

Peace and Security 2025

DISRUPTED VISIONS AND
RESILIENT APPROACHES

June 2022



GCSP
Geneva Centre for
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Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Maison de la paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2D
P.O. Box 1295
CH-1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland

www.gcsp.ch

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Foreword

By Ambassador Thomas Greminger

Director of the GCSP

Inflection points do not happen often in the peace and security field. The combination of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and the impact of climate change may be providing us with such a point. Therefore, if we look ahead to 2025, the plans we put in place and the decisions we take in 2022 may prove decisive. How do we want 2025 to look? What can we do differently today to overcome the challenges that we will face in the next few years – and beyond? This publication addresses these questions and is a timely contribution that helps us to consider how we may refocus our efforts today on what matters most in the future.

Firstly, focusing on visions for the future, on how we wish 2025 to look, and identifying shared elements in these visions is one way forward. From my experience as Secretary-General of the OSCE from 2017 to 2020, I am used to operating in polarised settings. In these settings dynamics may seem insurmountable, at least in the immediate future. But nevertheless, common ground must be found to move forward. Focusing on a common vision provides an opportunity to refocus the conversation and generate a constructive atmosphere for dialogue. It turns the conversation to the issue of how to collectively foster that vision with concrete and mutually beneficial steps to achieve it rather than becoming mired in potential

roadblocks. The setting for such a conversation is often not a formal environment that may be blocked by, for example, procedural or structural issues, but an informal setting that creates a space for constructive exchanges on a common vision or common interests.

Secondly, the transnational security challenges we are grappling with require intensified cooperation at the same time that multilateral avenues for discussion are facing legitimacy and accountability crises. To overcome this paradox, high levels of political commitment and innovative methods are required. This may take the form of informal platforms for dialogue and working with countries and other actors that you are not used to cooperating with. You can do so because you share some common interests, even if you may differ on many points. This approach is a feature of cooperative security. In an inclusive and realistic way, the shift to a cooperative security perspective encourages a longer-term perspective whereby investing in cooperation for longer-term gains is prioritised over the shorter-term scoring of political points.

There is no doubt of the size of the challenges that lie ahead. What this publication tries to do is to provide a constructive voice at a time when forward-thinking and concrete suggestions are needed. Challenges will not disappear overnight, and hard work and political leadership will be required, but starting with the questions of what we want the world to look like in 2025, what realistic pathways are needed to achieve this vision, and what kinds of innovative ways of cooperating will be needed to do so is a very good place to start.

Introduction

By Ms Emily Munro

Head of Strategic Anticipation, GCSP

The exact nature of the peace and security environment of 2025 is, of course, unknown, but we have information available to us today and yesterday's experience to guide us in our attempts to imagine what the key features of that environment might be. This teaches us that surprises will continue to happen. Our attempt to identify what 2025 will look like could simply stop here, and we could approach the next few years day by day and month by month, establish our strategic plans, and constantly adjust them in response to new circumstances as they arise. However, we can go a step further and use strategic foresight to help us creatively and systematically explore how that future may unfold and consider collectively the alternatives available to us for dealing with what happens and its implications. This publication takes the latter approach by asking the authors to determine a vision for particular global regions and realistically and concretely assess how we can achieve this vision (Part I), and present suggestions for how we as professionals in the peace and security domain can collaborate to respond as effectively as possible to the challenges of the next few years (Part II). In that sense, the analysis and suggestions presented here balance realism about the challenges ahead with a proactive and constructive perspective on how best to confront them. It is

with this in mind that the subheading of this publication is "*disrupted visions and resilient approaches*".

Visions are useful because they pull us forward and motivate action. They are important for creating direction and can be unifying. But if they are too lofty they can make us feel disconnected from the future we are attempting to confront, and in the worst case can paralyse our attempts to generate future-oriented policy and action. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine as the most recent reminders, any attempt to envision the next few years must be based on the certain knowledge that *disruptions will occur*. These disruptions can be broken down into two basic types: those that we see warnings of (i.e. by identifying weak signals) and those that are surprises (where crisis management is the only possible response in the short term). Regarding disruptions with warning signs, we need to ask ourselves: do we have an ongoing process in place for monitoring these signs? What will help us to prepare for multiple potential disruptions when resources are scarce? Do we have sufficient agility in our planning processes that will allow us to proactively respond to new warning signs when they arise?

