



Strategic Security Analysis

Developing Anticipatory Governance Capacities in Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Oliver Jütersonke and Emily Munro





The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation that aims to advance global cooperation, security and peace. The foundation is supported by the Swiss government and governed by 54 member states. The GCSP provides a unique 360° approach to learn about and solve global challenges. The foundation's mission is to educate leaders, facilitate dialogue, advise through in-house research, inspire new ideas and connect experts to develop sustainable solutions to build a more peaceful future.

Strategic Security Analyses

The GCSP Strategic Security Analyses series publishes short papers that address a current security issue. These papers provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and challenges, and propose policy recommendations.

This series is edited by Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli, Head of Global and Emerging Risks.

About the authors

Oliver Jütersonke is an independent researcher, knowledge broker and conflict analyst with over 15 years of professional experience in sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. His work focuses on the conceptualisation and assessment of projects and programming, the facilitation of organisational reflection processes, and the design and delivery of training curriculums and analytical tools for policy practitioners – including in the area of strategic anticipation.

Emily Munro is Head of Strategic Anticipation and a Senior Advisor, Research and Policy Advice at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. She works with governments and organisations around the world to foster more forward-thinking approaches to peace and security. She has worked on strategic foresight with partners such as the UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with governments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to extend their gratitude to all the individuals from foreign and international affairs circles who provided input to the research study that led to this Strategic Security Analysis.

ISBN: 978-2-88947-319-9

© Geneva Centre for Security Policy, January 2024

The views, information and opinions expressed in this publication are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect those of the GCSP or the members of its Foundation Council. The GCSP is not responsible for the accuracy of the information.

Cover photo: Brian A Jackson, Shutterstock.com



Key points

- Using strategic foresight in ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) involves employing a portfolio of approaches for anticipating futures across different time horizons, as part of what is institutionally becoming known as anticipatory governance.
- This approach turns the narrative that MFAs usually only react to the current volatile and complex environment characterised by crises such as climate change, health pandemics, and inter-state war into a proactive one whereby foreign policy decision-makers can strategically prepare for what may lie ahead.
- Building this capacity in MFAs requires generating and continuously readjusting a sustained demand for anticipatory and foresight-related products and outputs so that it is in line with the timely and convincing supply of such deliverables.
- Taken together, nurturing this enabling environment for the pursuit of strategic foresight in MFAs requires attention to three key elements: (1) the organisational parameters within which activities are carried out (the 'where'); (2) the skills and resources required (the 'who'); and (3) the concrete processes and activities involved (the 'what' and 'how').
- For MFAs to consolidate these aspects they will need to identify weak points to work on and strengths to exploit. Creating strategic value, establishing the necessary arrangements, fostering appropriate connections, and integrating such efforts will take time, and adjustments are to be expected as the equilibrium between demand and supply is constantly recalibrated in response to changing circumstances.



Introduction

Faced by multiple crises, including climate change, health pandemics and full-scale inter-state war, decision-makers in foreign affairs are increasingly turning to strategic foresight in their search for new tools to make sense of the complex systems that have become the ‘new normal’ of our age. According to this narrative, states and government institutions are no longer shaping our futures, but are instead in reactive or even damage-control mode. The key question motivating the quest for a new and better approach becomes, ‘how can we proactively prepare for what lies ahead?’ Strategic foresight is one answer.

The use of strategic foresight, as understood in this Strategic Security Analysis (SSA), is part of a broader strategic development process, in that foresight “informs the thinking that occurs *before* strategic decisions are made by expanding the perceptions of the strategic options or choices available to the organisation”.¹ For our present purposes, ‘foresight’ is taken to be synonymous with ‘strategic foresight’, viewed within a broader anticipatory governance framework defined as the “systematic embedding and application of strategic foresight throughout the entire governance architecture, including policy analysis, engagement, and decision-making”.² Foresight-linked anticipatory governance can, among other things, inform policy (by offering anticipatory knowledge regarding the dynamics of change, future challenges and options), facilitate policy implementation (by generating a common awareness of current and future challenges, and helping to refine the theory of change behind programming), and promote the participation of societal actors in policy definition and implementation, thereby fostering legitimacy, transparency and accountability.³

This SSA explores ways to consolidate and strengthen anticipatory governance capacities in MFAs. To do so it focuses on organisational parameters, human resource capabilities and skill sets, and the substantive modalities of generating and applying foresight to strategic planning and policy formulation. It also specifically addresses peace and security concerns. Far from offering a one-size-fits-all blueprint, the analysis embraces the diversity of government practices falling under the banner of strategic foresight. This analysis is based on an almost year-long research project at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy that was commissioned by the Policy Planning Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The insights shared are, on the one hand, based on results of interviews held in 12 country contexts⁴ across Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania, plus one regional organisation, and, on the other hand, both authors’ extensive experience.

