



Strategic Security Analysis

Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Antoine Got



Key Points

- In recent years, the out-of-area crisis-management activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been limited compared to the heyday of such endeavours in the 1990s and early 2000s. As the alliance prepares to unveil its next Strategic Concept, questions have been raised over the future of its out-of-area aspirations.
- Underpinning this is a debate framed, on the one hand, by calls for NATO to revert to projecting more influence globally, while others argue that the organisation should remain firmly anchored in the territorial defence of its member nations, as seen since 2014 after Russia's invasion of Crimea. It will be difficult for the next Strategic Concept to reconcile these competing visions.
- However, this dichotomy is outdated in many ways. The (re)appearance of great- and middle-power competition, the transnationalisation of security challenges and transformations in the nature of warfare itself are imposing new demands on NATO that in many ways will force the organisation to look beyond its member nations' borders.
- While existing out-of-area activities illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO's role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability, the alliance clearly remains hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. After its experience in Afghanistan, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high.
- This is unfortunate, because out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and a middle ground exists between these types of deployments and the political costs of inaction. To remain a prominent crisis-management actor, NATO must continue to apply the wide array of non-Article 5 instruments at its disposal for the best possible outcomes before, during and after conflict.

About the Author

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Introduction

As NATO articulates its priorities for addressing the next decade of security- and defence-related challenges, it is a timely moment to ask this key question: In an era of renewed great-power rivalry and pervasive instability, what responsibilities – if any – does NATO want to assume as a crisis-management and security provider outside its borders? The answer is not as simple as it seems. For while NATO certainly remains the undisputed guarantor of European collective defence and anchor of the US presence on the continent, in recent years the organisation has found it increasingly challenging to maintain its privileged status as the West's vehicle of choice for the use of force on its periphery. This has not always been the case: in the 1990s and early 2000s the alliance was seen by most as the primary orchestrator of Western crisis-management and stabilisation efforts around the world. In recent years, however, NATO's activities in this area have been comparably limited, which in turn raises questions over the future of the alliance and its member nations' aspirations in this regard. In 2019 French president Emmanuel Macron memorably lambasted NATO for being "brain dead", providing the impetus for the organisation to self-reflect on its priorities in the years up to 2030.

The alliance has promising options to offer in response to president Macron's challenge. Several were unveiled at the 14 June 2021 Brussels Summit, where the organisation's 30 member nations introduced a series of high-profile initiatives.¹ Among them was the decision to initiate a revision of the NATO Strategic Concept (its last iteration dated back to 2010). Another was the approval of the NATO 2030 "agenda for the future", providing a roadmap for long-term alliance adaptation.²

An important theme to emerge from these debates and from the forward-looking report submitted in November 2020 by an independent "Reflection Group"³ is a shared recognition that NATO should adopt a more international outlook and improve its ability to act as a multinational crisis-management institution. This was echoed in various public forums by the organisation's secretary general,⁴ Jens Stoltenberg, reigniting long-standing debates on the alliance's core functions and geographical scope. These are framed, on the one hand, by calls for NATO to revert to projecting more influence globally in Asia, the Middle East or Africa, while others argue that the organisation should remain firmly anchored in the territorial defence of its member nations, as has been apparent since Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea.

The most challenging task for the next Strategic Concept will be to reconcile these competing visions. In the current environment, compromise will likely be the outcome. For while NATO remains unlikely to re-engage in large-scale troop deployments and stabilisation efforts abroad soon, the organisation is not rescinding its role on the global stage, with promising signs of shifting allied attitudes and a growing recognition that engagement is necessary in this era of instability and renewed great-power competition. The following analysis will provide the historical context to the strategic dilemmas underpinning NATO's current out-of-area endeavours, before identifying some of the core security challenges the alliance is facing in this realm and evaluating the resources allocated to address them.

A contested evolution

NATO has embarked on the process of producing a revised Strategic Concept, which will be presented at the forthcoming 2022 summit in Madrid. As part of this process a vigorous debate is taking place over its role as a security provider. As China grows in prominence on the organisation's strategic agenda, an underlying question is that of the type of presence or power projection the alliance is willing to commit to in the Indo-Pacific area. A shift towards greater involvement in this area would likely meet with US approval. On NATO's southern border, many remain preoccupied with risks stemming from the Middle East and North Africa region – terrorism, instability and migration – while new conventional and hybrid challenges are arising from geopolitical rivals that include Russia, Iran and, increasingly, China. Russia, with its enduring assertiveness in terms of both rhetoric and action, remains a considerable threat to Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and others, as the latest troop manoeuvres on its border with Ukraine and growing hold over Belarus illustrate. The problem, of course, is that such challenges are hard to reconcile, given competing risk perceptions, and even more so to synthesise into a single strategic narrative.