A vision can help us to weather the storms – sometime very large ones – in this environment. In Part I of this publication the authors have applied the foresight method of backcasting to six global regions. This method recognises the multiple pathways that can be taken to achieve such a vision and emphasises the key steps that can be taken to achieve it. This process takes 2025 as the starting point and works backwards

to 2022. The process will inevitably be characterised by ups and downs similar to waves in the sea that can be gently undulating or more threatening. Visioning means that we are taking a more proactive approach to the future. We are saying that the future will not simply happen to us in ways that are out of our control, but is something we may be able to shape by striving to fulfil a vision we have created, provided that specific decisions are taken and appropriate efforts are made today.

The second part of this publication presents ideas on how to effectively respond to the peace and security environment envisioned in 2025. The authors of this section do this across three sub-themes: leadership, foresight and governance. Uniting them is the recognition that there are tools in our toolbox based on our experience and knowledge – in particular related to the peace and security community – that can be harnessed to achieve impact. The last few years have tested all of us in different ways in terms of how we engage with one another and the issues we work on. The ground is shifting, and we must be resilient in how we work. Take, for example, global governance in the international security domain. Here countries may need to undertake dialogue with other countries that they have not previously cooperated with and with whom they do not have much in common. Similarly, technology companies may need to partner with governments more and more, while influential individuals may have an impact on a variety of issues in unpredictable ways. This means finding new ways of collaborating and developing trust and a common

language with actors from vastly different backgrounds or domains.

Underlying this is the question of how we as professionals handle change. Change can be disorientating, but can also be invigorating. If we refer back to the visioning used in Part I of this publication, being adaptable can help us move a step closer to achieving our desired vision. It may not provide a direct path to that vision, but it can be a step in that general direction and will allow us to hold true to our core ideals and most important objectives. The seeds of the 2025 peace and security environment are in many ways already present in 2022, and we can do more today to encourage the growth of those parts we wish to nurture and stop the emergence of seeds we do not wish to see growing.



PART I

The regions

Backcasting 2025: Regions are more crucial than ever

By Dr Siobhan Martin

Head of Advanced Course Development, GCSP

The international system will continue to experience turbulence in the coming years to 2025. A continually stalled UN Security Council will lead to the regional level becoming increasingly important for efforts to manage peace and security issues. Indeed, we expect 2025 to reflect and respond to the dynamics we see currently in 2022 in terms of rising inequalities; the (in)effectiveness of the post-COVID recovery; the war in Ukraine and its global impact on food security, energy security and the global economy.

The crisis in the international system comes at a critical time for many issues, in particular that we are now at the “point of no return” in our need to mitigate climate change. Yet the shift to the regional level provides considerable potential. It is an opportunity for stronger collaboration to overcome challenges that exist at the international level, such as the lack of representation. There is also a greater understanding of local contexts at the regional level, allowing for more effective and innovative responses as a result. But we cannot underestimate the unknown, and this is why it is so crucial to engage in anticipatory governance. In the following backcasting analyses our experts will highlight their visions for 2025, how they may be achieved, and the challenges that will have to be considered along the way.

Highlights of the regional backcasting process:

- **the need to mitigate the lack of trust** between stakeholders and states and within the international system, and build a better understanding of how regional powers navigate **international geopolitics** as a barrier or opportunity;
- **the need to navigate the remilitarised global context** and address **urgent developmental issues**, including the potential of **youth** as a challenge or opportunity as well as increasing **food insecurity**;
- **the need to confront the negative impact of climate change** more broadly on the daily lives of citizens across the globe, but also to consider opportunities for establishing common ground and innovative partnerships, and for fast-tracking alternatives to fossil fuels;
- **the need to rebuild socio-economic resilience** due to the impact of COVID-19, as well as the wider implications of instability in Europe; and
- **the need to revive dialogue and regional mechanisms** both among and beyond state actors in order to promote collective action.

