# GCSP
Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Strategic Security Analysis

Strengthening Prevention with Better Anticipation: COVID-19 and Beyond

Emily Munro

Contents

Key points

- Prevention strategies warrant more attention and can be a framework to apply to situations with different levels of urgency. The cases of the Arctic, the Sahel and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate the value of prevention strategies in diverse ways.

- Anticipation is closely linked to prevention, and we should do more to understand how the future may unfold, and then act on the findings to help us to prevent crises and conflict.

- The interaction of issues often lies at the centre of the policy challenges we face today. It is necessary to unpack these interactions in order to strengthen our responses.

- Surprises cannot be entirely avoided, but we should place more emphasis on considering the implications of crises and ensure better integration of our approaches across the short, medium and long term.

About the author

Emily Munro heads the work on Strategic Anticipation at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and leads projects on dialogue on emerging security issues. She works with governments and organisations around the world to foster more forward-thinking approaches to international security policy. She directed the New Issues in Security Course at the GCSP from 2017 to 2019 and is a frequent contributor to other GCSP executive education programmes. She has 17 years of experience in international security and previous professional experience, and obtained her master's and bachelor's degrees in Geneva and Vancouver, respectively.

Introduction

What happens when the health sector meets the economic sector? The ongoing COVID-19 outbreak reminds us that we do not live in isolation, nor are the various sectors of our societies walled off from one another. The pandemic that began in late 2019 and early 2020 in Wuhan, China, and quickly spread outside Asia to the Middle East and Europe, and now the world, is having a serious impact on the global economy. Goods we have come to expect to be readily available on our store shelves may not be there and – of even more concern – some of the materials and equipment that healthcare professionals require to test patients and treat those who have caught the virus could also be unavailable. Experts are warning that we should be prepared for months of living with the virus – but its consequences for various aspects of the economy will last much longer, ranging from increasing the vulnerability of small businesses to disrupting global supply chains.

The economic impact of the current health crisis has been one of the first consequences to appear, but other impacts are emerging, including potentially those affecting international security. More generally, though, what a crisis of this kind does is to remind us of how difficult it is to anticipate the impacts of developments across different sectors or issue areas, and how important this kind of anticipation can be to preventing crises and conflicts from expanding – or even occurring in the first place. The following sections explore three cases where this can be observed: the Arctic, the Sahel, and the COVID-19 outbreak, and identify some lessons for policymakers.

What a crisis of this kind does is to remind us of how difficult it is to anticipate the impacts of developments across different sectors or issue areas.

Anticipation and prevention

The issue of *time* is at the heart of questions on anticipation and prevention in international security, just as it is in personal matters such as exercise, healthy eating, or retirement savings. Investing in the future requires having a vision of the kind of future we want, and most likely includes sacrifices in the present. Investing earlier generally pays off in the longer term in easily imaginable ways, but it is not always done. Both personally and in the policy sphere we are constantly torn between our desire for advantages that accrue in the short, medium or long term, but require sacrifices in one time period to achieve advantages in another.

Table 1: Prevention and anticipation in practice

Personal: exercise		Policy: conflict prevention
More energy	**Short term**	Avoiding violence; alleviating human suffering
Lose weight	**Medium term**	Sustaining peace
Longer life	**Long term**	Ensuring sustainable development and good governance

Efforts to prevent conflict can become deprioritised as we respond to an immediate crisis.[1] The prevention agenda has received a much-needed boost with the focus by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on the importance of conflict prevention as an essential part of the peacebuilding agenda in his report on *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace* and related efforts within and outside the UN system.[2] When investments in conflict prevention are made early, conflict can be either avoided entirely or mitigated if appropriate strategies are implemented.

What makes this difficult, though, is the fact that our ability to anticipate where and when these investments should be made is limited and this uncertainty makes us uncomfortable. The first step to improve this ability is to recognise that the future can unfold in a very different way to what we expect, whether good or bad. Secondly, a range of strategic foresight tools and techniques are available to us to explore alternative futures. Thirdly, we must act to direct our efforts to enhance the positive features of the future we see unfolding and minimise the negative ones. This will often mean encountering resistance in our institutions or the wider society in which we live, and will require regular adaptation of the strategies we decide to implement as we move ahead into the future.