The key question motivating the quest for a new and better approach becomes, ‘how can we proactively prepare for what lies ahead?’ Strategic foresight is one answer.



Strategic foresight in MFAs

Governments have started to adopt foresight approaches in the last decades in various forms – centralised or decentralised – with the Canadian, Finnish and Singaporean governments standing out as key examples. Save for a few exceptions, however – notably the *Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie* of the French MFA, which is currently celebrating its golden jubilee – it is only within the last years that many MFAs have sought to strengthen their strategic anticipation capacities.⁵ This has happened in conjunction with a rise in attention to futures work in multilateral organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN).

There are multiple, interconnected reasons for this rise in interest in anticipatory governance that are related to a growing malaise with the increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world we live in.⁶ According to this narrative, the external environment of (foreign) policymaking is complex, difficult to unpack, and constantly changing, making information and the forecasts generated by it lose predictive significance.

Against this backdrop, a number of studies have started to emerge that focus on the experiences of countries in applying foresight to strategic planning and policymaking. These have mostly examined government in general – either in the forms of single-country studies (e.g. of Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and the United States⁷) – or via a comparative analysis of a handful of cases.⁸ Notable exceptions that specifically take a foreign policy perspective include studies on Canada⁹ and Spain.¹⁰ Overall, the majority of these reports are commissioned pieces written for or co-authored by the policy establishment of the country in question.

While a whole-of-government approach is an important component of considerations as to how MFAs can go about integrating the tools of anticipation and foresight into their strategic decision-making, this study specifically focuses on some of the particularities of applying anticipatory governance in the context of foreign policy formulation. MFAs are traditionally highly reactive and crisis-oriented settings.¹¹ They are on the front lines of international developments and are influenced to varying degrees by their (cooperative or competitive) ties with other countries, leaving seemingly limited room for manoeuvre. They tend to have rigid internal structures based on geographic and thematic 'desks'. Furthermore, they have different standing commitments in international forums, given their membership of various organisations and other legal obligations. And in a national government context, MFAs have a somewhat unique staff rotation system that can be an asset, but that also leads to the loss of institutional memory and expertise. How is strategic foresight pursued in such a foreign affairs setting?

To address this question, the analysis relied on a series of confidential interviews in 12 country contexts and with one regional organisation. Countries were chosen based on a combination of purposive and convenience sampling, while comparability to Switzerland was also considered. In some cases, this involved multiple conversations, often in a group format. Sensitivities exist when discussing internal foresight and anticipation practices in MFAs, and these needed to be carefully navigated. In a few contexts, interviews were expanded to individuals (such as researchers or consultants) working with MFAs on foresight-related activities or implementing foresight practices in foreign and international affairs organisational settings. The interview data was triangulated with desk research and the authors' prior knowledge of anticipatory governance and their engagement in this field.

MFAs are traditionally highly reactive and crisis-oriented settings.



The enabling environment for anticipatory governance in MFAs

The OECD is undoubtedly a forerunner in promoting the use of strategic foresight in government circles, with its Strategic Foresight Unit, which was established in 2013. Across a variety of publications and presentations, the OECD speaks of “anticipatory governance and the institutionalisation of strategic foresight” in government – which includes “establishing dedicated foresight institutions and frameworks (e.g. units, committees, networks, legislation, and practices) and ... building a foresight culture within existing institutional structures”.¹²

Taking its cue from this call to action, the present analysis reflects on what such an institutionalisation process would involve within, specifically, a foreign policy setting. It does so by unpacking the enabling environment for such a process, understood here as an organisational setting conducive to the pursuit of strategic foresight. This enabling environment requires generating and continuously readjusting a sustained demand for anticipatory and foresight-related products and outputs that is in line with the timely and convincing supply of such deliverables. As long as demand and supply dynamics are in sync, anticipatory governance can be effectively practised even on a small scale, and then gradually expanded as an institutional mindset is progressively established.

