

The Role of Parliaments in Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Workshop Rapporteur: Marc Finaud



DCAF
a centre for security
development and
the rule of law



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra



The opinions and views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of the Swiss authorities or the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Copyright © Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011

The Role of Parliaments in Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Workshop Rapporteur: Marc Finaud

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international training centre for security policy based in Geneva. An international foundation with over 40 member states, it offers courses for civil servants, diplomats and military officers from all over the world. Through research, workshops and conferences it provides an internationally recognized forum for dialogue on timely issues relating to security and peace.

The Geneva Papers and *l'Esprit de Genève*

With its vocation for peace, Geneva is the city where international organizations, NGOs, and the academic community, working together, have the possibility of creating the essential conditions for debate and concrete action. The *Geneva Papers* intend to serve the same goal by promoting a platform for constructive and substantive dialogue.

Geneva Papers – Conference Series

The *Geneva Papers – Conference Series* was launched in 2008 with the purpose of reflecting on the main issues and debates of events organized by the GCSP.

It complements the *Geneva Papers – Research Series* (launched in 2011), whose purpose is to analyse international security issues that are relevant to GCSP training.

The *Geneva Papers – Conference Series* seeks to summarize and analyse international security issues discussed in conferences or workshops organized by the GCSP. It promotes dialogue on cutting-edge security topics, such as the globalization of security, new threats to international security, conflict trends and conflict management, transatlantic and European security, the role of international institutions in security governance, and human security. These issues are explored through the multiple viewpoints and areas of expertise represented in GCSP conference proceedings and by speaker presentations.

Drafts of the *Geneva Papers – Conference Series* are reviewed by the GCSP Review Committee.

All *Geneva Papers* are available online, at www.gcsp.ch/Resources-Publications/Publications

For further information, please contact:

Anne-Caroline Pissis, External Relations Manager: publications@gcsp.ch

Series Editor: Thierry Tardy

Copyright © Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011

Disclaimer

This report summarizes the contents of a workshop where different and at times opposing views were expressed by the participants. Its substance therefore does not necessarily reflect the positions of the organizers: the Swiss Confederation, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	6
Opening of the Workshop	11
Ambassador Georges Martin, Deputy State Secretary, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.....	11
Mr Geri Mueller, Member of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Committees of the Swiss National Council, Green Party.....	12
Mr Jacek Bylica, Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non- Proliferation Centre (WMDC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).....	13
Mr Marc Finaud, Special Advisor to the Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).....	13
Ambassador Theodor H. Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).....	15
Keynote Speakers	16
Baron Desmond Browne of Ladyton, Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom.....	16
Mr Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament, United Nations.....	22
Session 1: Overview, Current Status of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and Role of Parliament	29
Session 2: Policy Development	32
Sessions 3: Treaty-Making, Ratification, and Implementation	39
Session 4: Sanctions and Export Controls	43
Session 5: Governance	46
Conclusions: Next Steps for Parliaments	51

Annex 1: Catalogue of Good Practices on the Role of Parliament in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	52
Annex 2: Workshop Programme.....	56
Annex 3: List of Participants.....	59
Annex 4: Geneva Paper - Conference Series.....	63

Executive Summary

From 30 March to 1 April 2011, a high-level workshop was organized for parliamentarians from countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The topic of this event was “The Role of Parliaments in Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)”. It was a joint initiative of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre of NATO. Some thirty-five parliamentarians (including several former government ministers) from twenty-three countries attended the workshop along with the same number of staffers, government representatives, and independent experts (see List of Participants in Annex 3).

The aims of the workshop were the following:

- To promote the role of parliaments in arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of WMD through awareness raising among members of parliament about their role in these important policy areas;
- To increase transparency and accountability of arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of WMD;
- To exchange information on experiences, best practices, and tools related to the role of parliaments in disarmament, arms control, and the non-proliferation of WMD;
- To provide parliamentarians (including staffers) with the latest information on the current status and prospects of future arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD;
- To discuss and exchange views on strengthening the role of parliaments in disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation of WMD.

The workshop provided an opportunity to compare practices, depending on states’ policies and constitutional or institutional arrangements, in areas often regarded as technical or requiring secrecy, and are therefore generally left to

executive handling. Considering that the issues involved in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation are closely related to national security, defence expenditures, and procurement, but also to human security and the impact of arms reductions or the regulation of arms transfers on international security, there was a general consensus that parliamentarians, as elected representatives, had a critical role to play in those areas.

After discussing the current status of WMD and efforts in their control or elimination, the workshop focused in particular on the following areas where the role of parliaments and their individual members could be strengthened: policy development; treaty-making, ratification, and implementation; sanctions and export controls; and governance.

Under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution, the workshop allowed for a frank and substantive exchange of ideas on these issues. As a result of the discussion, several recommendations were formulated by participants with a view to strengthening the role of parliaments and promoting progress in those areas, stimulating or supporting government efforts and improving global peace and security. Those recommendations are summarized below, and listed in a “Catalogue of Good Practices” in Annex 1.

Keeping in mind the main objectives of the workshop, recommendations were formulated in the following areas: the roles and responsibilities of parliaments in security policy; difficulties and constraints in the fulfilment of these roles; and instruments and best practices at parliaments’ disposal.

1. Roles and Responsibilities of Parliaments

The workshop identified the following roles and responsibilities of parliaments:

- Oversee the government and hold it accountable for its policy decisions. As one participant phrased it: “We need vigorous parliamentary scrutiny”. The nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima was mentioned as an example of failed oversight;
- Challenge government policies and decisions, e.g. by parliamentary questions and motions;
- Support government positions in negotiations on disarmament and arms control, e.g. by parliamentary motions. The Norwegian Parliament, for instance, backed its government ahead of the negotiations on NATO’s New Strategic Concept;
- Make government activities more transparent. Transparency in turn contributes to creating confidence;

- Contribute to policy shaping and policy making, e.g. by introducing parliamentary motions. The Canadian Parliament, for instance, in December 2010 unanimously called on its government to engage in negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention;
 - Enact a legal framework in line with each state's international commitments in the areas of disarmament, arms control, and WMD non-proliferation;
 - Make appropriate decisions on the budget, including the defence budget.
- One participant summarized the role of parliaments as “bringing democracy and the rule of law to disarmament”.

2. Settings and Constraints

Parliaments are working within a political and legal framework when fulfilling their roles and responsibilities. This framework may be more or less forthcoming or challenging:

a) Constitutional and political constraints:

- In presidential systems, parliaments may have limited impact on security policy; they may be by-passed by presidential decrees;
- In authoritarian systems, parliaments have severely limited influence on government policies;
- Parliaments may have only reactive powers. This restricts their oversight function. Ex-post control of weapons exports is an example in that respect (“We are always one step behind”, one participant said);
- Budgetary authority may be limited to accepting or rejecting the budget as a whole. This reduces the possibility of shaping policies.

b) Limited access to information: “The acquisition of expertise may be a major challenge”, one participant stated:

- Parliaments may have limited access to independent information. They may depend on government sources and may thus have limited capability to challenge government positions;
- Parliaments might not have independent support structures at their disposal (e.g. parliamentary research services similar to the US Congressional Research Service).

c) Media pressure: media pressure on parliament and government may favour short-term policies. This makes the conduct of policy more difficult in any area. It may, however, affect security policy, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation more severely as these policy areas need more long-term coherence.

d) Specificities of security policy: “security policy is special”, as one participant phrased it. Security policy is characterized by secrecy and technicalities, which makes it difficult to challenge the security establishment.

e) Self-inflicted limitations: parliaments are not only constrained by outside factors. There are also self-inflicted conditions like lacking or insufficient technical expertise and missing political will to fully exert parliamentary oversight in security policy. One participant spoke of “passivity”.

Besides the aforementioned constraints, further factors impact positions and actions taken by parliamentarians, such as party policies and individual profiles. The workshop, for instance, opposed “realists”, who are in favour of an incremental approach towards disarmament, and “idealists”, who projected the vision of a world without arms.

3. Instruments and Best Practices

To live up to their responsibilities and overcome the aforementioned constraints, parliaments have a range of instruments at their disposal (“tool box”). There are different target groups of parliamentary activity, such as government, civil society, and third countries. These target groups have to be addressed with specific instruments:

a) Parliament

- Specialized parliamentary institutions may enhance impact on government policies: the following specialized bodies were presented at the workshop:
 - Arms Control Committee (United Kingdom);
 - Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation (Germany);
 - “Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence” (Norway). This committee allows parliament to discuss and shape foreign and security policy with government in “real time”. The committee meets in confidentiality;
- Parliamentary motions:
 - Parliamentary motions may be used to urge the government to act. They are especially effective if based on a unanimous decision. An example was given in section 1 above (Canada);
 - Motions may also serve to strengthen a government’s position, e.g. in negotiations. An example was given in section 1 above (Norway);
- Parliamentary questions. Tough questioning may induce policy shifts. At the workshop, an example in the area of weapons export policy was given.

b) Civil society: civil society is another target group for parliamentary action.

- Parliaments have the task to inform and educate citizens and civil society on security issues;
- Parliamentarians will try to influence public opinion ahead of public votes or referendums in plebiscitary systems (e.g. Switzerland);
- Parliamentarians may use tools like cultural or spiritual events to reach specific constituencies or to address specific problems. One participant explained how he had used such events to raise awareness on the need for nuclear disarmament in his country.

c) Third countries: parliaments play a role in foreign policy. They may use parliamentary diplomacy to:

- Contribute to confidence building;
- Promote regional security;
- Promote democratization;
- Exchange experiences with parliaments of other countries and learn from best practices of others.

d) NATO: several participants called for a reinforced engagement of parliaments with NATO policies. The NATO Security Concept and, more specifically, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and extended deterrence were mentioned as examples for parliamentary intervention. The following options were identified:

- Influence governments' policies on NATO (see instruments above);
- Work through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

e) "Missing tools": the "tool box" at the disposal of parliaments may lack instruments. This is principally due to three reasons:

- Limited constitutional authority;
- Limited expertise;
- Limited political will to fully exercise existing authority.

As one participant noted, the impact of parliaments on government policy depends on a "triple A": authority, ability, and attitude. Parliaments need the necessary constitutional authority to effectively oversee and influence governments in the area of security policy. They also need the necessary know-how as well as the political will to fulfil their roles and live up to their responsibilities.

Opening of the Workshop

The workshop was officially opened with welcoming addresses by representatives of the organizing institutions. A keynote address was then delivered by: Baron Desmond Browne of Ladyton, Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom; and Mr Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations.¹

Ambassador Georges Martin, Deputy State Secretary, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Geneva is the city both of disarmament and international humanitarian law (IHL); it thus offers an ideal venue to discuss arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of WMD. Geneva hosts the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which negotiated important agreements such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); this is also where most of the negotiations of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia took place. Geneva is also the city of IHL: the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005 are the main treaties applicable to armed conflicts and Switzerland is their depositary. Disarmament and IHL are two complementary approaches towards a safer world. Disarmament seeks to promote security through the elimination of some categories of weapons, whereas IHL aims to limit the effect of armed conflicts by prohibiting or limiting the use of weapons. In its disarmament policy, Switzerland distinguishes between conventional armaments and WMD.

With regard to conventional arms, Switzerland aims at disarmament, ensuring national and international security and stability at the lowest possible level of armaments; Switzerland promotes the elimination of some conventional weapons on the basis of humanitarian considerations. As for WMD, Switzerland is com-

¹ The welcoming and keynote addresses, as provided here, are transcriptions of the original addresses.

mitted to complete disarmament. Indeed those weapons have a negative impact on regional and international stability, and by their very nature, do not make a distinction between civilian and military targets. By definition, they massively destroy lives and goods. It is impossible to imagine any situation in which WMD would not have an impact on civilians. Their use would necessarily be a severe violation of IHL.