In international security, another factor we face is the overlapping nature of the issues we are grappling with. These issues often require policymakers to be able to move between sectors, can be highly specialised, and frequently involve the utilisation of essential technical knowledge. They also vary in the speed with which they appear, ranging from slowly creeping up on us to rapidly developing.[3] The complicated picture that unfolds in such circumstances can be overwhelming. Nonetheless, concerted efforts to understand the various issues we face and their interconnected dynamics will strengthen our policy responses. The 17 interdependent goals of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are an important recognition of this.[4]

Concerted efforts to understand the various issues we face and their interconnected dynamics will strengthen our policy responses.

It will never be possible to understand fully how the future will unfold, even if we are able to improve our foresight, and the interconnected nature of the threats we face complicates the picture.

Lastly, crises cannot be avoided, and preparedness is essential. It will never be possible to understand fully how the future will unfold, even if we are able to improve our foresight, and the interconnected nature of the threats we face complicates the picture. We can, however, (1) strengthen our crisis management capabilities, (2) spend more time and effort on mapping the types of crisis that could potentially unfold, and (3) build more resilient structures and societies by learning from the crises that do occur or have occurred in the past. However, short-term responses to crises should not dominate our daily business and efforts to address medium- and long-term issues should also be fully evaluated for their potential impact.

Sarah Cliffe and David Steven of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University have identified three strategic-level categories of prevention that can help us to better understand the various conflict- and crisis-prevention efforts that are available to us.[5] They have drawn on thinking from the public health sector to devise these categories and apply them to the UN's conflict-prevention agenda. These strategies are:

1. universal prevention strategies;

2. at-risk prevention strategies; and

3. prevention strategies during a crisis.

Cliffe and Steven recognise that prevention exists in an interconnected landscape, requires a strategic focus, and needs cooperative and adaptable operational models. The Sahel, the Arctic and the COVID-19 outbreak have many more aspects that separate them than unite them, but share common ground in terms of the need for better prevention and anticipation strategies. Cliffe and Steven's framework can be interpreted for the three cases covered here.

The Arctic requires *universal prevention strategies* according to this framework that involve many actors, and efforts that have benefits across various areas (economic, environmental, political, social) and address the problem of "patterns of development that are attractive in the short term but that may undermine peace and resilience in the longer term".[6] The Sahel is in a more critical phase and requires *at-risk prevention strategies* for target groups, peacebuilding with political dimensions, and multisectoral partnerships that can support a reduction of the risks the region faces and make space for "healthy and inclusive patterns of development".[7] Lastly, recognising the ongoing public health dimensions of the response (e.g. containment), we must view the COVID-19 pandemic as an ongoing crisis that requires *prevention strategies during a crisis*, which should include strong political leadership, cooperation among various actors in different sectors, and an even higher degree of targeted interventions to deal with the health-related issues faced by individuals and communities. The following sections unpack these three cases.

Case study 1 – Universal prevention: geopolitics meets the environment in the Arctic

A specific setting and range of mechanisms are needed to manage these developments, including the opportunities they offer, and to reduce the potential for conflict in an increasingly crowded part of the world.

The Arctic is on the frontlines of the impact of climate change, warming is taking place there at twice the rate of the rest of the world (with important secondary effects) and an ice-free summer may become reality by around 2040. This will mean the establishment of alternative sea routes between Asia and Europe, increased access to natural resources (oil and gas reserves and other resources), and potential economic benefits for communities (e.g. tourism). However, the negative consequences could also be widespread – with increased economic activity leading to a negative environmental impact, increased risk of accidents (e.g. shipping accidents, oil spills in a sensitive environment), and an adverse impact on the social fabric and livelihoods of the indigenous communities in the region.

Among the major powers, developments in the Arctic have not gone unnoticed. US policy in the Arctic relates to its global role and corresponds to its geographic position, but in recent years has been uneven.[8] Russia sees the Arctic as a strategic priority and has focused on energy resources and shipping in the region, while including it in its military modernisation plans since 2008.[9] China published its first Arctic White Paper in 2018 and links efforts in the region to its Belt and Road Initiative.