This enabling environment requires generating and continuously readjusting a sustained demand for anticipatory and foresight-related products and outputs that is in line with the timely and convincing supply.

The ‘where’: organisational parameters

Translating a general discomfort and lack of satisfaction with the way in which foreign policy is generated in today’s complex and uncertain external environment into a genuine institutionalisation of foresight in MFAs requires a shift in mindsets. MFA contexts where anticipatory governance has been systematically embedded have actively invested in building this appreciation of long-term thinking and exploring as an organisation the various purposes foresight serves. Sometimes the turbulent external environment and repeatedly getting caught off guard were important drivers of these efforts; in other instances they required greater investment in demonstrating foresight’s value through pilot projects, the sharing of experiences from other settings, and/or developing institutional requirements in order to get started on the journey of more deeply establishing the use of foresight in long-term planning. What are the organisational parameters needed in MFAs to implement this process, and how can sustainability be ensured?

- **Placement in the ministry:** Given the close linkages among strategic reflection, foresight and planning, it is logical for anticipatory governance capacities to be located in policy-planning units or divisions. These are generally part of the MFA civil service machinery, although there are numerous models for these units’ hierarchical positioning and thus proximity to the minister’s office. In some cases policy planning is one among a number of horizontally aligned departments or divisions, and thus several levels removed from the minister; in other cases the head of policy planning does not report to a deputy minister or state secretary, but directly to the minister her/himself or, in larger ministries, to a member of the minister’s cabinet staff. Even if the lead on foresight is in a policy planning unit, fostering foresight holistically in the ministry remains the objective. This is a particular issue in MFAs that may cover multiple topics beyond foreign affairs (development, trade and so on). If foresight is being used for peace and security policymaking, in particular as it relates to conflict prevention, it may be organisationally



The bottom line is achieving some balance between the distance needed for out-of-the-box thinking and the access needed to remain relevant and exercise timely influence.

separate from the policy-planning unit, which would require coordination between the two units (and potentially other units, e.g. those focusing on regional affairs).

- **Proximity to decision-makers:** Opinions diverge as to the advantages or otherwise of being positioned close to senior leaders at the ministry and to an elected politician (i.e. the minister). Arguments against such proximity include the danger of strategic thinking being overly politicised, lacking the space and independence to offer out-of-the-box ideas, and falling victim to short-termism and the dynamics of party-political election manoeuvring. Arguments in favour of proximity include the importance of having the minister's direct attention, since she/he is the ultimate target audience for the deliverables of strategic anticipation. If the minister is convinced that the reflections offered are useful for the deliberations of her/his team, it not only ensures that foresight-related resources will be maintained, but also guarantees that other departments in the ministry take the internal memos and papers seriously, since they know they are on the minister's desk and are being read. The bottom line is achieving some balance between the distance needed for out-of-the-box thinking and the access needed to remain relevant and exercise timely influence.
- **Collaboration within government:** Regardless of the organisational model pursued, MFAs can benefit from joining forces with other ministries to generate new foresight-based insights and shared analyses – especially given the complexity of many themes related to contemporary foreign policy that have both foreign and domestic dimensions, including security, climate change, digitalisation, health care and migration, to name but a few. A whole-of-government approach to the use of foresight in policymaking helps to capitalise on in-house thematic expertise (thus lowering the need for and dependency on outsourced knowledge) and generates inter-ministerial alliances that may transcend the political leanings of particular cabinet members.
- **Sustaining foresight-related efforts:** As leadership changes and team members rotate, having structures and working methods in place to sustain foresight-related efforts is crucial. This entails maintaining a regular cycle of foresight-based products, ensuring the visibility of foresight work, good record-keeping, and inserting foresight into routine programming. Sustainability can also receive added external impetus through government legislation that obliges ministries (including the MFA) to conduct and report on long-term strategic foresight activities. In this context, national governments – not least MFAs – can take note of developments at the subnational (e.g. innovative measures in Wales) and multilateral levels (e.g. the call to action via the UN Secretary-General's *Our Common Agenda* report) designed to view policymaking through a lens focusing on future generations.