2025 Visions for Six Regions:

West Africa and the Sahel

West African and Sahel countries are drawing on the dynamism of a rapidly growing youth population and – following years of economic recovery – partnering with one another to improve economic prosperity and inter-organisational security infrastructure to build a more stable and prosperous region.

[→ go to section](#)

The European Union

In a European continent again at peace, but facing geopolitical challenges, the European Union (EU) emerges as a more credible, strong, and autonomous provider of stability and resilience in its vicinity, complementing the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

[→ go to section](#)

Eastern Europe

In response to the crisis in European security caused by the war in Ukraine, Eastern European states – in particular those on Russia's periphery – are strengthening their resilience, while, thanks to continued sanctions on Russian energy, significant investments are being made in renewable energy, with a positive impact on the global climate. [→ go to section](#)

Middle East: Focus on Iran and the Gulf

The Persian Gulf engages in inclusive, sustained and institutionalised dialogue to address sources of insecurity, concretely enable the maintenance of peace and pursue further avenues for greater regional integration. [→ go to section](#)

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean are fostering long-term human security and sustainable development shaped by political stability, strong leadership, inclusiveness and equality, and creating a region where everyone lives with dignity and well-being.

[→ go to section](#)

South Asia

South Asia is developing integrated and innovative responses through regional partnerships in ecological and energy resilience, transboundary connectivity, socio-economic well-being, and interpersonal relations.

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West Africa and the Sahel

By Dr Olayinka Ajala

Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

VISION 2025: *West African and Sahel countries are drawing on the dynamism of a rapidly growing youth population and – following years of economic recovery – partnering with one another to improve economic prosperity and inter-organisational security infrastructure to build a more stable and prosperous region.*

How does the rapidly growing region of West Africa and the Sahel meet its 2025 vision and what key challenges need to be overcome for it to do so?

The West African and Sahel region has a vibrant youth population with an annual growth rate of about 2.6 per cent, making it one of the fastest growing in the world in terms of its populations. In addition, a positive economic forecast of an estimated growth rate of 3.6 per cent in 2022 and over 4 per cent in subsequent years coupled with stronger democracies and stability in countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Niger give a further glimmer of hope for 2025.

While opportunities will continue to arise between 2022 and 2025 in core areas such as food processing and value addition, fintech, and services, some

prevailing threats continue to hamper the unlocking of these hidden potentials. Long-standing issues such as porous borders, youth unemployment, poor educational attainment in several countries, trafficking of various kinds, intra-state conflicts and terrorism continue to stifle development.

At the same time, new forms of threats such as farmer-herdsmen conflict, and climate-change-induced displacement and conflict are increasing in several countries. While the vibrancy and hunger of the youth provide the key to unlocking these hidden potentials, this can only be achieved through adequate education, training and engagement of this growing population, otherwise these young people could again become instruments of violence, insecurity and underdevelopment.

Backcasting West Africa and the Sahel from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step EARLY 2024

Countries reach a new understanding of ways to manage regional conflict dynamics by moving from a focus on terrorism, trafficking and intra-state conflict to a much greater emphasis on agricultural development and mitigating the effects of climate change.

Key step EARLY 2023

There is increased investment in non-military counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mechanisms, with a focus on making violence unattractive, in line with the work of the Lake Chad Basin countries.

Key step LATE 2022

Countries in the region actively implement the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiative on youth by investing in skills development and fostering opportunities for young people.

2022

The European Union

By Dr Ricardo Borges de Castro

Associate Director and Head of the Europe in the World Programme, European Policy Centre

VISION 2025: *In a European continent again at peace, but facing geopolitical challenges, the European Union (EU) emerges as a more credible, strong, and autonomous provider of stability and resilience in its vicinity, complementing the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).*

How did the EU achieve this vision by 2025 in a context of rising geopolitical challenges?