Historically, this is perhaps unsurprising. For most of its existence NATO's essential *raison d'être* was firmly anchored in its core Article 5 task of ensuring collective defence.⁵ It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 that the organisation began a historic process of strategic reorientation away from the territorial defence of European states toward a broader range of security concerns and responsibilities. In the latter end of the 1990s this paved the way for a series of decisive NATO-led military interventions in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia which, together with the advent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), produced a great deal of optimism regarding the ability and perceived duty of foreign powers to defend populations against state-perpetrated atrocities in other parts of the world.

But as the early optimism of the 1990s turned into the excesses of the so-called "War on Terror" and 2003 invasion of Iraq, this enthusiasm began to falter. With the alliance's difficult experiences in Libya and Afghanistan came an enduring perception of mission fatigue and a sense of NATO's own limitations as a military organisation supporting crisis management. While Afghanistan helped to erode allied willingness to engage in future comparably ambitious stabilisation efforts abroad, events in Libya accelerated underlying trends by elevating questions over whether NATO was suited to act as a primary enforcer of R2P. This produced enduring scepticism regarding the general desirability and efficacy of NATO's engagements abroad, which culminated in 2014 with the end of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the transition to a "train-and-advise" mission that withdrew in September 2021.

A major turning point, moreover, came with Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing military involvement in eastern Ukraine. After years of decreased spending on conventional military capabilities and doctrinal emphasis on power projection, these events provided tangible incentives for the alliance to recalibrate its posture back to an emphasis on its Article 5 commitments,⁶ ushering in a sense of a "return to Europe".⁷ This had important ramifications for allied thinking on the organisation's operations and missions, reawakening underlying divisions in the security perceptions of NATO states along geographical and strategic lines. With eastern allies, especially Poland and the Baltic states, becoming reluctant

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to allocate the limited resources of the alliance to external excursions while they face the real prospect of some form of Russian aggression, the threshold for reaching consensus on such undertakings came to be set remarkably high.

Currently these trends have converged to produce an environment in which the alliance's willingness to engage in non-Article 5 crisis-response operations and missions has become comparably limited. Once active across the full spectrum of crisis-management endeavours, NATO operations and missions are now limited to a narrow, mostly non-combatant range of activities far from the original tempo, diversity and intent of their early days. Instead, the alliance is now relying more and more on a set of train-and-advise activities, defence capacity-building and security sector reform (SSR) programmes to support a growing list of partners ranging from Ukraine, Georgia and Tunisia to Iraq. The aim is to achieve resilience and stability under the core umbrella framework of "Projecting Stability", launched at the 2016 Warsaw Summit.⁸ This in turn mirrors an important shift taking place in allied and Western thinking on crisis management, moving from its earlier emphasis on large-scale force projection and response to a greater focus on prevention and the ability of partner countries to resist future shocks – a fragile compromise reached to accommodate the concerns of allies. On a military level, this is reflected in the adaptation of instruments such as the NATO Response Force, which were gradually tailored to better meet the demands of collective defence in the European theatre, with increased readiness and combat effectiveness, and the creation of a "spearhead force" within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

This transition, however, has not been without its own risks and trade-offs, which the alliance is now beginning to appreciate. Firstly, despite the organisation boasting a wide array of tools to engage crises in today's complex security environment, its reduced footprint – now limited to mostly non-kinetic undertakings – affords it only limited influence on the strategic and operational conduct of conflicts occurring on its periphery and beyond.⁹ Secondly, with the organisation often struggling in recent years to act as a forum for coordinated Western strategy, allies have been increasingly incentivised to secure their interests via unilateral action and coalition-building outside the NATO framework, igniting tensions at the expense of unity.¹⁰ The European Union (EU), meanwhile, has been comparatively more active than NATO in the area of crisis management, offering with its Common Security and Defence Policy framework¹¹ a more civilian alternative to NATO while emboldening EU proponents of the "strategic autonomy" concept.¹² In an increasingly crowded environment of security providers, these trends put the alliance at risk of becoming institutionally marginalised as a viable crisis-management player.