The 'who': skills and resources

Building a commitment to using foresight for long-term planning to achieve foreign policy objectives and generating action today can be approached in multiple ways. This will be a natural pursuit for some diplomatic staff, while for others it may need to be carefully developed. Having both an *internal focus* (constantly bringing it back to relevant people, processes and objectives) and an *external perspective* (seeking the injection of news ideas and ways of doing things, and having support) is essential. How can MFAs navigate the tension between these perspectives as they develop their capacities for foresight-informed policymaking?



Team members should have the ability to think differently, challenge standard narratives and question assumptions.

- **Ministry staff:** The task of shifting mindsets towards anticipatory governance and generating a collective understanding of its merits should not be underestimated. And while broad sensitisation to the mindset of strategic foresight is helpful for all diplomatic staff, it is important to distinguish between those who will need the skills to understand and ‘do’ foresight, and those who simply need to know what it is, what it is not, and where it may add value to their work. The latter might become the former in time, and if the groundwork is done at the junior level (e.g. via diplomatic training), this could constitute a valuable investment into future ministry capacities.
- **Team and team members’ profiles:** Policy-planning teams need to have the capacity to ensure the supply side of strategic foresight and related anticipatory activities. In terms of individual profiles, team members should have the ability to think differently, challenge standard narratives and question assumptions. Foresight team members moreover require different types of profiles: there is a tendency to put very good analysts in policy-planning teams, but people who can collaborate effectively, facilitate dialogues, and engage with diverse (internal and external) constituencies are also important. Foresight requires perspectives from different domains, so it is beneficial to have team members with different academic and professional assignment backgrounds. In all this work, the ability to develop insights based on foresight and turn them into policy action is a crucial skill set (this can be referred to as a ‘translation function’).
- **Leadership and champions:** The head of policy planning could be a seasoned career diplomat or an external recruitment: what matters most is for this person to be a ‘senior negotiator’ able to navigate bureaucratic politics and guarantee the demand side of the foresight-related supply-and-demand equation. Ideally this person should outlive election cycles, for instance by serving two terms as the specialised expert. Internal buy-in can also be harnessed by identifying and supporting strategic foresight champions across the ministry. These champions are not necessarily the foresight professionals themselves, nor are they necessarily senior, but should be those who see the value of the work, lend their time and expertise when asked, and may help in interpreting knowledge for policymaking purposes.
- **Use of representatives abroad:** An MFA is more than just a set of staff members currently based in the capital, but also includes all the country’s representatives abroad. This is a key asset: all these teams globally can be involved to different degrees (i.e. short or more involved inputs) in foresight activities. They will grow to see this as part of their routine professional activities, and widening the circle of individuals contributing to foresight work is extremely valuable, because it diversifies the perspectives of those involved. This also ensures that a critical mass of MFA officials are sensitised to anticipatory governance (especially because many of them will one day rotate back to the capital).
- **External input:** Most MFAs work to varying degrees with external experts on foresight-related activities. The main form of outsourcing entails maintaining a roster of expert consultants who are brought in at various points in the foresight process, but mostly at the input stage and/or during the review process. The use of data and analytics firms from the private sector has also been gaining in currency, not least in an era of big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Each form of bringing the external debate to the ministry comes with its own risks and challenges, in that it is resource-intensive to curate, and it may at times be laborious to turn information received into analytically



Building networks among MFAs, in particular middle and small-sized countries for comparability of experiences and resources, would provide an avenue for a rich exchange.

meaningful insights to use in policymaking. Ultimately, neither an external expert nor an algorithm can do the required analytical work for the policy-planning unit.

- **Leveraging networks:** Foresight networks can be a good place to learn about different approaches (ranging from methods, to ways of connecting to decision-making, etc.), upgrading skills and sharing identified lessons. They can also be an important way to learn about how other actors are seeing the world and what emerging issues they are monitoring. Building networks among MFAs, in particular medium-sized and small countries for comparability of experiences and resources, would provide an avenue for rich exchanges on conducting foresight in a foreign affairs context. Other networks include domestic and subnational forums, as well as international structures providing opportunities to connect with expertise both in and outside of government – not least the OECD and European Strategy and Policy Analysis System. Just as in the discussion of external input, however, caution is also warranted, in that networks can be a boost for foresight work, but not a replacement for internal legwork.