It is June 2025. Peace returns to the European continent after Ukraine and Russia sign a peace treaty in early 2024 that puts an end to the war. Talks are ongoing with Russia to define a new framework for relations with the West and Europe's security architecture under the auspices of the OSCE.

In early 2025 the EU's long-awaited Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) becomes fully operational, allowing it to respond to a range of crisis situations. European countries steadily increase defence budgets to meet NATO's 2 per cent target and foster joint procurement and capability development to avoid waste and duplication. This investment allows EU countries to provide key strategic enablers to support the RDC – from airlift and medical assets to intelligence surveillance and

reconnaissance capabilities – and strengthen the EU's capacity to be a global actor for peace and security.

The reconstruction of an independent and sovereign Ukraine is entering its first year with support from the EU and several other countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the United States. Ukraine is now an EU candidate country and membership negotiations have started.

The EU is no longer dependent on Russian fossil fuels and continues its transition to clean energies, but also strives to reduce dependencies on critical raw materials vital for its digital transition. A new EU strategy for diversification, resilience and reliability of supply chains has been fully in force since the end of 2023.

Yet security and geopolitical challenges abound in the EU's neighbourhood. The aftershocks of the food security crisis unleashed by Russia's war on Ukraine are still felt, especially in the Middle East and North Africa region and sub-Saharan Africa. Intensified by climate-induced migration and instability and slower-than-expected COVID-19 vaccination campaigns, the resulting volatility requires global attention and solutions.

Backcasting the European Union from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step EARLY 2024

A Ukraine-Russia peace treaty is signed with the establishment of a joint peace and reconciliation commission chaired by the UN.

Key step MID-2023

The EU runs the first RDC live exercise with NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in the Mediterranean based on previously designed operational scenarios.

Key step MID-2022

NATO's new strategic concept reiterates the centrality of the NATO-EU partnership for the security, resilience and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic area.

2022

Eastern Europe

By Mr Paul Dziatkowicz

Head of Diplomatic Dialogue, GCSP

VISION 2025: *In response to the crisis in European security caused by the war in Ukraine, Eastern European states – in particular those on Russia’s periphery – are strengthening their resilience, while, thanks to continued sanctions on Russian energy, significant investments are being made in renewable energy, with a positive impact on the global climate.*

What factors lead to the 2025 vision in Eastern Europe being realised and what challenges remain?

There are some, but relatively few, positive knock-on effects from the Ukraine war. Following decades of foot-dragging on reforms, Eastern European states, particularly those on Russia’s periphery, grasp the urgency of their situation and move assertively to strengthen their resilience. Meanwhile, thanks to the war-induced sanctions, Eastern European governments are finally investing significantly in renewable energy, with positive impacts on the global climate.

However, West-Russia relations are at their lowest ebb in 50 years, while the multilateral system continues to reel from the shock of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. A “Cold War 2.0”, characterised by division and mistrust, replaces a relatively constructive era of multilateral

cooperation. Some compartmentalisation allows progress in limited areas of mutual interest, including a new Iran nuclear deal signed in late 2022.

Voices grow louder for wholesale reform of the UN Security Council. Meanwhile progress on rethinking the European security architecture remains elusive, as deterrence becomes the predominant Western doctrine. Wary of further Russian belligerence, European states have significantly raised their defence spending since 2022.

In mid-2023 Ukraine and Russia sign a lowest-common-denominator agreement to de-escalate, but this heralds an “ugly peace” that leaves key issues undressed; among others, Kyiv refuses Moscow’s demands to cede parts of Ukrainian territory. Despite the ceasefire, a heavily militarised Ukraine becomes the launching pad for an insurgency that retakes some territory and frustrates the de facto leaders of Russian-occupied south-eastern areas of the country. Russia, now economically weakened, struggles to contain it.