Contrary to chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons have yet to be prohibited by an international convention. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) admits a temporary possession of nuclear weapons by some states, while containing an obligation of disarmament. This obligation, for the most part, has not been complied with in the forty years of existence of the NPT. At the initiative of Switzerland, the humanitarian imperative was introduced into the sphere of the NPT: at the May 2010 Review Conference, it was recognized for the first time that any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. The same Conference also confirmed the duty for all states to abide by IHL at all times.

Parliaments have a hugely important role to play in disarmament, arms control, and the non-proliferation of WMD. They decide on budgets, and therefore on the size of weapons programmes; they approve or reject treaties, including on disarmament; and they vote confidence for or overthrow governments, thus confirming or discarding those governments' policies. Parliamentarians also influence their governments' security policy through work in the relevant committees or interventions in plenary sittings. Parliaments serve as interface between citizens and governments, including in security policy. Parliaments thus have at their disposal a whole spectrum of instruments to influence and control their states' security policy. This ability to control also generates responsibilities. This workshop should help to assess the instruments at the disposal of parliaments in the areas of arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of WMD. It aims at strengthening the role of parliaments in those vitally important areas through an exchange of experiences and the identification of best practices.

Mr Geri Mueller, Member of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Committees of the Swiss National Council, Green Party

People do not want war. Most conflicts imply the use of small arms and light weapons, which are called the "true weapons of mass destruction". Parliaments should seek a world that does not need enemies. This is possible; the end of the

Cold War saw two types of society move closer almost without bloodshed. Today, there is discrimination against Islam and Muslims, while the Arab Spring proves that simple patterns do not reflect the reality of these societies. Humanity needs to move towards a more peaceful world. It can achieve this by knowing better those who used to be called enemies.

Countries must stop exporting weapons. According to SIPRI, more than USD 1,500 billion were spent on military expenditures in 2009. Regarding military equipment, the main exporting countries are the United States and Western European states; countries controlled by their parliaments. Parliamentarians need to work with one another towards the goal of stopping weapons exports.

Mr Jacek Bylica, Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Non-adherence to international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments as well as some existing programmes to develop WMD and their means of delivery can undermine global norms and pose a threat to international security. Nuclear weapons and radiological and chemical agents that remain in the world could be vulnerable to exploitation if not properly secured. Rapid advances in biological science and technology continue to increase the bio-terrorism threat; and there are indications that terrorists intend to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials for malicious purposes. NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, assesses that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other WMD, and their means of delivery constitute threats with incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions. People are also acutely aware that modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire CBRN capabilities.

This meeting takes place almost exactly two years after the milestone speech delivered by the US President in Prague, where the future of nuclear weapons was again put very high on the international agenda. It is also one year after an important NPT Review Conference, which hopefully averted a disintegration of the global non-proliferation regime, and barely months after both the US Con-

gress and the Russian State Duma ratified the New START Treaty. Important as it is for maintaining strategic stability at lower levels of strategic armaments, this latter treaty has only increased the appetite in many quarters for further reductions in nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon-states.

NATO, according to its New Strategic Concept, seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. It is resolved to seek a safer world for all and, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. It will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future. However, any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons. In any future reductions, the aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.

Recent dramatic events in Fukushima, as a quarter of century ago in Chernobyl, underscore the need for great humility in the face of the forces of nature, as well as for deep thoughtfulness and special care when dealing with the power of the atom whose both constructive and destructive potential is enormous.

Participants in this workshop are exactly the sort of people who understand the challenges of dealing with an extremely important policy issue on which expertise tends to be concentrated in closed military or government establishments. So the challenge of assuring democratic, parliamentary oversight, based on an informed public debate, is especially great. At the same time, these are also the people who understand the value of sharing expertise and experience, both good and not-so-good. Both kinds are useful: sometimes one can learn a lot from someone's negative experience, such as how to avoid certain mistakes or pitfalls.

Mr Marc Finaud, Special Advisor to the Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
The GCSP is an international foundation and a Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) Training Centre with 42 member states, training mainly government officials (civil

and military) in all aspects of security policy, including arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. It trains some 500-600 people per year, and with its research and outreach activities, increasingly involves civil society. Indeed, civil society demonstrated its importance in the process of banning antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions and is actively contributing to the future negotiation on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Jointly with parliaments, civil society can now also play a more active role in the area of WMD.

Ambassador Theodor H. Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

The topic of this workshop is both timely and most relevant. It fits very well within the mandate of DCAF to promote democratic accountability and transparency. This mandate obviously must also include weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – the most powerful and difficult weapons – and their governance.² Transparency and accountability are two major principles of democratic governance and they are indispensable for achieving arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both at the national and international levels. Indeed, at the national level, accountability and transparency are instruments and a precondition for the domestic constituencies to assure that arms control obligations are lived up to, chances for disarmament seized, and the objective of non-proliferation is actively pursued. From this point of view, accountability and transparency at the national level reinforce the international regime's aiming at a world without WMD. No less important is the role parliaments in nuclear-weapon states must play in the development of nuclear doctrines, the control of nuclear arsenals, and their safety. In this context, people's thoughts are with Japan; which was hit by the triple catastrophe of an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear disaster. The disaster that has struck Japan will need to be analysed in detail. Yet some conclusions appear evident already now. The most obvious is that oversight has dramatically failed. Japan was sure that its nuclear power plants were at the cutting edge with respect to safety. They were not. The civilian and military uses of nuclear energy are two very different topics, yet they share some fundamental

² DCAF is a foundation under Swiss law. It is at the crossroads between an NGO and an international organization. Its 59 member states (including all NATO countries except Iceland and most PfP states) have mandated DCAF to support governments and international organizations in their efforts to reform their security sectors in accordance with the principles of democratic governance, the rule of law, and human rights.

aspects – the most crucial of which is the need for accountability and transparency. These two pillars of good governance are paramount to both civilian and military use of nuclear energy in order to avoid disaster, as well as to assure that governments and their national agencies are functioning according to the publicly stated policy objectives, national laws, and international obligations.

Going back to the agenda of this workshop, parliaments do play and must play an important role in implementing and bringing the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agenda to the next level. Only parliaments can give full democratic legitimacy to this very important policy field. Their role is vital in debating and questioning existing policies, as well as requesting and approving new policies and legislation. This workshop should lead to an exchange of best practices, opinions, and ideas among parliamentarians, as well as to identify the future roles of parliaments.

Keynote Speakers

Baron Desmond Browne of Ladyton, Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom

The world is in need of more high quality work on how it might build international peace and security, and more work, in particular, on the theme of parliamentary engagement and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Much of that work already goes on in this city: Geneva has a special place in international efforts to address these issues. This workshop addresses two related and timely themes. I am a parliamentarian who previously held responsibility for my country's armed forces, including responsibility for nuclear weapons strategic deterrence, but I am also a passionate believer in the necessity of arms control and multilateral disarmament. Many would have us believe that one can either be hard-headed and committed to defence and national security, on the one hand, or be committed to disarmament on the other, and that it is not credible or possible to be seriously committed to both. I reject that absolutely. The time has come for multilateral disarmament to be a centrepiece of the national and international security strategies of all nations and for parliamentarians to play a more sustained and better informed role in bringing this change about. This is an urgent task: in the next two decades and beyond, the world is likely to be faced with growing proliferation risks, new biological weapon strains, a continuing threat from chemical weapons, and the possible deployment of military assets into space. And as

the international community seeks to manage these challenges, it will have to do so in a world in which the balance of power is shifting rapidly from West to East and from North to South.

Modern history is not well endowed with examples of the international community managing large processes of change in a peaceful manner; rather to the contrary, periods of change have resulted far too often in periods of war. There are very significant challenges ahead for all parliamentarians and for the international community at large. But the military and security establishments already do enormously valuable work in helping to address these challenges. They not only protect people in their home countries and beyond, but also frequently carry out humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping work that saves the lives of many others around the world. They serve with dedication and bravery and they are doing so right now across the world, particularly in Afghanistan and over the skies of Libya. The currently serving military personnel deserve an enormous debt of gratitude for the work they are prepared to do. However, military and security institutions, like all institutions, can become trapped in old ways of doing things and in old ways of thinking. They can come to view their own role of delivering defence and security as a technical one, in which only their views, the views of the experts, have merit. They can come to view political engagement as an unwelcomed and sometimes ill-informed interference. And when they do this, they need to be challenged. The relationship between elected politicians and the defence and security establishment needs to be rebalanced. The military, security, and diplomatic institutions deserve the utmost respect and must be resourced and allowed to do their duty professionally, but politics and public accountability must also reach into the heart of defence and security policy to ensure that this policy is accountable to those that it is made to serve.

Part of the old and deeply embedded thinking about today is related to disarmament. Many of the professionals and experts have come to view disarmament as the option preferred only by those who do not understand the real dangers the world faces. It is seen as a utopian vision. Again, this needs to be challenged. It is possible to see defence and disarmament as part of the same coordinated process building trust and security; a process in which disarmament reinforces rather than competes with defence. This coordination is not easy to achieve because it

requires a change in the way security is viewed, nor is it helped by the tendency, in many countries, to compartmentalize the two between ministries of Defence and those of Foreign Affairs and between force partners, on one hand, and arms controllers on the other. But one must nevertheless do it. The question is how to articulate the need for change and to overcome the obstacles to that change in practice.

First, why is disarmament necessary now more than ever and what role can political leadership play in pursuing this goal? What could NATO itself do to address the disarmament issue? Nuclear weapons pose the most serious challenge and the problems they face for parliamentary input and influence are replicated in other areas of security policy. Further, which challenges confront members of parliament in playing a more active role in furthering the aims of disarmament and its associated measures? How can the desired rebalancing effect between parliamentarians and security professionals be achieved in practice? Finally, what about the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, an organization that can play a positive role in this area?

First, the strategic environment in which the world finds itself today makes the case for disarmament both more compelling and more difficult to achieve. Nowhere is this truer than in the field of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons remains the most awesome and terrifying force; and their proliferation, the most serious danger the world faces. The international community must address not only possible further proliferation to countries like Iran and the expansion of the North Korean arsenal, but possibly as a result, the threat of regional proliferation cascades in the Middle East and East Asia. There is also a potential threat from nuclear armed terrorist groups and, given the planned expansion of civil nuclear power internationally (events at the Fukushima plant in Japan notwithstanding), of increased stocks of fissile material being generated globally without always being kept secure. There is an increasing danger on this point to the extent that if nuclear weapons are not eradicated, they will get used. This has been the conclusion of the four senior American statesmen who have launched their initiative for a world without nuclear weapons,³ the precursor to

3 In an essay published in 2007 in the *Wall Street Journal*, completed by a series of articles (published in January 2008, January 2010, and March 2011), former US Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of Defence William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn developed a strategy to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

President Obama's speech. There are those who ask why the world did not hear about this from these people when they were in positions of power? Yet it should be remembered that twenty years before, two world leaders in offices of very different political persuasions had both come to the same conclusion. At a meeting in Reykjavik in 1986, President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev came close to agreeing to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, to the dismay of many of their officials. The meeting in Reykjavik failed to achieve their aims, but it laid the foundation for future agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 1987. Their meeting also demonstrated that the problem of nuclear weapons requires vision, the ability to see beyond a narrow phase of orthodoxy, but above all, leadership by personal engagement. This is why President Obama's endorsement in his speech of the vision of a world without nuclear weapons is so important.