The ‘what’ and ‘how’: foresight processes and activities

The toolbox of foresight methods is extensive, but a number of core principles differentiate strategic foresight from more predictive approaches such as forecasting and core analysis work – all of which are useful, but not entirely sufficient in periods of high complexity and turbulence. Employing strategic foresight in foreign affairs requires establishing processes and trying out new methods that can link to decision-making in volatile conditions. A number of key reflections on such efforts were made in the context of this project. Firstly, it is less important what method is employed or if the term ‘foresight’ is even being used to denote the activity: what matters is having the influence required to expand the range of options to be considered. Secondly, it is important to adopt a flexible approach and be adaptable to the environment and resources (human, time, financial) available. And while foresight work takes time, valuable inputs can also be produced by using foresight approaches in short-term and discrete ways. Thirdly, the aim of strategic foresight work can be incremental. The art lies in producing insights in different forms that spark interest internally. These insights should challenge standard thinking, but without ruffling feathers to the point of being rejected. With these reflections in mind, how are MFAs conducting foresight work?

- **Time frame:** The time frame selected for strategic foresight work in foreign affairs varies, but it is common for MFAs to conduct such work with a three-to-seven-year horizon. Some shorter-term studies that look one or two years ahead are also being pursued. The window of three to seven years provides a conceptual distance for freer thinking about how things could evolve beyond an existing planning horizon where strategies are already in place. Pragmatically, however, it is clear that new events and potential challenges frequently alter MFA thinking and may provoke a new foresight study that could influence existing strategies. In this sense, MFAs are also pursuing shorter-term studies that include some foresight approaches and that look only one or two years ahead. In the context of applying longer-term thinking to peace and security matters (e.g. concerns related to conflict prevention), it is important to note that while foresight approaches may be adopted, shorter timelines are often used that are adapted to suit the more rapidly moving nature of work in conflict-affected settings. In the final analysis, however, the time horizon is only of secondary importance for the enabling environment, and is outweighed by the necessity of conceiving of foresight as an



ongoing, continuous activity (i.e. a mindset) rather than as a series of one-off exercises.

- **Process and methods:** Methodologically, a foresight process involves a number of steps, all of which can be adapted to suit the requirements and demands of anticipatory work in an MFA setting. Three considerations are noteworthy here. Firstly, output and/or products can be generated at different intervals. For instance, insightful discussions around weak signals can emerge, and can be reported on continuously and fed into strategic reflections and policy formulation. Secondly, the choice of methods will need to be adapted depending on the type of output desired and its purpose. Repeatedly anchoring a foresight approach in the same series of methodological steps is ill-advised. Thirdly, when selecting methods, it is critical to plan wide inputs from across the ministry and externally, and to think about how the foresight outputs that are generated will be disseminated. Peace and security concerns may moreover require specific methodological innovation, notably to combine foresight with conflict prevention, early warning and mediation activities.
- **Formal outputs:** An MFA conducting strategic foresight must be able to produce different types of products. These might include existing products infused with foresight, new wide-scope ‘set pieces’, new issue- or geographically based foresight products, or short papers or memos for the minister’s benefit. Teams will gradually start to develop these outputs and embed them in the ministry. Timing their release is critical and depends on existing schedules around strategy formulation, election cycles or budgetary matters. A foresight study can broaden the range of options being considered in a new or updated strategy-drafting process. Alternatively, foresight can serve to stress test an existing strategy that is hopefully sufficiently agile to adapt to changing dynamics. Another issue is whether to issue public reports. These decisions must weigh a desire to fulfil an important civic aspect of government by informing – and potentially consulting in participatory foresight processes – the public on strategic policy formulation (which gains in importance as public diplomacy and the impact of technological advances on diplomacy grow) with sensitivities around the content – the essence of foresight work is about creating a safe space to explore alternative futures, some of which may require more confidentiality than others.
- **The informal dimension:** Having an impact on the minister’s thinking (and on the thinking of the ministry as a whole) does not entail providing ‘know-it-all’ papers, repeating standard tropes or offering off-the-wall ideas, but essentially aims at getting key people talking about and debating a broader range of alternatives for how an issue may develop, not least to foster a collective internal MFA outlook on specific topics and themes. From such a perspective, the informal aspects of foresight are just as important (if not more so) as the final products (written reports). Informal activities include attendance at senior leadership meetings; an ability to contribute to regular leadership retreats; outreach with thematic and geographic divisions to establish a supply-and-demand function (‘they need you, you need them’); the creation and fostering of an anticipatory network (e.g. focal points) across the ministry; the use of foresight methods during a team meeting in the capital or at an embassy; the holding of open informal discussions on weak signals to spark debate; or the creation of a discussion series based on an external speaker’s/expert’s input on an emerging issue.