Current threat landscape

In addition, NATO's threat landscape is changing. Competition with Russia and especially China is growing in prominence on the strategic map of NATO governments, adding to the enduring threat posed by terrorist organisations and compounded by risks stemming from the technological and environmental domains.¹³ Among these issues, a number of external security challenges requiring attention were not nearly as prominent a decade ago, and will in the future increasingly shape the ways in which NATO will interact with the wider world. This requires a better understanding of tomorrow's conflicts – and a re-evaluation of the role NATO can play in them.

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A cross-cutting characteristic of the contemporary environment lies with the recognition that where NATO does not act, others will. The heightened state of geopolitical competition and emergence of new instruments of power and technologies that facilitate intervention by surrogate(s) without many of the traditional costs associated with these otherwise risky, high-stakes foreign endeavours¹⁴ have made the environment in which NATO will have increasingly to operate considerably more contested. With the returning appeal of war by proxy making contemporary crises highly zero-sum in nature, state and non-state actors alike are now more likely than ever to capitalise on the breakdown of order outside NATO's borders to exert power and influence, often at the expense of Western interests. Recent years have seen state competitors – notably Russia – demonstrate a willingness to use crises as opportunities to shape strategic environments to their own advantage, which they could then exploit in a conflict with NATO.¹⁵

Most importantly, these strategies are no longer the privilege of great powers. Iran has a long history of supporting proxy groups in the Middle East, including Hamas and Hezbollah, militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. Seeking to confront Iran's growing regional influence, Saudi Arabia is providing varying degrees of support to opposing sides in Syria, Yemen and beyond. Pakistan, too, has a long track record of supporting proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan, while the Libyan conflict has seen Egypt, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and others all vie for influence and a victorious outcome.

Simultaneously, China's growing influence is adding more stress to an already pressurised international system. As Beijing seeks to consolidate its rising status, a key concern lays with its use of its economic, military and political clout to coerce or otherwise persuade weaker nations to acquiesce to its foreign objectives. To protect its commercial interests stemming from the Belt and Road Initiative, China has sought to bolster its blue-water navy and force projection capabilities to the "far seas", including through construction of a brand-new base in Djibouti, bringing Chinese military presence ever closer to the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁶ The ambiguity of Beijing's ties with Moscow, meanwhile, brings considerable uncertainty to strategic calculus in the West. Against the backdrop of receding democratic norms globally, the support that states like Russia and China provide to undemocratic regimes and proxies, together with Beijing's fervent anti-interventionism, raise the prospect of Western marginalisation, while their commitment to an illiberal world order challenges the West's ability to uphold its rules-based character.

Below state-level dynamics, criminal organisations, private military and security companies, militias, paramilitaries, terrorist groups, and other non-state players have displayed a tendency to thrive in the chaos and vacuum produced by failed states and ungoverned spaces, producing myriad challenges for NATO allies in the political, economic, social and security spheres, with consequences well beyond the geographical site of their activities. Although its reverses in Iraq and Syria forced some of its activities back underground, non-state groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which emerged in Iraq and the Levant, have expanded their activities to areas as diverse as Afghanistan, Libya, Mozambique and the Sahel.

This transnationalisation of security challenges points to the many ways in which crises and conflicts have evolved to become more complex and ubiquitous globally, challenging the associated foreign efforts to support stabilisation and recovery – a difficulty NATO is all too aware of, given its experiences in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In this increasingly complex

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and ambiguous environment some distinctions that were once crucial, for instance between Article 5- and non-Article 5-related matters, have lost their previous meaning and monopoly. If the events of 11 September 2001 had already illustrated how instability abroad could have security consequences at home, reaching the threshold of an Article 5 armed attack, the trends that made this possible have since only accelerated. The breakdown of order in Libya, Syria, the Sahel and other parts of the world, combined with increasingly sophisticated technology and ubiquitous access to the Internet, enables terrorists to attract recruits with unparalleled ease, evade detection and operate anonymously – making it easier than ever for them to proliferate. In future decades, climate change will open sea lines in the Arctic, bringing collective defence challenges for NATO through the increased military presence of opponents like Russia. Insurgencies in the Middle East and North Africa help to increase adversaries' military presence on the southern flank of the alliance and the Mediterranean. This increases the burden on organisations like NATO to become more global and anticipate risks abroad before they materialise.