Vision is one thing, but implementation is another. There are some immediate matters of substance on NATO's agenda. Right now, NATO could do more in a number of areas to turn vision into reality. In the first place, it could change its language. Continuing to state that "as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance" does not send the right message. That language might as well be reversed and say that "as long as we, NATO, maintain a safe and secure arsenal in NATO, nuclear weapons will continue to exist". NATO should tighten its strategic policy, such that the stated rule of NATO nuclear weapons is to respond to a nuclear attack on the Alliance itself and nothing more. The Alliance has found itself in the almost impossible position of having a declaratory policy that is different from the declaratory policy of the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the primary providers of nuclear weapons to its collective defence. This is an issue that needs to be resolved sooner rather than later. Furthermore, NATO should explore far more actively ways of reducing and eventually eliminating US sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Some challenges have to be managed here, but the solution that was proposed is not necessarily in the right way forward. There are challenges in terms of reassuring some allies about the strength of the collective security guarantee and maintaining the transatlantic link. However, with creative thinking these challenges can be managed. NATO should give more substance to the new disarmament committee mandated by the

Lisbon Declaration. Once established, this committee could perform several roles. It could provide a venue for consultations with the United States on its bilateral negotiations with Russia. It could play a more effective coordinating role and could produce assessments of where NATO and its members stand on the various arms control activities. Finally, NATO and Russia could work harder together to revive the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) regime in order to achieve greater transparency in conventional forces. This, along with cooperation with Russia on ballistic missile defence, would contribute to trust building and help to create an environment in which deeper cuts to nuclear weapons will become possible.

Coming to the role of parliamentarians in this policy area, the major impediment to parliamentary involvement in the fields of deterrence, defence, and disarmament lies in the acquisition of the expertise necessary to challenge and hold accountable the views of the professionals. One of the central problems here is that defence and security are not just another spending department of legislative oversight. Defence is special in the sense that it affects decisions to commit lives and expenditure to the nation's defence. This "specialness" provides the executive with an excuse for confidentiality and secrecy, which can compound the problem of resistance to political engagement that can be found among security and defence professionals. If defence is special, then nuclear defence is even more special and specialized, and the expertise confined to an even smaller group of people. The challenges are not insurmountable. However, some areas related to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons require technical or operational expertise, but judgements about the role of these weapons in national security strategy and the relevance of nuclear deterrence to current threats are essentially political judgements. The operational and technical experts are not necessarily well placed or placed at home to make these judgements. Acquiring the degree of competence and confidence to challenge the experts in this area is not easy given the competing demands on parliamentarians' time, but it can be done. Parliamentarians need the help of appropriate support mechanisms, such as access to independent advice, research departments, institutes, think tanks, an inquisitive media, and an active non-governmental organization network. This form of assistance is essential in order to provide alternative sources of information and to avoid undue reliance on official government sources. The questions par-

liamentarians have to ask themselves, however, is why they are not doing more to put these mechanisms in place. Why do they have too few support structures, nationally and internationally, to help parliamentarians in this area? Why is it that very few parliaments around the world even have a parliamentary disarmament committee? The German parliamentarians are to be commended for having established such a committee, but it is the exception rather than the rule.

Parliamentarians have too often accepted the argument that this agenda is beyond their competence. They have not challenged the experts enough and they have not invested enough in the structures they need to challenge them with confidence. This state of affairs has to change quickly. Armed forces and security professionals can manage some of the symptoms and consequences of international mistrust, tension, and conflict, but real solutions to the challenges the world faces must be political. Senior military officers continually say from environments of conflict around the world that this cannot be resolved by force alone. The answers to those problems often lie in the political sphere. Parliamentarians have to take responsibility for and play a more active role in arguing for policies that give greater visibility to disarmament; they have to give political leadership to disarmament because without it, success is impossible.

This is why the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (ELN) was created. This organization is attempting to practice some of the ideas discussed today. It brings together leadership figures from across the continent, including from Russia and Turkey, with expertise and experience to share. It is partnering with think tanks like the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw to combine political leadership with analytical expertise. It is using this combination of skills to challenge strategic orthodoxy, to build public awareness and political capability on disarmament issues, and to perform a public education function. The intention is that the ELN will increasingly become a clearinghouse for expertise on political engagement in disarmament issues and it will increasingly support parliamentarians who want help to work toward the disarmament agenda. The ELN is open to partnership, working with all those who share this vision, because it is not enough to identify the challenges and obstacles to change; politics, if it is about anything, is about solutions.

Mr Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament, United Nations

The organizers of this workshop are to be commended for recognizing the important contributions in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation by parliaments whose deliberations provide an opportunity to ensure accountability in performing international commitments. Parliaments are involved in ratifying treaties, appropriating funds, adopting legislation to implement treaty commitments, helping to educate the public, and in serving as a bridge between civil society and national governments. In short, they have crucial roles to play in bringing both democracy and the “rule of law” to disarmament. Predictions are difficult in this area because there are a lot of unknowns about future intentions and capabilities, and hard facts can at times be difficult to find. A good starting point for thinking about the future of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation is to examine the implementation of past commitments and to consider what more is needed to fulfil them. Achievements – there have been many. There are, first of all, two multilateral conventions approaching universal membership that outlaw biological and chemical weapons. These conventions have established – and are helping to sustain – a global taboo against the very existence of such weapons. Today, nobody is boasting the vital benefits of such weapons for national security or insisting upon the legality of using them, and nobody is putting forward chemical or biological weapons as a means to maintain a doctrine of extended deterrence to defend allies. With respect to nuclear weapons, there is the impressive statistic of 190 states that have joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognizing that North Korea has announced its withdrawal. The NPT contains specific legal obligations relating to non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and negotiations on nuclear disarmament – goals in each of these areas were included in a 64-point Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. While the treaty does not outlaw nuclear weapons per se, the International Court of Justice has interpreted Article VI of the NPT as encompassing not only the duty to “pursue negotiations in good faith”, but also the responsibility to bring such negotiations to a conclusion.

Yet there still is no nuclear weapons convention nor are there any negotiations underway in nuclear disarmament, as proposed by UN Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon in his five-point proposal of 24 October 2008.⁴ And despite many other calls worldwide to commence such negotiations – which are required by the NPT’s Article VI – and to establish timelines for achieving disarmament goals, such proposals continue to be opposed by many, including nuclear-weapon-states and their allies. In contrast to this legal obligation and many policy statements on nuclear disarmament, robust nuclear-weapon “modernization” activities are underway in all possessor states, backed by concrete, long-term plans extending decades into the future. Forty-one years after the NPT entered into force (1970), it remains true that no nuclear weapons have been destroyed pursuant to treaty commitments, which so far have focused only on limiting deployments. Instead, over 20,000 nuclear weapons reportedly remain and nuclear deterrence – practiced either unilaterally or through alliance commitments – remains a security doctrine covering over half of humanity. Even the posture of nuclear “first-use” persists in several countries and many nuclear weapons remain on high-alert status. Meanwhile, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not yet in force and negotiations are not yet underway on a fissile material treaty, a vision originally pursued over a half century ago. As a consequence, the world is a long way from achieving “global zero”.

Furthermore, this mixed track record is hardly limited to the elimination of nuclear bombs and warheads as the rule of law, with respect to delivery systems for nuclear weapons, is even less developed. There are no multilateral treaties addressing long-range missiles, heavy bombers, or missile-launching submarines and the only bilateral treaty addressing missile defence systems – the ABM Treaty – is no longer in force. There are also no treaties banning space weapons, though the Outer Space Treaty does ban the orbiting of WMD and their stationing anywhere in outer space. To be sure, there will be many opportunities for multilateral cooperation in the next few years to address some of these shortcomings and nobody should conclude that past setbacks will dictate outcomes of the future. This applies not just to disarmament efforts involving WMD. These opportunities include:

- The Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which will get underway in December 2011;
- The convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East;

4 UN Secretary-General, “Contagious Doctrine of Deterrence Has Made Non-Proliferation More Difficult, Raised New Risks, Secretary-General Says in Address to East-West Institute”, 24 October 2008 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm>).

- The first meeting in 2012 of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference;
- An international meeting in 2012 to negotiate a multilateral Arms Trade Treaty (ATT);
- The fifth Biennial Meeting of States in 2012 to implement the Programme of Action against illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons;
- The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013.

Yet the future of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation will not be determined solely by what transpires at large gatherings such as these. Progress will remain driven by the policies and priorities of states; and this is an area where the activities of the international diplomatic community and civil society must have some real impact if disarmament will have any hope of moving forward in the years ahead. At present, virtually all the key components of the UN disarmament machinery are facing significant difficulties because of the lack of a consensus in state policies. The Conference on Disarmament – the world’s sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations – has been deadlocked for the last thirteen years; the UN Disarmament Commission – a purely deliberative body – has also been unable to reach a substantive consensus in over a decade; and the nuclear-weapon-related resolutions of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly continue to be adopted only by deeply divided votes. With this UN disarmament machinery locked in chronic conflicts over competing priorities and policies, some states have proposed that the next step for building multilateral norms should take place through actions of “coalitions of the willing”. Similar reasoning led groups of states to conclude the Ottawa Convention on landmines and the Oslo Convention on cluster munitions. Some states have proposed this approach if the Conference on Disarmament is unable to commence negotiations on a fissile material treaty. This was a theme found in several statements made at the UN’s High Level Meeting in September 2010 on Revitalising the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. Of course, if states do conclude that the best way forward in constructing new multilateral disarmament norms is through small steps by like-minded states, then the problem will inevitably arise of how to convert these ad hoc agreements into universal norms. This problem becomes more challenging when states are asked to join regimes that they had no role in creating and to adopt standards that

they may not regard as fully equitable. Such initiatives can give rise to questions of both their legitimacy and efficacy.

In looking ahead, one should also consider what might be the full implications of efforts that attempt to disaggregate specific weapons challenges into problems susceptible to their own unique solutions. This kind of piecemeal approach to disarmament and non-proliferation challenges inevitably raises questions about how these various efforts and so-called “partial measures” can be integrated into a broader multilateral framework. In the past, the world community has on three occasions been able to assemble for a fully comprehensive examination of the multilateral institutions and priorities in the field of disarmament. These occurred at the UN General Assembly’s Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD), which took place in 1978, 1982, and 1988. The two latter Sessions ended without agreement. The First Special Session, however, produced by consensus a very valuable Final Document. More than thirty years have elapsed, and even though there is today widespread recognition of the difficulties facing each of the various institutions comprising the UN disarmament machinery, there is still no consensus that holding a Fourth Special Session on Disarmament is the best way to address those concerns. Long ago, efforts to integrate disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation were widely viewed in the context of the broader framework of “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (GCD), which the General Assembly declared in 1978 was the UN’s “ultimate objective”. Although GCD is a concept found in over a dozen multilateral treaties – including the NPT – it is scarcely mentioned today, except perhaps as a rationale for postponing nuclear disarmament until all other challenges of international peace and security can be resolved first. Yet if one considers, just for a moment, what GCD means, the more sense it makes as an integrating device for organizing multilateral cooperation towards agreed goals. The goals of GCD are not as utopian or unrealistic as the term implies. The concept entails the simultaneous pursuit of efforts to eliminate all WMD – nuclear, chemical, and biological – while also working to limit and to regulate conventional armaments. These echo the goals found in the UN Charter of pursuing “disarmament” and the “regulation of armaments”. There is a solid basis of logic and experience in pursuing both of these goals together, as opposed to pursuing them sequentially, with one serving as some

kind of precondition for the other. In their recent op-ed of 7 March 2011 in the *Wall Street Journal*, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn stated that “A world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today’s world minus nuclear weapons”. The same could be said about a world without WMD in general – the goal of the whole business of disarmament is to strengthen international peace and security, not simply to destroy a particular type of weaponry as an end in itself. This argues powerfully for returning to an approach that seeks to combine and integrate WMD disarmament with conventional arms controls – without sacrificing one to the other or holding one hostage to the other. Both should be pursued concurrently as interdependent paths to a more secure world. Without such a comprehensive approach, the international community may well find itself engaging in multiple processes without purposes, or in “redoubling our effort when we have forgotten our aim” – words that the philosopher George Santayana once offered to define fanaticism. Collective action could become impossible because of competing demands that various preconditions must first be met before progress can proceed. This is a recipe not just to postpone disarmament indefinitely, but to ensure a perpetual stalemate in the evolution and growth of global multilateral norms in disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation. In other words, international peace and security is not a precondition for disarmament to occur: it is instead strengthened by disarmament.