The informal aspects of foresight are just as important (if not more so) as the final products.



Creating strategic value, establishing the necessary arrangements, fostering the connections, and integrating efforts will take time, and adjustments are to be expected as the equilibrium ... is constantly recalibrated.

Conclusion

Focusing on organisational parameters, human resources and skill sets, and the processes and approaches employed provides a lens to unpack the enabling environment for anticipatory governance in MFAs. Taken together, consolidating these aspects will require the identification of weak points to work on and strengths to exploit. Creating strategic value, establishing the necessary arrangements, fostering the connections, and integrating efforts will take time, and adjustments are to be expected as the equilibrium between demand and supply is constantly recalibrated in response to changing circumstances.

Two specific issues stand out that warrant further investigation beyond the scope of this study. The first pertains to the particularities of applying strategic foresight to peace and security topics, especially as they relate to conflict prevention, dialogue, and mediation in a multi-stakeholder setting involving governments, international organisations, regional organisations, civil society, and the private sector. The second issue relates to the particularities of conducting long-term planning and using foresight tools in small-to-medium-sized MFAs with limited staff capacities. Fostering an enabling environment for anticipatory governance in such a setting may offer both additional challenges and potential opportunities that merit further attention. In this context, enhanced cooperation, exchanges of experiences, and fostering a network among selected MFAs would be valuable.

Specific insights from this comparative analysis of anticipatory governance in foreign affairs include the following for MFAs intending to integrate foresight into policy planning:

- Adapt foresight approaches and terminology to the MFA's internal setting and way of working. This may also mean adapting time frames, especially regarding conflict prevention.
- Cooperate *across the ministry* (both in the capital and abroad) and *across government*. The interconnection of many issues demands this.
- Create a culture of anticipatory governance by sensitising all MFA staff to the concept and training young diplomats on foresight.
- Build a diverse internal team with complementary skills (analysis, communication).
- Balance a focus on developing formal outputs, including timely short ones, with cultivating informal connections.
- Experiment with methods while maintaining the focus on how foresight can be applied to policymaking in a foreign affairs context.
- Identify opportunities to support the sustainability of the use of foresight through the creation of related obligations within the ministry and/or across government.
- Proactively engage with networks domestically and via international foresight circles.

Each of the foreign affairs settings explored in this study adjusted anticipatory processes to their specific context and institutional needs, maintained a level of agility in their efforts, and exhibited different levels of foresight maturity.¹³ Nowhere was this path linear, with commitments to anticipatory governance expanding with time, but also suffering setbacks as leaders change, staff rotate, crises loom large and day-to-day demands dominate. The essential elements were to start using foresight, nurture allies internally, foster wider connections and remain adaptable.



