learned or Ignored: New Insights from the Mozambican Civil War”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.48(3), 2022, pp.605-613, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2022.2083859>.
- 5 See A. Vines, “Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?”, Chatham House, 5 August 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/prospects-sustainable-elite-bargain-mozambique-third-time-lucky>.
- 6 R. Saraiva, “Peace-making from Within: Adaptive Mediation of Direct Dialogue in Mozambique’s New Peace Process (2013–2019)”, in C. de Coning et al. (eds), *Adaptive Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Peace-making in Colombia, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Syria*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
- 7 The mediation team was made up of Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, linked to the Global Leadership Foundation, together with Jakaya Kikwete, former President of Tanzania, represented by Ibrahim Msambaho, Jonathan Powell of InterMediate (UK), and Neha Sanghrajka for CHD, the EU, which was represented by Mario Raffaelli (a former mediator in the 1992 peace process) and Ângelo Romano (Community of Sant’Egidio); the Vatican, represented by the apostolic nuncio in Maputo, Edgar Pena and the secretary of the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique and auxiliary bishop of Maputo, Dom João Carlos Hatoa Nunes; and three representatives of the President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, including Mandlenkosi Memelo and George Johannes of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid., 92).
- 8 For more on the nature of elite bargains in the Mozambican political context, for instance the manner in which Renamo extracts elite bargains from Frelimo towards a temporary political settlement, see Vines, 2021.
- 9 A. Vines, *As Perspectivas de um Acordo Sustentável entre as Elites em Moçambique [Perspectives on a Sustainable Agreement between Elites in Mozambique]*, Chatham House, 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-09-04-ElitePerspectivesMozambique-Portuguese.pdf>.
- 10 A. Duursma, “African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa”, *International Organization*, Vol.74(2), 2020, pp.295-330, doi:10.1017/S0020818320000041.
- 11 Members of the Contact Group were the Ambassadors to Mozambique of Switzerland, Botswana, China, the EU, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 12 For more, see C. De Coning, “Adaptive Mediation”, in C. De Coning et al. (eds), 2022, pp.19-56.
- 13 Vines, 2019.
- 14 B. Weimer and J. Carrilho, *A economia política da descentralização em Moçambique: dinâmicas, efeitos, desafios [The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Mozambique: Dynamics, Effects, Challenges]*, Maputo, IESE, 2017, https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/IESE_Political_Economy_of_Decentralisation_-_Livro.pdf.
- 15 S.J.A. Mason and M. Siegfried, “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in Peace Processes”, in *Managing Peace Processes: Process Related Questions. A Handbook for AU Practitioners*, Vol.1, Addis Ababa, African Union, and Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013, pp.57–77, <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AU-Handbook-Volume-I-Process-related-questions-July-2013.pdf>.
- 16 A. Hess Sargsyan and A. Möller-Loswick, *Redefining Peace Leadership Insights from Track One Women Negotiators and Mediators*, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Zurich, 2021.
- 17 C. McCauley, “Making Leadership Happen”, White Paper, Center for Creative Leadership, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.35613/ccl.2014.1004>.
- 18 For more on this notion of *protagonismo*, see M. Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- 19 Comments of Katia Papagianni, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, at the Geneva Security Debate.
- 20 Peace Process Support: The Secretariat, “Gender in the Mozambique Peace Process”, n.d., https://maputoaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Gender-in-the-Peace-Process_2023_compressed-1.pdf.

Building Peace Together

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Maison de la paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2D
P.O. Box 1295
1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 730 96 00
E-mail: info@gcsp.ch
www.gcsp.ch

ISBN: 978-2-88947-322-9



GCSP
Geneva Centre for
Security Policy