As President Obama stated in his speech in Prague in April 2009, the international community should be seeking “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” – which is quite different from saying that it should be seeking peace and security as a precondition for disarmament to occur. One needs, therefore, to consider more closely how progress can be sustained as a dynamic process in these fields and how concrete steps forward in nuclear disarmament can build confidence that will permit not only further steps forward in that direction, but can also enable progress in alleviating threats posed by other types of weaponry, including missiles and other delivery systems, space weapons, and conventional arms. One needs to consider more closely what kind of examples are being set for tomorrow by the current policies of today – in particular regarding the various rationales for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and claims of their unparalleled effectiveness in ensuring national security interests.

Such policies and practices virtually invite their further spread in the world – and, as it is well known, ideas and concepts proliferate just as readily as weaponry, if not more so. One needs to consider what kind of world would exist, as suggested in the *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, if the great destiny of “global zero WMD” were ever actually achieved. Would the world be facing never-ending conventional wars based on regional or sub-regional conventional arms races and rivalries? How would security and stability be maintained – to the dubious extent it applies today – in a world without nuclear deterrence? What would be needed to strengthen compliance with the other fundamental norms of the UN Charter, in particular those that prohibit the threat or use of force against other states and that require the peaceful settlement of disputes? Serious consideration should be given to these questions, and the place to do so is at the United Nations in a fully multilateral environment.

The concept of GCD offers us clues about how to answer these questions. In the specific case of nuclear disarmament, the world community has made it clear – notably through UN General Assembly resolutions and NPT consensus documents – that it should be achieved in a manner that satisfies certain agreed multilateral criteria or standards. These include irreversibility, transparency, verification, universality, and binding commitments. Clearly, disarmament arrangements satisfying such rigorous standards would significantly enhance confidence in compliance. But they would do much more. They would enhance the world’s ability to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons because there would be no double standards as “zero” would mean zero for all. It is far easier to prevent the development of weapons whose very existence is prohibited and illegitimate, than it is to attempt to maintain forever a discriminatory regime of have and have-not states. This is why disarmament – achieved consistently with these standards – is best viewed as both a responsible national security policy and as a significant and credible means to strengthen international peace and security overall.

All who are involved with NATO policy, work in NATO institutions, and all who are cooperating with NATO through the Partnership for Peace are to be warmly encouraged to build on the progress made at the present conference today by raising the profile and priority of disarmament in parliamentary work. The official website of the NATO Partnership for Peace identifies several subjects as

“activities on offer” under the programme “defence-related work, defence reform, defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster-response, and cooperation on science and environmental issues”.⁵ Surely the time has come for the term “disarmament” to be added to this list. This would help ensure that this conference becomes part of an unfolding process of strengthening security through disarmament – one of the greatest challenges of this time.

5 NATO, “The Partnership for Peace programme”, 2011 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm).

Session 1: Overview, Current Status of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and Role of Parliament

This first session aimed at giving an overview of the current status and future trends in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation. It addressed the scope, opportunities, and various roles that parliaments can play (i.e. legislative, budgetary, and oversight roles) as well as the main challenges for parliament, for example, lack of statutory powers, lack of information, lack of expertise and staff, and limited or no access to classified information. The main points discussed were:

- What are the main threats and challenges related to WMD today?
- What are the main national and international responses in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation (treaties, initiatives, international cooperation, etc.)?
- What is the main role of parliament in this important field and what are the main challenges for parliament to fulfil or to expand its role?

One expert described the status of WMD in today's world. She asked whether nuclear weapons were not just a remnant of the Cold War. Why can they not just be eliminated? Can their use be imagined? Their possessors claim that nuclear weapons are conceived as a deterrent to potential attackers and thus prevent war. However, belief in nuclear deterrence creates an environment of fear, which is the primary delay in nuclear disarmament. Evidence for the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is anecdotal at best. Most of the responses that have been proposed so far are technical solutions, but parliamentarians will be held to account if preventative action is not taken: is the international system prepared to deal with a catastrophe? International humanitarian law aims at protecting civilians and therefore requires results: it will not allow nuclear arms possessors to remain comfortable. Removing the source of the problem would mean to outlaw nuclear weapons. Indeed, there are no boundaries to any use of nuclear weapons: it would affect

all populations everywhere. Another question is: what would be the impact of keeping nuclear weapons but encouraging others not to acquire them (as the NPT does)? There is a shift from this paradigm based on faulty information (the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence) to the requirement of nuclear disarmament for the benefit of all humanity.

One parliamentarian considered that President Obama has opened a space for dialogue never seen before. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's five-point plan includes the negotiation of a convention that would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. Indeed, an incremental approach will never bring about nuclear disarmament: the proponents of the step-by-step approach see disarmament as an "eventual" goal. But how can nuclear proliferation be stopped while maintaining current arsenals? What is needed is a global legal ban on all nuclear weapons. The world must refuse to wait for the obliteration of a city to take action. Political cooperation will break down under nuclear hegemony. A participant invited all parliamentarians to call for a diplomatic conference in 2014 to commence the negotiation of a framework convention. The organization named "Mayors for Peace" is calling for at least an outline on a nuclear weapons convention by 2020: parliaments should encourage their governments to co-sponsor such a resolution. Indeed, states need to be encouraged and feel in "good company". In Canada, 550 members of the Order of Canada have participated in pressing the government to support the UN Secretary-General's plan; this has resulted in a motion for a Canadian diplomatic mission on disarmament and support for the UN plan, which was unanimously adopted. Canada will now work actively for nuclear disarmament and parliamentarians will work together on an issue of global importance. Concretely, what can parliamentarians do? They should get their governments to endorse the Secretary-General's plan and work for its implementation. They should get their governments to explicitly endorse a nuclear weapons convention and encourage other governments who have already made progress. There has already been a backlash on the effort of the proponents of nuclear deterrence: NATO still considers that nuclear weapons are the "supreme guarantee" of its security and that, as long as any other state has them, then NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. However, the New Strategic Concept commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons and includes arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation into the Alliance's missions.

According to another Member of Parliament (MP), parliaments think that they

can only have some general influence but not on anything concrete. However, in Germany an absolute majority was found to endorse a nuclear weapons convention despite German representatives' vote against it at the UN. There is a Disarmament and Arms Control Subcommittee in the German Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Disappointing to parliamentarians was the approach to nuclear weapons in NATO's New Strategic Concept. However, NATO has also recently set up an Arms Control Committee, although more transparency in NATO's policy is still needed. Regarding non-proliferation, a decision will be taken soon on whether to accept India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group without even a requirement to sign the CTBT nor a cap on its production of weapons-grade fissile material. US ratification of the CTBT is essential to encourage other countries to join. The step-by-step approach to the process of nuclear disarmament has been agreed since 1995 in most parliaments, but discussion on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons ("the nuclear winter") has regrettably vanished. What is needed is a series of regional processes to discuss disarmament and arms control with confidence-building measures, in order to support other regional processes.

Another parliamentarian welcomed the increasing number of discussions on disarmament and the present workshop as yet a new forum. He underlined that parliaments are not limited to addressing national defence policy; they also have the role of discussing the subject of security in international bodies. He considered that Russia was very pleased with the New START Treaty, especially because it was balanced for both countries, with strengthening effects beyond the United States and Russia. It also helped with non-proliferation. He warned against upsetting the delicate balance established in the treaty, including in its preamble, between offensive and defensive arms. A new level of disarmament has been reached, but special attention will be paid to the placement of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. One can hope for full implementation on both sides and any problems to be solved in the bilateral process. This treaty will allow us to examine future disarmament within the commitment to global nuclear zero. One will need to ensure that no nuclear weapon is deployed on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states. Parliamentarians should be involved in further efforts for a dialogue between civil society and governments so as to promote progress in disarmament; taking into account all factors of risks, threats, conventional armaments, and the nuclear weapons of all possessor states.

Session 2: Policy Development

The second session aimed at exploring the role of parliaments in policy development, implementation, and evaluation in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation. It also explored the question of why parliament should play a proactive role in facilitating and initiating policy in this domain. The main discussion points were the following:

- What are current and recent policy initiatives in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation?
- What role do parliaments across the world play in developing, implementing, and evaluating policy in this field (“from idea to practice”)?
- What are the major challenges to parliament playing a meaningful role in policy development (e.g. lack of expertise, constitutional limitations, lack of staff, or limited access to classified information)? How can parliament’s role be strengthened?

One MP considered that when President Obama set out the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, he did an enormous service to all parliamentarians who had been struggling to raise the profile of debate on these issues and lift them up the order of national and international priorities. A similar debt of gratitude is owed to George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, and Sam Nunn, who had launched a review of the conventional wisdom about the value of nuclear weapons and the risks of proliferation.⁶ Although grass-roots activity on these issues is important and individual or collective efforts of parliamentarians are essential, they are no substitute for leadership at the highest level of national policy-making. The converse can be demonstrated by the eight years of George W. Bush’s presidency. So leadership does matter, most particularly in countries that possess a nuclear weapons capability. For a number of decades the debate in Great Britain was an exercise in futility. It was dominated first by the government, whether Conservative or Labour, which was determined to hang on to “Britain’s

⁶ See footnote 3.

nuclear deterrent” and ensure that relevant decisions were taken as far away from the public view and with as little parliamentary debate as possible. This reflected the fact, particularly on the Labour side, that these decisions were deeply divisive in party terms. The second group was made up of those who wanted Great Britain to give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally, irrespective of what was happening in the rest of the world. It tended to be deeply hostile toward general US and NATO foreign policy objectives, even outside the nuclear field, which did not help them to gain wider support. The debate was futile because its outcome was always predictable – the victory of the first group – and because a black-and-white debate of that sort crowded out any calm, deliberative consideration of wider issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Anyway, this belongs to the past, as is illustrated by the recent establishment of a number of all-party groupings – the Top Level Group and the Trident Commission, set up to look into the future of Great Britain’s nuclear weapons. A lesson from this experience is the need to avoid too black-and-white of an approach to these issues if one wants to achieve a serious debate and consideration of the policy choices. In non-nuclear-weapon-states, it is not difficult to achieve a wide consensus that nuclear weapons must be abolished and are, effectively, evil. But those are not particularly useful conclusions to reach in terms of negotiating potential in a world where there are far too many nuclear weapons already and where those who have them tend to have broad national support for their retention.