This ambiguity stems, moreover, from transformations currently taking place in the nature of conflict itself. With foreign aggression unlikely to come in the form of a large-scale invasion or deployment of force, and with low odds of interstate war occurring, the instruments of power nations are willing to deploy to defend their interests abroad are changing. Most current adversarial actions occur below the threshold of what is normally considered to be an armed attack in what can be called the “grey zone” of conflict. States and terror groups increasingly use an agile combination of conventional and irregular methods and technologies to secure strategic aims: disinformation, cyber attacks, interference with democratic processes, economic coercion, proxies, etc. Crucially, these threats are often covert and not bound by geography, which in turn increases their value as foreign policy instruments. The WannaCry ransomware attack, for instance, thought to have been launched by North Korea, affected hundreds of thousands of computers in more than 150 countries worldwide, with disastrous consequences. This, too, forces security institutions like NATO to look beyond their borders.

A more global outlook

These trends confirm, firstly, that the West's unipolar moment is firmly over, and that its uncontested presence in a largely favourable international environment is a thing of the past. Secondly, they encourage NATO to become more assertive, and serve as a warning sign that the West cannot remain confined within the geographical boundaries of Europe and North America, or indifferent to crises brewing on its periphery and beyond. Although it will be challenging to address this wide array of threats credibly, the alliance, fortunately, has an impressive track record of adaptation to the ebb and flow of history. Currently consensus is beginning to emerge on the desirability to orchestrate a cautious return to the global stage using existing instruments, including partnerships, to face competition with Russia and China and continue the fight against terrorism.

Some initiatives that can be envisaged in these terms capitalise on the success of existing programmes to provide defence capacity-building, training and SSR assistance to partners, which NATO allies are looking to expand in several areas around the world, including the Middle East and Africa. They also involve functional domains such as countering hybrid threats and increasing vulnerable countries' counter-terrorism capacity.¹⁷

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Such efforts are based on the recognition that, as the world's greatest source of military expertise and know-how, NATO can share knowledge and best practices to help establish the conditions for long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law¹⁸ – thus reducing the risks and potential costs of crises deteriorating into conflict.

Other initiatives relate to engagement with multinational organisations. Cooperation with the EU has grown exponentially in recent years, especially in the areas of resilience, exercises, hybrid threats, dialogue and logistics. Amid calls for the EU to become a more geopolitical actor, such cooperation is likely to remain a high priority, notably to ensure that NATO and the EU do not compete with, but complement each other. While these initiatives have hitherto focused on the European space, a logical area for expanded cooperation would be external crisis management, where their respective capabilities – civilian on the one hand, military on the other – seem to be inherently complementary. NATO engagement with the African Union (AU), meanwhile, remains comparatively modest, although this is also likely to evolve with plans – reiterated at the 2021 Brussels Summit – to increase support in the area of peace operations. Greater engagement with the AU reinforces two important NATO strategic objectives: improving stability and regional ownership of security assistance efforts in Africa, and countering China's growing regional security influence.

Engagement in the Indo-Pacific is another important yet controversial point on the alliance's agenda, driven especially by Washington's desire to show a united front against China, but encouraged also by support from the United Kingdom, France and Germany. While perhaps it is still too early to determine the full scope of future activities in the region, the high degree of political signalling taking place among NATO, India, and NATO partners Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea is a sign that NATO is increasingly willing to generate new forms of regional cooperation, likely in a bid to strengthen messaging toward Beijing.¹⁹ Such efforts, driven by a desire to protect democratic and liberal values against encroachment and guarantee freedom of navigation on the region's seas, could involve enhanced strategic dialogue, joint exercises, and demonstrations of air and naval forces.

Finally, with future conflicts increasingly requiring decision-making agility, speed and flexibility,²⁰ NATO allies agreed at the Brussels Summit to look inward at internal challenges that are a recurring obstacle in matters of out-of-area engagement. With this in mind, the allies have made a compelling appeals to strengthen the North Atlantic Council as a genuine forum for consultation, and for NATO to adopt measures to ensure that consensus-based decisions are reached in a timely manner and successfully implemented.²¹ They acknowledge that some of the challenges that NATO is currently facing can be alleviated by enhancing the organisation's internal consultative and decision-making functions. For although its integrated command structure and highly interoperable capabilities make the alliance a powerful instrument for the collective application of force, it often struggles to translate multiple political wills into concrete action. While NATO allies have refrained to date from agreeing to any departure from the consensus principle, fearing it would weaken the organisation's cohesion, the independent Reflection Group had initially proposed institutionalising a mechanism enabling the formation of internal coalitions.²² The proposal, however, was not subsequently referred to in the Brussels Summit communiqué.

Looking ahead

While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO's role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high.

NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exists between this and the political costs of inaction.