More positively, despite the strain on Western governments and the fragility of the ceasefire, donors rally to offer Ukraine a colossal “second Marshall Plan” to resuscitate its economy. Globally, the economic fallout from the war – including a food security crisis – is calamitous. Coupled with Putin-inspired military adventurism by other would-be “regional heavyweights”, this contributes to instability in other regions, leading to greater militarisation and reduced investment in socio-economic priorities.

Backcasting Eastern Europe from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step MID-2024

Eastern European countries announce a gradual pivot away from their over-reliance on fossil fuels in a new renewable energy pact.

Key step LATE 2023

A pledging conference for rebuilding Ukraine secures a US\$ 120 billion recovery package.

Key step MID-2023

A 'comprehensive ceasefire agreement' is signed between Ukraine and Russia, but is regularly breached.

2022

Middle East: Focus on Iran and the Gulf

By Dr Dina Esfandiary

Senior Advisor, Middle East and North Africa Programme, International Crisis Group

VISION 2025: *The Persian Gulf engages in inclusive, sustained and institutionalised dialogue to address sources of insecurity, concretely enable the maintenance of peace and pursue further avenues for greater regional integration.*

How does the Persian Gulf region accomplish the 2025 vision, despite the challenges facing it in 2022?

The region focuses on creating a sustained and inclusive regional dialogue to help overcome the distrust and cycles of heightened tension. This lays the groundwork for regional economic integration.

Fed by the perception of a growing US disengagement from the region, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the instability caused by regional conflicts, in 2022 regional states pragmatically pursue avenues for engagement with one another. This builds on the resolution of the Gulf crisis with the Al Ula agreement in January 2021, although many of the underlying causes of the split remain. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi pursue dialogue with Iran bilaterally, although this dialogue remains limited in mid-2022. To achieve the 2025 vision, it is imperative that these bilateral dialogue

tracks are expanded to eventually lead to an inclusive regional dialogue.

But some key challenges remain, the repercussions of which may still linger in 2025. The fate of the nuclear deal with Iran (the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) remains uncertain; the conflict in Yemen drags on, increasing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and new international crises such as the war in Ukraine pose new challenges for some countries, while providing a boost to others in the Gulf region.

Backcasting the Middle East: Focus on Iran and the Gulf from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step LATE 2025

An institutionalised regional dialogue forum is established comprising the Gulf Arab states, Iran, Iraq and Yemen to discuss regional security issues and steps for greater regional integration.

Key step MID-2024

The existing bilateral conversations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE, and within the Gulf Cooperation Council are expanded into a region-wide dialogue.

Key step LATE 2023

Progress is made on existing bilateral dialogue tracks between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE, Qatar and the UAE, and Qatar and Bahrain.

2022

South Asia

By Dr Dhanasree Jayaram

International Climate Protection Fellow, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
and Assistant Professor, Manipal Academy of Higher Education

VISION 2025: *South Asia is developing integrated and innovative responses through regional partnerships in ecological and energy resilience, transboundary connectivity, socio-economic well-being, and interpersonal relations.*

How does the geopolitically fragmented region of South Asia achieve the 2025 vision in view of the challenges facing it in 2022?

The region of South Asia (constituted by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) undertakes an integrated response to major transboundary challenges – a need reinforced by the shared ecosystems and socio-cultural linkages that do not recognise political boundaries. Regional partnerships are formed by 2025 through bilateral agreements between countries; existing regional organisations/forums such as the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Initiative and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); and non-state transboundary networks.

The various planetary crises (e.g. climate change, COVID-19, etc.) present new opportunities in the years

leading up to 2025 for the development of regional partnerships in key areas that will benefit all countries in South Asia. This includes, for example, building partnerships to increase knowledge production and sharing, resource pooling, innovation, sustainable development, and cultural relations, which would aid sustainable infrastructure development, disaster risk reduction, food-water-energy security, livelihood diversification, economic well-being, smart connectivity, gender mainstreaming and overall planetary health.