So what can parliamentarians do to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons while recognizing that the road towards that objective is a long one, strewn with obstacles and possibly setbacks? What should they be working for? First of all, it is important to move these subjects away, at least in debating terms, from negotiations dominated by abstruse and difficult to explain or understand technical issues and away from the “alphabet soup” of acronyms, which has no meaning for ordinary people or even for the average parliamentarian. Obviously, negotiations and issues of verification need to be handled by technically qualified people, but these people and their political masters need to be subjected to rigorous parliamentary scrutiny and need to be required to explain themselves in broad political terms to audiences that cannot simply be baffled by science and technical expertise. Second, there needs to be a determined effort to

raise the priority given to disarmament and proliferation issues in each country's foreign policy and to better understand how they relate to wider foreign policy questions. The case of the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea illustrates this need. Preventing these two countries from successfully breaking out from the non-proliferation regime requires looking beyond the narrow limits of nuclear policy and involves wider considerations of security and the future role that these two countries might expect to play in their respective regions. Similarly, the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ) cannot sensibly be separated from the state of negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

Raising the priority of all these issues and widening the perspective in which they are considered are clearly objectives to which parliamentary activity can contribute. This is what the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-proliferation in the British parliament seeks to achieve. In the recent past, it had speakers from a wide range of countries including both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. This too is what general, topical debates in Parliament seek to achieve. Beyond those activities in national parliaments, there clearly is both the scope and the need for greater collective activity by parliamentarians in support of the "Obama agenda": further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons beyond the New START Treaty, the bringing in of the other three recognized nuclear-weapon states, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the reduction in the prominence of nuclear weapons in the defence doctrines of all possessor states, strengthened measures against further proliferation, and the beginning of a sustainable negotiating process at the 2012 conference on a MENWFZ. But for such collective activity to be genuinely effective and useful, it needs to: reach out to and include former military leaders, diplomats, and representatives from the three non-NPT possessor states; look beyond the confines of fully democratic countries with properly functioning parliamentary systems; and listen to the views of those with contrary opinions.

The continuing turmoil in the countries of the Middle East – which is not set to subside any time soon – will certainly complicate the task of carrying out the mandate agreed unanimously at last year's NPT Review Conference to hold a MENWFZ conference in 2012. The risk is that Israel, which seems to be turning

in on itself in horrified alarm at what is going on with its Arab neighbours and is therefore reacting purely defensively, and the new governments in those neighbouring states, which are more sensitive to public opinion's hostile attitude towards Israel and towards Israeli possession of nuclear weapons, will singly slide into a confrontation that will raise the temperature in a region already near the boiling point and add one more to the range of issues that appear to be insoluble. So, avoiding that worst-case scenario must be an important objective; and it is high time that a UN facilitator be given the task of doing just that. More positively, there is a need to make the 2012 conference the first step in a process whose end-date it will probably be impossible to predict but whose end objective, an MENWFZ, needs to be kept alive, however unpromising the short-term political background.

As for Iran and North Korea, it is hard to be optimistic in the short term but necessary to avoid a degree of pessimism that overwhelms rational calculation. In both cases, the use of military force surely remains a worst-case scenario that risks unleashing a whole range of unintended consequences. But it would be unwise to discount it totally as a possibility even if it ought to be ruled out as an objective of policy. Nor can one find siren songs calling for a revision of existing policies towards Iran and North Korea very convincing. Sanctions are in both cases putting pressure on the transgressors and the possibility of more sanctions is almost certainly inhibiting their actions. The continued offer of a diplomatic, negotiated way out of the impasses – through the Six-Party process⁷ for North Korea and the 3+3 approach for Iran⁸ – remains an essential part of any twin-track policy, which needs to be sustained and refreshed from time to time. Meanwhile, strategic patience is essential. It should never be forgotten that it was changes in South Africa's domestic politics and completely unforeseen changes in the international context that resulted in that country's reversal of its well-developed and far-advanced policy of acquiring nuclear weapons.

So there is a wide agenda – without even mentioning the project for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – and much work for parliamentarians to do. The international community is at an important stage, perhaps a turning point, in the debate about WMD. Things could go disastrously wrong with a wider breakout from the

7 The Six-Party Talks include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States.

8 To the initial "EU-3" (France, Germany, the United Kingdom) were added China, the Russian Federation, and the United States.

disciplines of the NPT and the foundering of efforts to achieve new measures of arms control and disarmament. Or, as a participant said, further progress will be possible in the more hopeful direction of travel set out by President Obama. All of this is occurring at a moment when the world needs to grapple with a new global challenge in the field of cyber security and explore the possibility of some rules or guidelines that will facilitate dealing with the threats from intra-state cyber attacks, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism without resorting to the sorts of policies that, in the nuclear field, led to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. It will not be easy to make progress on such a broad and complex agenda, but it does need to be done and parliamentarians do need to take their part in promoting it.

Another parliamentarian considered the New START Treaty as an important step towards disarmament: indeed, the United States and Russia still hold 95 percent of the world's nuclear warheads. He stressed that any use of nuclear weapons would cause a level of destruction incompatible with any foreign policy objectives. Claiming that nuclear weapons will not be used against NPT countries respectful of their obligations leaves open the possibility of attack against Iran or North Korea and justifies the doctrine of pre-emption. Any use of nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world, would affect people everywhere in the world. This is why the world needs to move quickly, but it cannot do that while any nation holds onto its nuclear weapons. The building down of arsenals may take decades: that kind of time is not available. The world's annihilation could only take a moment. The best way to move forward would be to ban nuclear weapons now.

For another parliamentarian, the nuclear power catastrophe in Japan may create a new debate about nuclear issues. It is true that there is the New START Treaty and that a new working group for arms control has been established within NATO. However, no longer are young people seen demonstrating in the streets for a nuclear-free world. Nuclear weapons, the most destructive and inhumane of all, are still legal despite the ban of others. There is a strong link between civil society and parliamentarians. They were successful partners in banning cluster munitions. The Norwegian parliament unanimously supports a convention on nuclear weapons; indeed, if all WMD are considered as evil, nuclear weapons are the weapon of mass destruction. The emphasis should be put on cooperation with young people (from right and left), scientists, and civil society. People must

be given the facts about nuclear weapons. There is an enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in the Norwegian parliament. It is important because it involves both parties in government and in the opposition. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is rather conservative. NATO must not make itself an obstacle to disarmament, especially against US efforts.

Another panellist recalled that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attributed important responsibilities to parliaments. It was the first time that a UN Secretary-General had directly contacted the parliaments of all member states. He considered that it was wrong to continue the dichotomy between non-proliferation and disarmament, which had led to the breakdown of the NPT Review Conference in 2005. In 2010, there was an improvement in a merger of those ideas, with non-proliferation and disarmament as building-blocks for a nuclear-free world. There was also a dichotomy between the step-by-step approach of disarmament and the comprehensive approach. At the moment there is no dialogue possible between the proponents of deterrence and those of abolition. The participant asked whether it is necessary to develop new legal mechanisms or whether existing ones can just be strengthened. The Nuclear Abolition Forum aims at bringing together all sides. By thinking ahead, people can start planning for mechanism that might be necessary. The nuclear weapons convention can be compared to climbing a high summit: it will take time, but all can see the goal, the base camp, and the stages to reach the summit.

In the discussion, the constitutional limitations on parliaments and the moods of nations were addressed. In order to be ratified, any treaty will always need 66 votes in the US Senate. There are no constitutional limits in Norway. There are a whole range of activities in which parliamentarians can be engaged beyond treaty ratification. The German parliament must ratify multilateral and bilateral agreements; it is more of a political constraint for the government.

The question was asked whether the issue of nuclear disarmament was addressed by parliamentarians with their population. It appeared that, even in non-nuclear-weapon-states, there was usually support for the armed forces, and also some contradiction between a pro-disarmament discourse and an active defence industry and arms exports. As a result, an all-or-nothing approach was likely to result in pure rhetoric without actual results or a trade off (as in the ATT) between

a strong treaty with few parties and a weak treaty with more membership. Besides, the UN Charter provides for a range of under-utilized options for peaceful settlement of disputes without the threat or use of force; the recourse to WMD is unjustified. In any case, exploratory work is important even if some states are not ready for the negotiation of a treaty providing for an immediate and total abolition of nuclear weapons.

On the role of parliaments within NATO, it was recalled that the 2008 Bucharest Summit was used by Germany as an opportunity to introduce the issues of arms control and disarmament into NATO and that a group of states succeeded in putting nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the ministerial meeting before Lisbon. All this would not have been possible without consensus in parliaments. Regarding NATO's nuclear doctrine, it was mentioned that, in its latest strategic review of October 2010,⁹ the new British government provided a statement of the UK nuclear posture. This raised the issue of differences in doctrines at the national level and within NATO. For instance, the NATO doctrine does not include negative security assurances (NSA). This discrepancy was considered to be unsustainable; it was felt that NATO should adopt a more UK-like policy.

With respect to the role of the media in the debate on these issues, it was considered that the media can be superficial but is ultimately focused on current affairs with a short attention span. However, parliamentarians must work with the media that exists. They will not convince public opinion with pictures of diplomats in suits coming out of conference rooms but with debates on the substance of the issues.

⁹ The British Government, "Strategic defence review published", 19 October 2010 (http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/NI1/Newsroom/DG_191706).

Session 3: Treaty-Making, Ratification, and Implementation

The third session dealt with the role of parliaments in treaty-making, ratification, and implementation in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation. The session also outlined the gaps, challenges, and future trends related to the main treaties covering the various types of WMD. The main discussion points were:

- What is the current status and what are the main gaps in bilateral and international treaties concerning arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation?
- What is the current role of parliaments across the globe in developing, ratifying, and implementing major treaties in this area?
- What are the main challenges in those fields and how can parliament's role be strengthened?

One of the panellists considered that parliamentarians are the conscience of their fellow citizens. He focused on the CTBT, one of the cornerstones of today's non-proliferation agenda and a potential catalyst for further actions on nuclear issues. It is indeed the last legal barrier to preventing misuse of nuclear energy resources. Although the treaty is still not in force after having been opened for signature in 1996, it is approaching readiness for entry into force, especially the system established for its monitoring and verification. The system was tested when the DPRK conducted its nuclear explosions in 2006 and 2009 and it proved its utility. The case of the DPRK reminded the world how fragile the prohibition of nuclear testing is without a legally binding agreement. The CTBT has been called the longest-fought-for development in arms control and parliamentarians within the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) have contributed to this achievement. In fact, the IPU, established in 1889, was the first example of multilateralism in action. This is evidence that multilateralism is an essential component for addressing a variety of security issues. Parliaments can push for the remaining nine ratifications¹⁰ required for the CTBT to enter into force.

¹⁰ Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, United States of America.

Another panellist addressed the implementation of the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes. He considered those as issues of relevance for parliaments. Indeed, the treaties already exist and have been largely ratified, but their implementation is still important. Regarding the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), in effect since 1975 now with 163 states parties, the main problem is that there is no international organization to monitor compliance or any verification measures. The 7th BWC Review Conference in December 2011 is unlikely to push either for verification measures or for an international organization but will instead focus on the improvement of voluntary confidence-building measures. MPs may ask their governments what they do to achieve verification of the BWC regime, whether they implement the confidence-building measures, and whether they monitor scientific and technological developments. As for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in effect since 1997 and with 188 states parties, it relies on a treaty-based international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague. One major issue is the fact that the April 2012 destruction deadline will not be met (mainly by the United States and Russia). Besides, it is still unclear how to adapt the OPCW after the completion of CW destruction. There is resistance to expand verification beyond the schedule-based approach. Moreover, less than half of all states parties have introduced national legislation covering all key areas of the CWC, including advances in science and technology. The questions that MPs can ask their governments are: what is the status of the national implementing legislation, how do they prepare for a shift of the OPCW to focus on control of non-acquisition, and do they support verification beyond the existing schedules? An expert concluded that, even if both conventions were by and large effectively implemented, the BWC needed strengthening and the CWC needed adaptation. The scientific and technological revolution (and in particular the convergence between chemical and biological substances) requires continuous attention beyond electoral cycles and collaboration between arms control, science, and technology experts.