Endnotes

- 1 M. Conway, “An Overview of Foresight Methodologies”, *Thinking Futures*, 2006, p.1 (emphasis added).
- 2 OECD Strategic Foresight Unit, *Strategic Foresight for Better Policies: Building Effective Governance in the Face of Uncertain Futures*, Paris, OECD, 2019, p.3. While the OECD has been most recently advancing the thinking around anticipatory governance (which is sometimes called anticipatory innovation governance), Leon Fuerth developed the concept earlier; see L. Fuerth, “Anticipatory Governance: Practical Upgrades: Equipping the Executive Branch to Cope with Increasing Speed and Complexity of Major Challenge”, Project on Forward Engagement, 2012. See also OECD Strategic Foresight Unit, *Foresight and Anticipatory Governance: Lessons in Effective Foresight Institutionalization*, Paris, OECD, 2021; P. Tönurist and A. Hanson, *Anticipatory Innovation Governance: Shaping the Future through Proactive Policy Making*, Paris, OECD, 2020.
- 3 See O. Da Costa et al., “The Impact of Foresight on Policy-making: Insights from the FORLEARN Mutual Learning Process”, *Technology Analysis & Strategic Management*, Vol.20(3), 2008, pp.369-387.
- 4 The overwhelming majority of interviewees were MFA officials in these countries, plus a few from other sectors such as academia, consultancy firms, and data and analytics companies.
- 5 See also I. Dreyer and G. Stang, with C. Richard, “Foresight in Governments – Practices and Trends around the World”, *EUISS Yearbook of European Security*, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2013, pp.7-31.
- 6 Variations and “upgrades” of this jargon include “turbulence, uncertainty, novelty and ambiguity (TUNA)”, proposed by R. Ramirez and A. Wilkinson, *Strategic Reframing: The Oxford Scenario Planning Approach*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018; “rapid, unpredictable, paradoxical and tangled (RUPT)” suggested by the Centre for Creative Leadership (ccl.org); and, most recently, “brittle, anxious, non-linear and incomprehensible (BANI)” suggested by Jamais Caisco of the Institute for the Future, Palo Alto, California.
- 7 See P. Warnke et al., *Studie zur Institutionalisierung von Strategischer Vorausschau als Prozess und Methode in der deutschen Bundesregierung*, Karlsruhe, Fraunhofer-Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung, 2022; Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, “Towards a Strategic Foresight System in Ireland”, OECD Policy Brief, Paris, OECD, 2021; J.M. Greenblott et al., “Strategic Foresight in the Federal Government: A Survey of Methods, Resources and Institutional Arrangements”, *World Futures Review*, Vol.11(3), 2019, pp.245-266; J. Boston, “Anticipatory Governance: How Well Is New Zealand Safeguarding the Future?”, *Policy Quarterly*, Vol.12(3), 2016, pp.11-24. The European Union Institute for Security Studies also published a series of short country profiles in the form of a Foresight Series, including on Russia, China and the United States: see A. Monaghan, “How Russia Does Foresight: Where Is the World Going?”, Foresight Brief No. 1, 2021; P. Charon, “Foresight in China: The Other Missing Dimension”, Foresight Brief No. 5, 2021; and M. Burrows, “How the US Does Foresight: The United States’ Difficulty in Accepting Multipolarity”, Foresight Brief No. 7, 2021.
- 8 Beyond those already cited in previous footnotes above, these include J.I. Santander, “Foresight and Its Application in Ministries of Foreign Affairs”, Serie de Artículos y Testimonios No. 167, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, 2022, pp.1-12; School of International Futures (SOIF), *Features of Effective Systemic Foresight in Government around the World*, Sidcup, SOIF, 2021; and T. Kuosa, *Strategic Foresight in Government: The Cases of Finland, Singapore and the European Union*, Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013.
- 9 A. Wilner and M. Roy, “Canada’s Emerging Foresight Landscape: Observations and Lessons”, *Foresight*, Vol.22(5/6), 2020, pp.551-562; republished in shorter form by the Foreign Policy Research & Foresight Division of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) as *Make the Future Work for the Present: Lessons Learned from the Foresight Unit*, Ottawa, GAC, 2022.
- 10 A. Barroso, “Prospectiva y planificación estratégica en la acción exterior española”, *Estrategia Exterior Española* No. 4/2014, Real Instituto Elcano, 2014.
- 11 For a discussion from the diplomatic angle of the work of MFAs and how this profession is adapting to complex challenges, see A. Cooper et al. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 12 See OECD Strategic Foresight Unit, 2021, pp.4-5.
- 13 The foresight maturity model proposed originally by Terry Grim and interpreted recently by the Futures Platform provides an illustrative way to interpret how foresight looks in foreign affairs contexts. See T. Grim, “Foresight Maturity Model (FMM): Achieving Best Practices in the Foresight Field”, *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol.13(4), 2009, pp.69-80; and A. Grabtchak and M. Stucki, “Building Foresight Capabilities: Introducing Futures Platform’s Foresight Maturity Model”, Futures Platform blog, February 2022, <https://www.futuresplatform.com/blog/foresight-maturity-model-developing-foresight-capabilities>.



GCSP

Geneva Centre for
Security Policy

People make peace and security possible

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Maison de la paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2D
P.O. Box 1295
1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 730 96 00
E-mail: info@gcsp.ch
www.gcsp.ch

ISBN: 978-2-88947-319-9