However, political and democratic fragility in the region's countries, socio-economic crises, and lack of financial and technological resources remain in several of these countries to varying degrees. Transnational challenges (e.g. terrorism), border disputes (e.g. Kashmir), and the influence of extra-regional players (e.g. China and the United States) also continue to shape geopolitical tensions in the region, leading to a general lack of trust among regional countries. These elements have thus far affected possibilities for regional cooperation on peace and security in the region, but could be partially overcome by the focus on partnerships in key areas.

Backcasting South Asia from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step LATE 2024

Key transboundary projects are implemented in the Bay of Bengal region, made possible by the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and sustainable development within all regional cooperation frameworks.

Key step MID-2023

Existing working groups are strengthened through financial mobilisation and the setting up of regional knowledge networks and implementation agencies based on a joint statement issued after the meeting in late 2022 and steps taken to develop an institutionalised response to various challenges.

Key step LATE 2022

South Asian countries meet to discuss ways to overcome major socio-economic upheavals, including the ongoing political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka, and catastrophic disasters.

2022

Latin America and the Caribbean

By Ms Maricela Muñoz

Executive-in-Residence, GCSP, and Former Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations in Geneva

VISION 2025: *Latin America and the Caribbean are fostering long-term human security and sustainable development shaped by political stability, strong leadership, inclusiveness and equality, and creating a region where everyone lives with dignity and well-being.*

How does the region achieve its vision for 2025 despite the prevailing challenges facing it in 2022?

By adopting a visionary perspective of how 2025 will look, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean experience a green, just and sustained recovery from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For starters, deep structural reforms take place to deal with high poverty, unemployment and inflation rates in 2022. Many leaders in the region finally understand that the only way out of the economic and climate debacles is through their genuine commitment to inclusive dialogue and collective action. They therefore purposefully call on women, youth and other excluded communities to give their views on and participate in a new social contract.

Governments from across the political spectrum advance transformative policy agendas and internalise the need to decisively invest in clean technologies to escape the spiralling price of fossil fuels and mitigate climate change. They are particularly successful in attracting blended financial investments for this purpose, while negotiating salient and people-focused agreements with international financial institutions.

Notwithstanding these achievements, national and regional security remains weak until 2025, with corruption, impunity, violence and transnational organised crime still rampant. Increasing respect for human rights, closing the infrastructure and technological gaps, and achieving meaningful human development continue to be a “work in progress” across the region.

Backcasting Latin America and the Caribbean from 2025 to 2022

2025

Key step EARLY 2024

Green recovery mechanisms
are mainstreamed.


Key step LATE 2023

Collective governance models are
developed in a majority of countries.

Key step MID-2022

Ambitious yet achievable climate
change strategies are implemented.

2022



PART II

Effective response

The peace and security marina

By Ms Emily Munro

Head of Strategic Anticipation, GCSP



A marina is a dock with moorings and other features for yachts and small boats located on seas, lakes or rivers. It is an interconnected system that allows for the safe and smooth functioning of boating. A marina here represents the system in which peace and security professionals are operating. Various components of this system need to work together collaboratively for achievements to occur. However, challenges exist for users of the marina from the weather systems that come in off the water to technical breakdowns that may occur. What are the components of our peace and security marina and their key characteristics?

Open sea:

The wider environment of *multilateral cooperation* of our peace and security actors in terms of which incoming weather systems (i.e. challenges) can be seen on the horizon. This system experiences turbulence as the weather changes more frequently due to climate change, and our boats must be able to effectively manage the increasing ups and downs.

Regattas:

Joint activities in which many boats take part, thus constituting settings for the building of informal *networks and unprecedented coalitions*. Unexpected communications and meetings occur during a regatta both on and off the water among diverse stakeholders, which may lead to innovative ideas and breakthrough results in efforts to resolve seemingly intractable problems.

Repairs and refueling:

Technical activities to maintain the marina and its members (boats) during which *dialogue* on misperceptions and areas of disagreement take place among boat crews. This dialogue occurs calmly off the water on dry ground. Trust and common understanding can be achieved by pausing to fix a technical breakdown or when refueling is required. It is also a moment where boats can exchange parts (i.e. best practices) to increase their ability to navigate troubled waters.