One parliamentarian from a country where nuclear testing was carried out in the past testified on the ecological and humanitarian disaster that still affected the testing area today. He advocated combating not only arsenals but also weapons

in the hearts and minds of people. Parliamentarians can also be active diplomats and promote not only the interests of their country but also the mutual needs of all people on the planet.

Another MP considered that nuclear proliferation was a serious security issue in which NATO, as well as parliaments, had a large role. He thought that the assumption that the destructive nature of nuclear weapons would prevent war and that proliferation was not a real risk was a dangerous illusion. There is a risk that terrorists or rogue governments use nuclear weapons. Because nuclear weapons are a threat to humanity, it needs a goal of global zero. As Kissinger, Nunn, Perry, and Schultz recently pointed out,¹¹ the world is simply lucky that there has not been another use of nuclear weapons, but is it prepared to leave its security to good fortune? The New START Treaty itself is not very impressive, but the fact that it was signed is positive and may have an impact on proliferation by Iran and North Korea. For the first time, NATO's New Strategic Concept cautiously moves away from the full endorsement of nuclear weapons as the basis of its defence posture. However, cooperation between Russia and the United States is a key factor, without their cooperation there can be no progress in disarmament, especially to make further reductions of tactical nuclear weapons possible. European parliamentarians should make it clear to the United States that Europeans do not need those weapons to be deployed in Europe.

Another parliamentarian asked what role parliaments could play in non-democratic countries engaged in the arms race. How can the countries that ratified all the disarmament treaties feel any more secure when other states still maintain such an overkill potential of weapons? How can this lack of confidence be explained despite the end of the Cold War and so many agreements? Should the focus be kept on WMD or should a comprehensive approach be developed? In Europe, with the suspension of the CFE Treaty by Russia, there are no more inspections and ceilings of military forces, which has resulted in a greater feeling of insecurity. Treaties are necessary but not sufficient. It is difficult to persuade countries to follow arms control and disarmament standards without democracy. Therefore there is a need to encourage democratic processes. One major source of concern is the lack of progress on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The Arab revolutions show that the people of that region aspire to peace dividends. The solution to conflicts is political and cannot be based on deterrence.

11 See footnote 3.

During the discussion, the question of lessons learnt from the SARS¹² outbreak was raised. If SARS had been smallpox it would have been devastating; the way it was contained is a success for the public health infrastructure. Parliamentarians should learn from the outbreak, but it only falls into a small category on the spectrum. With respect to the Verification Protocol of the BWC, the Bush administration torpedoed the draft in 2001, but the Obama administration still agrees with that approach. The final product was far from being perfect: it was based on a misguided approach to verification. The BWC deals with pathogens and material verification does not work for such a kinetic material. There is a need to move forward in conceptual terms. Scientists need to be educated on potential dual use and supported with a framework including legislation and regulations.

12 SARS: Severe acute respiratory syndrome.

Session 4:

Sanctions and Export Controls

The fourth session addressed the role of parliaments in sanctions and export controls in the area of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation. The main discussion points were:

- What is the current status and what are the main challenges to export controls and sanction regimes concerning WMD?
- What is the role of parliament in promoting and strengthening national and international sanction regimes and export controls to counter the spread and production of WMD?
- What are the challenges, best practices, and lessons learned for parliament to play a strong role in this area?

An expert explained how to counter WMD proliferation through export controls and sanctions. She mentioned the major transformations in export controls that occurred after the Cold War and after 9/11: from a bloc-oriented approach to a more inclusive and co-operative approach; from a territorial focus to an end-use focus; from a state-centric approach to the inclusion of non-state actors; from strict export control to transfer and trade control. This evolution has expanded the complexity of export control to strategic trade control, including brokering and transit, etc. The types of items under control are mainly dual-use items including tangible and intangible software, technology, and technical assistance. The types of actors and activities to be controlled include producers, shippers, traders, brokers, freight forwarders, financiers, the research community, company staff, and technology holders. The export control of dual-use items is a challenge for non-technical personnel tasked with recognizing them. Strategic trade controls are justified by considerations of both international and national security, commitments or obligations under international law and regional commitments. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is a crucial element in this framework: it aims at preventing access of non-state actors to WMD. There are also the sanc-

tion resolutions vis-à-vis the DPRK and Iran. The elements of an effective export control system include: comprehensive and clear primary legislation; effective administrative/criminal sanctions; policy-making mechanisms; a licensing system; outreach to industry and the research community; international information exchange and cooperation; and an enforcement system. The trends and challenges in export control include: constant technological developments; intangible transfers of technology (ITT); the consequences of globalization; the issue of transit; the difficulty of determining true end-use; terrorism; and matching policy priority with resources.

One parliamentarian stressed that, in order to hold governments accountable, parliaments need to have access to relevant information. In the United Kingdom there are public reports on authorized arms sales and Parliament also receives classified information from the government. A scrutiny committee brings together MPs from trade, defence, foreign affairs, and international development committees. Indeed, sustainable development is also a criterion: arms should not be sold to impoverished countries. Individual members have an influence and they need to decide whether they use it, for instance, in question time. The Arab uprisings have triggered questions about arms exports in the recent past and 156 licenses to four countries¹³ have been revoked. The replies to parliamentary questions have been made public: when the committee calls for evidence, there are public evidence sessions with ministers responding on record to the committee's questions; when the government report is published, the committee can announce a public enquiry and NGOs can reply.

A parliamentarian from a country producing conventional arms described the national export control system contained in a Federal Act on War Material, which includes criteria for approving arms exports (peace, stability, human rights, child soldiers, development, conduct towards the international community, the attitude of other exporters, etc.). He mentioned the issue of definitions (defining war, conflict, occupation, etc.), which may make parliamentary oversight difficult. The same goes for the criterion of respect for issue of human rights since almost all countries have some problem with human rights. He also mentioned the dilemma of sales to friendly countries engaged in military operations in places like Iraq,

13 Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

Afghanistan, or Libya. Another issue is the fact that parliamentary response can only occur after the arms exports have taken place, when it may be too late to prevent the use of weapons for domestic repression or in a conflict. The recourse to pressure from the media may appear useful in some cases to inform the public and stop some exports which have the capacity to make civilian victims.

In the discussion, questions were raised about the discrepancy between most export controls, which are of a bilateral nature, and weapons programmes or companies, which are multinational. Moreover, it was asked whether it would be possible to involve parliaments before exports happen and whether parliamentarians would ever be able to affect and change government policy. The argument was made that it is a problem of resources to be able to stop exports before they occur. In any case, without international rules on what can and cannot be sold, the world would be a much less safe place, but enforcement is the problem. Moreover, there is a need to apply export controls on components and spare parts just as equally as whole weapons. One parliamentarian considered that, even if it was felt not prudent to have parliaments involved in approving arms exports because this could compromise their other functions, parliaments could nevertheless be involved in formulating the criteria for licensing. The dual-use nature of most items was considered as a challenge for any export control. For some, the existence of many grey areas was a reason for both an international approach and consultations with parliaments before exports. The issue of safety of exports of nuclear power technology was also mentioned as a source of concern.

Session 5: Governance

The fifth session explored the role of parliaments in domestic governance, including budgetary control of WMD, either to ensure their safety and promote their elimination in possessor states or to prevent any acquisition in non-possessor states. The main discussion points were the following:

- What are the main characteristics of domestic governance of WMD and how do these characteristics challenge the role of parliament?
- What are effective instruments, tools, or legal provisions parliaments can use to play a role in domestic governance of WMD?
- What are the best practices and lessons learned for parliament?

An expert described the systems of democratic accountability and civilian control of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon-states (NPT and non-NPT parties). He challenged the pessimist view that nuclear decisions have largely escaped the control of the democratic process. He addressed three criteria for assessing effective parliamentary oversight: Authority, Ability, and Attitude. He mentioned some reasons for governments to maintain secrecy around nuclear weapons: not to risk easing the task of an adversary in countering the forces or eroding deterrence by disclosing possible weaknesses or limitations in nuclear forces; not to disclose information that might be of use to a proliferating state or to those seeking to obstruct or disrupt forces; to avoid or postpone public discussion that might be sensitive internationally with allies or others; not to disclose information provided by other governments in confidence; not to prejudice negotiating positions either domestically, e.g. with industry, or with other governments; to avoid controversy within a governing party or parties; and to avoid or limit public argument on matters of awkward domestic political controversy. But he also highlighted the good reasons for transparency: non-proliferation requirements (high standards in material protection, control, and accountancy; common decisions on export control guidelines); nuclear disarmament (deployments of tactical nuclear weapons to be eliminated; production facilities for the verification of an FMCT; information

on disposition of excess materials and dismantlement of nuclear warheads; information on stockpile stewardship activities for confidence in the CTBT). As key issues of governance, he listed: whether decisions within government are taken by actors of appropriate authority and legitimacy; whether these decision-takers are readily, candidly, and objectively given all of the relevant information and advice they need and seek; whether adequate and timely information is provided publicly to make effective scrutiny and debate possible; when information so provided falls short of the ideal in amount, quality, or timeliness, what the reasons are for the shortfall, and whether they are legitimate and sufficient to justify it. The accountability of nuclear weapons can be addressed from three perspectives: non-proliferation, command-and-control, and democratic governance. Traditional debates on command-and-control procedures focus on military control while the democratic governance perspective applies the security sector governance to nuclear weapons.

The expert described the four layers of accountability:

a) The military control: it includes the physical custodians of the weapons, responsible for their storage and safety, and avoidance of illegal or accidental use. It is extended to deployment and potential use. Usually weapons are stored separately to avoid unauthorized use or accidents. This is reinforced by the “permissive action links” (PALs) and the 2-3 men rule;

b) The civilian (executive) control: the decision to use nuclear weapons is the prerogative of the Head of State or Prime Minister who only can authorize the use. Pre-delegation is contrary to democratic accountability but the elected decision-maker may have difficulty in assessing information coming from the military or scientific establishment. In some states the line of succession on nuclear command is different than the one laid down in the constitution or not arranged at all (United Kingdom). It is especially important for states with less stable political climates (see the assassination attempts on the Pakistani President or Prime Minister). Public speeches on nuclear weapons are usually made by the Head of State or government;

c) The parliamentary control: in most countries, the role of parliaments is marginal. However, the US Congress has the “power of the purse” and can affect research, development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons.

Parliaments ratify international treaties on nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. Some parliaments organize public hearings that offer a forum for discussion which is an important source of information (sometimes the only one) for the general public on the government's policies. Parliaments can also enact legislation, in particular on safety and non-proliferation (India, United Kingdom, United States); issue public parliamentary reports (France); or request changes of policy (United States). Among the political systems analysed, it was found that: the US Congress had strongly used these powers, whereas the constitution made it illegal for the Duma to control the government in Russia; the UK Parliament has budget power but it is not often used to challenge the government; the nuclear issue is a sleeping issue in the French Parliament due to a cross-party consensus about the French nuclear arsenal; China's legislature has never had a debate on nuclear weapons; there is a sub-committee on nuclear weapons in Israel but the nuclear ambiguity policy of the country prevents any real debate; the Indian parliament debates weapons but does not challenge the government and only exercises reactive powers; and parliament in Pakistan is ill-equipped to challenge the government;

d) The public control: this includes the media, think tanks, and public opinion groups, which provide the general public with an alternative voice. This expertise may be used by parliaments (e.g. in the United Kingdom and the United States). It is not a direct form of control because citizens control the government in democracies via elections and therefore public opinion plays a role in the minds of politicians. There are also independent public offices, such as audit offices, outside government and parliament, often appointed by parliament and reporting to parliament and government. There is also expertise in civil society (e.g. in the United States); there are anti-nuclear movements (e.g. in the United Kingdom and the United States); and public opinion polls on nuclear issues (e.g. in India).