At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the *known* risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over-reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non-Article 5 instruments at NATO's disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence.²³ NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict.

NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exists between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.²⁴

Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out-of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis-management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.

Endnotes

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5. J. Sperling and M. Webber, "NATO Operations", in H. Meijer and M. Wyss (eds), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018.
6. For more on Article 5, see NATO, "Collective Defence – Article 5", 8 February 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.
7. Ibid.
8. See R. Díaz-Plaja, "Projecting Stability: An Agenda for Action", *NATO Review*, 13 March 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/03/13/projecting-stability-an-agenda-for-action/index.html>.
9. The consequences are observable in areas of active fighting, including Iraq and Afghanistan, where alliance missions have become mostly unsustainable without the concomitant application of kinetic force by individual allies, notably the United States, on which they rely to ensure stable operational conditions, logistical support, and the protection of mission and diplomatic personnel. This in turn raises concerns over fair burden sharing at a time when Washington is increasingly unwilling to let Europeans free ride on US hard power abroad or to commit resources to the "forever wars" of the Middle East and North Africa.
10. Beyond harming cohesion, the West's experiences in Libya and Syria illustrate how such dynamics can collapse into a series of disjointed and highly ineffective national efforts, which in turn impair the interrelated agendas of humanitarian assistance and stabilisation, and create opportunities for adversaries to meddle. Similarly, the support that Western allies have provided to proxies on opposing sides of conflicts in places like Libya and Syria has contributed to generating unnecessary tensions between them, which if anything underscores the role NATO can play as a forum for consensus building and coordination regarding such endeavours.
11. European Commission, "Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)", n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.
12. The concept of "strategic autonomy" was first referred to in 2013; see European Council, "Conclusions", EUCO 217/13, European Council, 19/20 December 2013, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf.
13. De Maizière et al., 2020.
14. A. Krieg and J.-M. Rickli, *Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-first Century*, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2019.
15. Russia's intervention in Syria illustrated how competitors can capitalise on instability abroad to bolster their strategic and international standing. In Libya a number of states' political and military involvement has become increasingly active and visible in recent years, helped by the deployment of state-affiliated private military companies, including Russia's infamous Wagner Group.
16. M.D. Swaine, "The PLA Navy's Strategic Transformation to the 'Far Seas': How Far, How Threatening, and What's to Be Done?", paper presented at the conference on Going Global? The People's Navy in a Time of Strategic Transformation, China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College, Newport, 7 May 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/07/pla-navy-s-strategic-transformation-to-far-seas-how-far-how-threatening-and-what-s-to-be-done-pub-80588>.
17. In February 2021 NATO announced that it would enlarge its mission in Iraq to a maximum of 4,000 personnel and become responsible for some of the non-combat activities carried out to date by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. Other plans include providing more training to Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners by capitalising on the NATO-ICI Regional Centre inaugurated in Kuwait in 2017. In Africa, additional engagement with regional structures like the G5 Sahel and individual member nations is likely, with a recent NATO trip to Mauritania undertaken to lay the groundwork for additional activities with the country's national security institutions.
18. Díaz-Plaja, 2021.
19. In December 2020 NATO's four Asia-Pacific partners participated for the first time ever in a NATO foreign ministerial meeting, with allies subsequently agreeing at the Brussels Summit in June 2021 to increase dialogue and practical cooperation in the region.
20. See C. Kasapoğlu and B. Kirdemir, "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict", in T. Valášek (ed.), *New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO's Next 70 Years*, Brussels, Carnegie Europe, 2019; J.-M. Rickli, "The Strategic Implications of Artificial Intelligence", in A. Naqvi and M.J. Munoz (eds), *Handbook of Artificial Intelligence and Robotic Process Automation: Policy and Government Applications*, London, Anthem Press, 2020.
21. De Maizière et al., 2020.
22. The organisation's expansion to 30 allies and the ensuing plurality of risk perceptions and domestic political challenges that make consensus more difficult to achieve have brought new salience to this issue.
23. These can serve to orchestrate extraction operations; support disaster relief and humanitarian operations; conduct search and rescue missions; guarantee freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement; sanction and embargo enforcement; and provide support to stabilisation and reconstruction, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency.
24. While such undertaking can be contentious, raising questions of secrecy and accountability, NATO can reconcile this with principles of transparency and legitimacy, mirroring, for instance, the successes achieved to date by the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, while capitalising on the targeting and accuracy advances offered by emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence and data analysis.



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