Boats:

Diverse *individual actors* that link up with different teams (in the marina analogy, dock at different jetties). These individuals in our peace and security marina bring their own personality characteristics, institutional backgrounds and perspectives – just like the rich diversity of boats in a marina – that enrich their conversations and achievements. Peace and security actors also need others to operate effectively and they need to adapt to the rapidly moving and complex security environment as they link up with other teams.

Boat computer system:

Our *strategic foresight system* that helps us to make sense of the peace and security environment by identifying weak signals, monitoring trends, addressing issue interconnections, and creatively and collaboratively devising scenarios of how the future may evolve. The waters ahead may change rapidly from smooth to very bumpy – or somewhere in between – but strategic foresight can help us to be more resilient in the face of such changes. These individual computer systems are highly connected to other systems, including on many other boats, that enable them to fulfil their functions.

Jetties:

The different *teams* we work in, in our organisational, bilateral, multilateral and ad-hoc settings. Cooperating on long-standing and cutting-edge issues in peace and security requires interacting with individuals from diverse domains and building understanding across multiple boundaries (geographical, cultural, linguistic, expertise). In other words, some boats are there for many different reasons, but they all have to share the same jetty harmoniously and cooperate to achieve common aims.

Reimagining leadership

By Mr Peter Cunningham

Head of Leadership and Co-director, Geneva Leadership Alliance, GCSP

Organisations and leaders in the international peace and security sector are experiencing significant changes in and disruption to almost all aspects of their work. Looking out to 2025, the following factors are likely to differentiate leaders who can adapt themselves and their organisations.

Firstly, *a mindset that leadership is more than a position held by an individual*. While leadership roles and responsibilities remain important, it is equally important to encourage leadership practices that everyone should be expected to demonstrate. Recognising the importance of both individual leader roles and shared leadership practices will increase the capacity of teams and organisations to meet the demands of complex work that requires the ability to adapt quickly to challenges as they arise.

Secondly, *establishing and maintaining trust with diverse stakeholders*. This is both an internal and an external priority: internally, as workforces become more diverse and are expected to collaborate with people from different professions, cultures, and world-views; and externally, as cross-sector collaboration is increasingly required. The building of public trust will

require purposeful attention, especially at senior levels of leadership.

Thirdly, *defining short-term priorities and providing medium-term sense-making*. Short-term priorities help people to focus on what matters most at times of high uncertainty. Convening people from different perspectives with different types of expertise to engage in collective sense-making through foresight is a valuable practice. Beyond eliciting plausible futures, it also encourages people to listen to, exchange, and value different points of view, and learn to navigate conflict healthily. It will also develop the collective capacity to recognise and flag early signals of change, and so respond more resiliently to uncertainty.

These three factors can make a positive difference; however, there are other aspects of leadership to consider, such as culturally different approaches to leadership; re-evaluating the capabilities needed in an organisation in the years ahead; and how to attract, motivate and retain the best people possible to work with you.

Peace and security in turbulent times: Breaking the silos

By Dr Stephan Davidshofer

Course Director, European Security Course, and Academic Advisor to the Master of Advanced Studies, GCSP

It is manifestly obvious that the globalised and interdependent world we live in calls for flexible and adaptive solutions to the many challenges we face. Issues such as global warming or terrorism constitute transnational challenges to peace and security that need to be dealt with by a great variety of actors using many different tools. The fact that the past three years witnessed a succession of two major global crises – the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine – adds a significant level of complexity to any attempt to look forward to 2025.

That being said, security and peace expertise is still scattered among numerous and very different professions and areas of know-how, each with its own rules, values and traditions. When cooperation becomes essential – let's say in the aftermath of an armed conflict – militaries, police officers and humanitarian actors would all have different solutions for the same problem.