Democratic accountability of nuclear weapons strengthens the non-proliferation regime because it: contributes to transparency about intentions and capabilities between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon-states; minimizes the risk of accidental or unauthorised use; decreases the chance of nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism; decreases the possibility for governments to start secret nuclear weapon development programmes; enhances success of IAEA Safeguards by embedding them in a system of

domestic democratic governance; and is a confidence- and security-building measure at the international level.

One parliamentarian described the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, which suddenly became nuclear powers in 1991 having inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union. Ukraine was then the third largest nuclear power in the world. There was a process of negotiation with the Russian Federation for the transfer of all weapons under the control of Moscow. It was based on constitutional provisions in Belarus and a parliamentary declaration in Ukraine, but it took until 1994 to complete the withdrawal of weapons from Belarus and until 1996 from Ukraine, after both countries had been satisfied with international cooperation and assistance. It is a successful case of denuclearization, despite the statement by the Belarus president in 2010 that this withdrawal had been a “mistake”, because now there is no risk of the re-nuclearization of those countries.

Another panellist described the political control system of nuclear weapons in Great Britain where Parliament agrees to the budget in general terms and where committees scrutinize retrospectively the specific allocations to nuclear deterrence. However, he noted a deficit of competence in parliament where the current generation does not have sufficient understanding and many decisions on nuclear issues have moved away from parliamentarians to civil servants and the military. The lack of independent expertise makes it difficult to obtain proper accountability from the government. On the advice of independent experts, the number of deployable warheads could be reduced while a minimum deterrent could still be maintained. Most decisions are in fact made by civil and military experts who actually are accountable to no one, without any public engagement and hardly any debate in parliament.

An expert looked at the situation in Russia, where he considered that although the government was still committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the parliament did not play a role up to modern standards. He explained this for historical reasons. Under the Communist regime, the Supreme Soviet only rubber-stamped policy decided upon by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, albeit assisted by competent experts. The opacity of defence policy and military budgets was not questioned by the people because admittedly the country was trying to catch up with the United States in the arms race. The first treaty

of its kind to be reviewed in parliament (and also in the scientific community and the press) was the NPT in 1968. Later, more bilateral agreements enhanced the importance of parliament's role and civil expertise. However, difficulties in information availability persisted (for instance, an annex to the 1979 SALT-2 Treaty on Soviet arsenals was published not by Moscow but by the UN as a Russian translation of the US version of the Treaty). Moreover, the Russian government decided that some treaties did not require ratification by the State Duma: the 1992 US-Russian Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (or CTR agreement), which was crucial for the building down of the Russian arsenal; and the 1992 US-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement for blending 500 tons of HEU down to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). These agreements became known to parliament when it was too late to amend them. Now, thanks to a 1995 Federal Law, ratification of all treaties related to defence, arms control, and disarmament is mandatory. Budget is one of the most important controls that the Duma has over government, although the process is not always transparent enough. There is also a lack of access to relevant information by independent civil expertise on military and nuclear issues. A draft law presently envisaged on civilian control over the military organization could improve the situation while the independent civil expertise of Russian think tanks is gaining in professionalism.

In the discussion, reference was made to the differences in parliamentary control relating to differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, where the procedures of allocating budget cannot be compared. Similarly, the role of independent expertise in various countries was compared: the United States has an extensive network that is impossible to replicate in most other countries due to a lack of resources. Even when there is a tremendous amount of open source material, the expertise to decipher and analyse it is needed. However, most parliaments do not even ask for expertise; they should adopt freedom of information laws to increase transparency and democratic oversight.

Conclusions: Next Steps for Parliaments

One expert concluded that it was obvious that each parliament did things differently. There is no model, but instead, best practices. The US system could not be taken as a model because it is too specific. The workshop highlighted opposing viewpoints:

- Between idealism and pragmatism: some want a world without armies or weapons, others challenge the place of disarmament. Some ask whether armaments are the symptom or the cause of conflicts and instability. President Obama and the UN Security Council seek to “create the conditions” for a world without nuclear weapons. There is opposition between a grand scheme and an incremental approach, a slower approach that feels the need for consensus;
- Between defence (run by the military) and disarmament (run by the diplomats): too often they are at odds with each other. There is a need for civilians to engage with and respond to the military establishment;
- Between focus on nuclear weapons and the other weapons: nuclear weapons are special; they are relied on by some for deterrence and, at the same time, most people want to get rid of them. The risks of their possession outweigh their dubious chances of imposing peace; indeed, their contribution to the maintenance of peace cannot be proved. The issue is thus how to begin de-valuing nuclear weapons. Global zero is a goal everyone aspires to but it will take time and the focus should be more on the “journey”. NATO does have a responsibility to reflect aspirations to a world free of nuclear weapons. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and also the CTBT really need more attention because there are still problems in implementation or entry into force.

The task for parliamentarians is to take on or challenge the professionals, including the executive and the military, and to support the development of independent expertise. In terms of expectations and outcomes, the context is highly relevant to what parliamentarians want to achieve. The United States still has a leading role to play but President Obama may be slowed down by domestic constraints. It is difficult to predict how the disaster in Japan will influence this debate and spill over nuclear weapons. In any case, new thinking is needed and no one better than parliaments can set the pace on this issue.

Annex 1

Catalogue of Good Practices on the Role of Parliament in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction¹⁴

A. General

1. The impact of parliaments on government policy depends on the “triple A” of effective parliamentary oversight: authority, ability, and attitude. Parliaments need to have the necessary constitutional authority to effectively oversee and influence governments in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They also need to possess the necessary know-how as well as the political will to fulfil their roles and live up to their responsibilities.

B. Shaping Policy

2. Parliaments need to oversee that government programmes and policies on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD are all unified under the ultimate goal of “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament).¹⁵

3. Parliaments should request of their governments that arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD become the centrepiece of national and international security strategies of states and alliances.

4. Parliaments should request that their governments endorse UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Five Point Proposal on “The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World” of 24 October 2008 and its implementation.

14 This catalogue is derived from the suggestions made and discussions held in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Workshop on “The Role of Parliaments in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)”, Geneva, 31 March – 1 April 2011. The list must be seen as a catalogue of good practices that might or might not be used by parliaments or individual members of parliaments in accordance with their constitutional and legal provisions. The catalogue of good practices does not necessarily represent the official position of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), NATO Non-Proliferation Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Centre, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

15 United Nations General Assembly, Res. A/S-10/4 (1978).

5. Parliaments should supervise that defence and security policy is coordinated with disarmament and arms control policies.
6. Parliaments need to oversee that their countries' export control systems include the following elements: effective administrative/criminal sanctions; policy-making mechanisms; a licensing system; outreach to industry and the research community; international information exchange and cooperation; an enforcement system.
7. Recognizing that the nexus of WMD proliferation and terrorism has become one of the most dangerous current realities, parliaments should enact all legislative measures to prevent WMD proliferation in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which aims at preventing access of non-state actors to WMD.

C. Supervising Treaty-making, Ratification, and Implementation

8. Parliament should enact a legal framework that promotes arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD in line with the state's international commitments, including international humanitarian law commitments.
9. Contrary to chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons have yet to be prohibited by an international convention. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) admits a temporary possession of nuclear weapons by some states while containing an obligation of disarmament. In this context, parliaments should call upon their governments to engage in negotiations for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention.
10. Parliaments should play a role in overseeing the implementation of already ratified treaties. In particular, parliaments should check the following aspects of treaty implementation: (a) national implementing legislation; (b) independent verification; (c) confidence-building programmes; (d) monitoring of scientific and technological developments.
11. Parliaments should check whether their governments are fully carrying out all activities necessary to achieve compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention regime, whether their governments implement confidence-building measures, and whether their governments monitor scientific and technological developments.
12. Parliaments should adopt motions that serve to strengthen a government's position in negotiations, international conferences, and high-level meetings.

D. Involving Civil Society

13. Parliaments should play an important role in informing and educating citizens about arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD. This especially applies to awareness raising and education of young people at schools.

14. Parliaments should support the organization of public events in order to create awareness among the public about the need for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

15. Parliamentarians need the help of appropriate support mechanisms, such as access to independent advice, research departments, institutes, think tanks, an inquisitive media, and an active civil society network. This form of assistance will guarantee that parliaments are provided with alternative sources of information and will avoid exclusive reliance on official government sources.

E. Shaping Foreign Policy/Parliamentary Diplomacy/Alliances

16. Parliaments may use “parliamentary diplomacy” to: (a) contribute to confidence building measures; (b) promote regional security; (c) promote democratization; and (d) exchange experiences with parliaments of other countries and learn from best practices of others.

17. Parliaments should scrutinize their governments’ position in NATO regarding the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy, in particular the role of tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and extended deterrence in the NATO New Strategic Concept.

18. Parliaments should call upon their governments to play an active role in NATO’s new WMD Control and Disarmament Committee (cf. NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010, pnt. 31)

19. Parliaments should call upon their governments so that NATO raises its profile in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD (cf. NATO’s Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008, pnt. 39).

20. Parliaments may work on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD through NATO Parliamentary Assembly. This type of work may extend to the coordination of policy positions as well as the exchange of best practices of parliamentary oversight of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD in NATO and PfP member states.

21. Parliaments should supervise (through their governments) that disarmament,

arms control, and non-proliferation of WMD will be included as an area of activities within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace.

F. Parliamentary Tools and Support Structures

22. Parliaments should use their budgetary and discharge authority to ensure that their governments are actively contributing to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD.

23. In order to hold governments accountable, parliaments need to have access to information from their government about the size and budget of arsenals of WMD in possessor states, position of governments in treaty negotiations, as well as reports on arms sales.

24. Parliaments should use motions, parliamentary questions, and votes of confidence to endorse or to challenge their governments' policies and decisions.

25. Parliaments should set up a parliamentary body dealing with arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Examples of these parliamentary bodies are: parliamentary committee (United Kingdom), sub-committee (Germany), ad-hoc committees, joint committees (Norway) or all-party caucus (United Kingdom, United States) on arms control, disarmament, and non proliferation.

26. Parliaments may organize public hearings with experts, academics, and NGOs in order to receive an independent view on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD.

Annex 2

Workshop Programme

Geneva, 30 March – 1 April 2011

Wednesday, 30 March 2011

Reception Attended by Workshop Participants and Permanent Representatives to the Conference on Disarmament of those states represented at the workshop

Thursday, 31 March 2011

Welcome and introduction **Georges MARTIN**, Deputy State Secretary, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Geri MUELLER, Member of Parliament, National Council, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Security Policy Committee, Switzerland
Jacek BYLICA, Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Marc FINAUD, Special Advisor to the Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Theodor H. WINKLER, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Keynote speakers **Desmond BROWNE**, Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom
Sergio de Queiroz DUARTE, High Representative for Disarmament, United Nations
Introduced by **Jürg LAUBER**, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

SESSION 1: Overview, current status of WMD, and role of parliament

Objective The first session aims at giving an overview of the current status and future trends in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also address the scope, opportunities, and limitations of the role that parliaments can play in this important field. In particular, it will look into the various roles that parliament can play (i.e. legislative, budgetary, and oversight roles) as well as the main challenges for parliament, for example, lack of statutory powers, lack of information, lack of expertise and staff, and limited or no access to classified information.

Discussion Points	<p>What are the main threats and challenges related to weapons of mass destruction today?</p> <p>What are the main national and international responses in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (treaties, initiatives, international cooperation, etc.)?</p> <p>What is the main role of parliament in this important field and what are the main challenges for parliament to fulfil or to expand its role?</p>
--------------------------	--

Lunch

SESSION 2: Policy development

Objective	The second session will explore the role of parliaments in policy development, implementation, and evaluation in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also explore the question of why parliament should play a proactive role in facilitating and initiating policy in this domain.
Discussion Points	<p>What are current and recent policy initiatives in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?</p> <p>What role do parliaments across the world play in developing, implementing, and evaluating policy in this important field (“from idea to practice”)?</p> <p>What are the major challenges to parliament playing a meaningful role in policy development (e.g. lack of expertise, constitutional limitations, lack of staff, or limited access to classified information)? How can parliament’s role be strengthened?</p>

SESSION 3: Treaty-making, ratification, and implementation

Objective	The third session will deal with the role of parliaments in treaty-making, ratification, and implementation in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The session will also outline the gaps, challenges, and future trends related to the main treaties covering the various types of weapons of mass destruction.
Discussion Points	<p>What is the current status and what are the main gaps in bilateral and international treaties concerning arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?</p> <p>What is the current role of parliaments across the globe in developing, ratifying, and implementing major treaties in this area?</p> <p>What are the main challenges in those fields and how can parliament’s role be strengthened?</p>

Dinner Hosted by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Friday, 1 April 2011

SESSION 4: Sanctions and export controls

- Objective** The fourth session will address the role of parliaments in sanctions and export controls in the area of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Discussion Points** What is the current status and what are the main challenges to export controls and sanction regimes concerning weapons of mass destruction? What is the role of parliament in promoting and strengthening national and international sanction regimes and export controls to counter the spread and production of weapons of mass destruction? What are the challenges, best practices, and lessons learned for parliament to play a strong role in this area?

SESSION 5: Governance

- Objective** The fifth session explores the role of parliament in domestic governance, including budgetary control of weapons of mass destruction (both in possessor and non-possessor states).
- Discussion Points** What are the main characteristics of domestic governance of weapons of mass destruction and how do these characteristics challenge the role of parliament? What are effective instruments, tools, or legal provisions parliaments can use to play a role in domestic governance of weapons of mass destruction? What are the best practices and lessons learned for parliament?

CONCLUDING SESSION: Next steps for parliaments

Annex 3

List of Participants

ABDELHAMID Khaled G., Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Austria

BANACKA Mira, Second Secretary, Permanent Delegation of Slovakia to NATO, Belgium

BAUER Sibylle, Head of Export Control Project, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden

BLIDDAL Henrik, Director, Science and Technology Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Belgium

BOEHM Niki, Staffer, Hellenic Parliament, Greece

BORN Hans, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

BROWNE Desmond, Member of the House of Lords, United Kingdom

BYLICA Jacek, Ambassador, Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

CIMOSZEWICZ Włodzimierz, Member of Parliament, Member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Poland

CORLATEAN Titus, Senator, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee, Senate of Romania, Romania

DE DARDEL Jean-Jacques, Ambassador, Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO, Belgium

DUARTE Sergio de Queiroz, High Representative for Disarmament, United Nations, New York, United States

DUFRANE Anthony, Member of the Defence Committee, House of Representatives, Belgium

FEDORYAK Nikolay, Member of the Council of the Federation, Deputy Chairman, Committee for Defence and Security, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Russia

FINAUD Marc, Special Advisor to the Director (Seconded from France), Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland

FRIEDRICH Andreas, Minister, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament Section, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

GLAUSER Brian, Assistant, Conference & Travel Logistics, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

GODEC Josko, Member of Parliament, National Assembly, Slovenia

GOSTELI Claude-Hélène, Head of Conference & Travel Logistics, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

GRASS Fabian, Advisor, Permanent Representation of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Switzerland

HALTER Matthias, Acting Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Policy, International Relations Defence, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, Switzerland

HAENGGI Heiner, Professor, Assistant Director and Head of Research, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

HANNAY David, Member of the House of Lords, Vice-Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, United Kingdom

IBRAHIMQIZI Malahat, Member of Parliament, Azerbaijan

JOHN-CALAME Francine, Member of Parliament, National Council, Member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Council of Europe, Member of the Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophonie, Switzerland

KADYROV Bakhtiar, Member of Parliament, Kyrgyzstan

KAELIN Irène, Assistant to Mr Geri MUELLER, Switzerland

KARAPETYAN Hrayr, Member of Parliament, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, National Security and Internal Affairs, Armenia

KELLE Alexander, Senior Lecturer, University of Bath, United Kingdom

KIDD Bill, Member of the Scottish Parliament, Council Member, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), United Kingdom

KORODI Attila, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Chamber of Deputies, Foreign Affairs Committee, Romania

KUCINICH Dennis, Congressman, House of Representatives, United States (by video link)

KURBONOV Beg, Member of Parliament, Tajikistan

LA MALFA Giorgio, Member of Parliament, Member of Commission III on Foreign and Community Affairs of the House of Deputies, Italy

LATKOVSKIS Ainars, Member of Parliament, Chairman of Standing Committee, Defence, Internal Affairs, Corruption and Prevention, Latvijas Republikas SAEIMA, Latvia

LAUBER Jürg, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland

LEWIS Patricia, Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States

LUNN Simon, Senior Fellow DCAF, former Secretary-General of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Belgium

LUESCHER Marcel, Assistant to Mr Geri MUELLER, Switzerland

MALVIK Henrik, Secretary of Delegation, Norwegian Parliament, Norway

MARTIN Georges, Deputy State Secretary, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

MASIULIS Kestutis, Professor, Member of Parliament, Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, Lithuania

MASMEJEAN Laurent, Political Affairs Officer, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

MATZ Johan, Secretary, Swedish Parliament, Sweden

MELESCANU Teodor Viorel, Senator, Chairman of the Committee on Defence, Public Order and National Security, Member of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Senate of Romania, Romania

MERCAN Murat, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Grand National Assembly, Turkey

MISURAGIN Ignaty, Member of Parliament, Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, Belarus

MUELLER Geri, Member of Parliament, National Council, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Security Policy Committee, Switzerland

MUKHAMEJANOV Tolegen, Member of the Senate of the Parliament, Kazakhstan

MUKHAMMADIEV Ulugbek, Member of Parliament, Deputy Speaker, Uzbekistan

MUTT Valter, Member of Parliament, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sweden

NIOTIS Grigorios, Member of Parliament, First Deputy Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Greece

NYBAKK Marit, Member of Parliament, Vice President of the Norwegian Parliament, Norway

OYMEN Onur, Member of Parliament, Member of the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Parliament, Turkey

PORELL Victoria, Intern, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland

PRAZ Jean-Daniel, Directorate of Political Affairs, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

RIGACCI HAY Elena, External Relations Officer, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Austria

ROCHE Douglas, Senator, former Member of the Canadian Parliament, Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, Canada (by video link)

RYBACHENKOV Vladimir, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Arms Control, Russia

SCHOENENBERGER Christian, Head, Task Force on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

SCHREIER Fred, Senior Consultant, Operations, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

SHNYAKIN Valery, Member of the Council of Federation, Member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Russia

SLAPNIK Tadej, Member of Parliament, National Assembly, Slovenia

STANLEY John, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Committee on Arms Export Controls, United Kingdom

TURDIMATOVA Nodira, Member of Parliament, Tajikistan

WARE Alyn, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, New Zealand

WINBACK Christer, Member of Parliament, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sweden

WINKLER Theodor H., Ambassador, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland

ZALESKI Jerzy, Disarmament Consultant, Adviser to the Delegation of Poland to the Conference on Disarmament, Switzerland

ZAPF Uta, Member of Parliament, Chair of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Germany

Geneva Papers – Conference Series

- No. 1 – 2008** E. Munro, “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges”, 28 p.
- No. 2 – 2008** J. Cockayne and D. Pfister, “Peace Operations and Organised Crime”, 55 p.
- No. 3 – 2008** M. Fugfugosh, “Operationalising Mediation Support: Lessons from Mediation Experiences in the OSCE Area”, 64 p.
- No. 4 – 2008** D.L. Aaron, S. Chubin, S. Feldman, A. Sager and S. Martin, “Middle East Perspectives: Conference Proceedings from Gstaad, Switzerland”, 43 p.
- No. 5 – 2008** D.M. Gormley, C.M. Kelleher, S. Warren and T. Wetzling, “Missile Defence Systems: Global and Regional Implications”, 59 p.
- No. 6 – 2009** J. Strandquist, “The Gstaad Process: The West’s Relations with Russia: Towards a Cold Peace”, 39 p.
- No. 7 – 2009** S. Hanova, “Central Asia Seminars: 1st GCSP-OSCE Academy Seminar: ‘Central Asia 2008’”, 57 p.
- No. 9 – 2009** F. Tanner, N. Al-Rodhan and S. Chandiramani, “Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives”, 84 p.
- No. 10 – 2009** J.-J. de Dardel, “Whither the Euro-Atlantic Partnership? Partnership and NATO’s New Strategic Concept”, 92 p.
- No. 11 – 2010** S. Chandiramani, M. Finaud and K. Koser, “Pakistan and South Asia’s Security Nexus: Scenarios for the Future”, 69 p.
- No. 12 – 2010** M. Finaud, “Can Autonomy Fulfil the Right to Self-Determination?”, 54 p. [French version: “L’autonomie peut-elle satisfaire le droit à l’autodétermination?”; Spanish version: “¿Puede la autonomía satisfacer el derecho a la autodeterminación?”]
- No. 13 – 2010** D. Golikova, “Central Asia Seminars. 2nd GCSP-NUPI-OSCE Academy Seminar: ‘Central Asia 2009’”, 50 p.

- No. 14 – 2010 T. Sisk, "Cooperating for Peace: The Challenges and Promises of Partnerships in Peace Operations", 59 p.
- No. 15 – 2010 S. Chandiramani and M. Finaud, "Safety and Security in the Biotechnological Age", 61 p.
- No. 16 – 2010 B. Sitt et al., "Sanctions and Weapons of Mass Destruction in International Relations", 133 p.
- No. 17 – 2010 M. Reimaa, "START Ends: How to Start Again? Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Challenges Today", 80 p.
- No. 18 – 2010 P. Annawitt, "Global Security and Regional Responses: Conflict Management in a Fractured World", 50 p.
- No. 19 – 2010 E. Klimenko, "The 3rd GCSP-OSCE Academy-NUPI-NESA Seminar – Central Asia 2010", 30 p.
- No. 20 – 2010 G. Lindstrom, "Gstaad Process 2010. Beyond Geopolitics: Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?", 22 p.
- No. 21 – 2011 P. Annawitt and M. Finaud, "Reinforcing Disarmament: Combating Illicit Trade in Weapons and Materials", 69 p.

GCSP

avenue de la Paix 7bis

P.O. Box 1295

CH - 1211 Geneva 1

T +41 22 906 16 00

F +41 22 906 16 49

info@gcsp.ch

www.gcsp.ch



Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Centre de Politique de Sécurité, Genève
Genfer Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik

Impartial, Inclusive, Influential