Thus, coping with the challenges of global governance calls for breaking silos and building solid bridges linking very different professional universes. This can be

achieved by constantly working on the development of efficient networks as places where peace and security actors coming from very diverse geographical and professional environments can get to know each other and learn to work together. This goes beyond just setting up loose platforms for possible cooperation, but entails the constant development of common knowledge and approaches.

Effective solutions need therefore to create safe and inclusive spaces where different and sometimes diverging expertise can cross-fertilise.

Uncharted waters call for unprecedented coalitions

By Dr Thomas Gauthier

Professor, emlyon business school, and Associate Fellow, GCSP

According to [Stewart Brand](#), there are “six significant levels of pace and size in the working structure of a robust and adaptable civilization”: innovation, business, infrastructure, governance, culture and nature. [Crises of civilisation](#), which strategic anticipation can help us inquire into, may unfold when each layer does not respect the pace of the others. Thus, when business today is “allowed by governance and culture to push nature at a business pace”, then life-support systems such as wetlands, oceans and the atmosphere will become increasingly endangered out to 2025.

All in all, societies are racing towards ever-greater (technological) complexity in an attempt to solve the existential problems they have to deal with. Meanwhile, energy and other natural resources that are vital to sustain ever-increasing levels of complexity are finite. Hence humanity is finding itself in an unprecedented predicament. This predicament will impact peace and security as conflicts over these resources multiply and different approaches to manage the increasing level of complexity are implemented.

Strategic anticipation can be used to inform and facilitate the design of different paths to address the predicament, i.e. innovative state-led, multilateral dialogues to implement new forms of policy action and the creation of unprecedented coalitions that bring together diverse groups of environmental, social justice and political advocates with artists who are imagining a green future.

Conclusion

By **Ms Emily Munro** Head of Strategic Anticipation, GCSP and **Mr Pablo Chaillat** Junior Professional Officer, GCSP

In an ideal world, peace and security professionals would spend their time in prevention mode, i.e. analysing conflict, implementing strategies to prevent it from erupting, and working in harmony with local and international actors from a variety of sectors. In reality, these professionals spend more time in reaction mode or firefighting as the world stumbles from one crisis to another. The time dedicated to looking further than one year – or even six months – ahead is very limited. This publication has invited experts to take this too rare step and make an imaginative leap out to 2025 to describe their visions for a region and what it would take to get there, realistically. This is not an idealistic form of visioning, but a practical attempt to draw attention to the steps we can take today to encourage such a vision to emerge. We have also asked what the approaches are that will allow us to work effectively in the peace and security environment that will emerge in 2025. Focusing on reimagining leadership, cultivating unprecedented coalitions, and breaking down silos limiting the way in which peace and security are governed, our experts explore how existing working methods may need to be adapted and new ones found.

What are the takeaways from this effort? The key takeaway is that it is possible for peace and security actors

to enhance their ability to deal with change and dare to make decisions in 2022 with the long term in mind that prepare us to cope with the challenges we may face in 2025. This requires in particular a firm commitment to addressing the impacts of climate change, tackling inequalities related to a range of human security concerns, and engaging in bold political dialogue at a time of high geopolitical tensions. Rebuilding trust is another pressing issue that leaders must not lose sight of, while creating innovative partnerships and investing in multilateral institutions are also key.

In the face of a largely gloomy international security outlook in the first half of 2022, this publication has attempted to take a constructive look at the next couple of years. In a forward-looking and realistic way we hope that the analysis and ideas it presents will provide readers with some inspiration on how to cultivate the peace and security environment of 2025 that we want to evolve.

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation established in 1995, with 52 member states, for the primary purpose of promoting peace, security and international cooperation through executive education, applied policy research and dialogue. The GCSP trains government officials, diplomats, military officers, international civil servants and NGO and private sector staff in pertinent fields of international peace and security

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Maison de la paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2D
P.O. Box 1295
CH-1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland

Tel: + 41 22 730 96 00
Fax: + 41 22 730 96 49
E-mail: info@gcsp.ch
www.gcsp.ch

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