The Arctic Council – the intergovernmental forum for the region – has eight Arctic members, including Russia and the United States, and includes China (since 2013) and a host of other countries (and organisations) as observers. However, the Council focuses almost exclusively on sustainable development and environmental protection issues related to such topics as search and rescue, scientific research, and so on. Efforts by Finland, the recent rotating chair of the Arctic Council, which are supported by the current chair, Iceland, to address the implications of the changes referred to above for the Council at the strategic level are facing resistance from other members who want to insulate the grouping from broader developments and avoid a militarisation of the Arctic region. The debate currently under way is a welcome and much overdue sign of movement on this issue.

The meeting of environmental concerns – specifically the impact of climate change – and the shifting balance of power globally, with repercussions in the Arctic, require attention. The focus is more universal at this stage and comprehensive in terms of prevention strategies. A specific setting and range of mechanisms are needed to manage these developments, including the opportunities they offer, and to reduce the potential for conflict in an increasingly crowded part of the world.

Case study 2 –
At-risk prevention: inequality meets multilateralism in the Sahel

Much has been written about the crisis in multilateralism at the global level, but how does this translate to regions at risk, in this case the Sahel?

Our understanding of inequality has expanded beyond core issues of income and wealth. In a recent UN report a framework involving *basic capabilities* (early childhood survival, primary education, entry-level technology, resilience to basic shocks) and *enhanced capabilities* (access to quality healthcare and high-quality education at all levels, effective access to present-day technologies, resilience to unknown new shocks) was used to broaden our understanding of inequality.[10] If we focus only on *basic capabilities*, the Sahel is a region on the frontlines of the inequality challenge.[11] A limited amount of data for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – a sub-grouping of countries in the wider Sahel – starkly demonstrates this, including for women in this region (see Table 2).

Table 2: Data on selected Sahel countries

	Human Development Index 2019 (positions 1-189)*	Proportion of population in multidimensional poverty (%)**	Gender Inequality Index 2018 (positions 1-162)***
Burkina Faso	182	83.8	147
Chad	187	85.7	160
Mali	184	78.1	158
Mauritania	161	50.6	150
Niger	189	90.5	154

Sources:
* <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking>
** <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2019-MPI>
*** <http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>

Two interlinked factors combine to amplify inequalities in the Sahel. Nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists in the Sahel suffer from lack of access to education and healthcare, given their unique lifestyle (only approximate figures are available, but this could represent between 10 per cent and 40 per cent of the population, depending on the country). Climate change will also impact the Sahel disproportionally, causing severe droughts and disputes over land use. In terms of consequences and given that inequalities are a key factor linked to radicalisation, this region is suffering directly from related terrorist activities that have increased substantially between 2016 and 2020, and indirectly from, for instance, migration as people flee from terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria.

Much has been written about the crisis in multilateralism at the global level, but how does this translate to regions at risk, in this case the Sahel? The Sahel has received increased attention from external actors in recent years, but this attention has lacked concerted purpose, coordination, and funding to address the deeper, longer-term issues. Firstly, laudable efforts have been made to localise solutions at the community level, initiatives such as those of the Group of Five for the Sahel,[12] including the Joint Force, and the involvement of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States. Secondly, individual actors are taking action: France intervened militarily six years ago to combat terrorism in consultation with local governments in the region. This intervention has not been without controversy, however. The private sector – particularly

companies involved in resources extraction – is another actor that needs to be taken into account.[13] Thirdly, the international community, including the UN through the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, has made concerted efforts in the region to implement the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the related Support Plan.

However, much of the effort has been focused on responding to the immediate crisis threatening the Sahel, in particular the growing terrorist threat, and much less on deeper issues related to social and economic inequality and the impact of climate change.[14] What is interesting about this case is that there is relative agreement among the UN Security Council's five permanent members on the key issues affecting the region. There is also broad consensus among researchers on the linkages between security and development in general, and in the Sahel in particular. However, this has not resulted in the coordinated and scale of effort required. Inequality can be a marker of problems to come, and for the people of the Sahel not enough action has come early enough, but it is not too late to adjust current approaches.[15]

A recent UN report recognised that inequality demands "integrated, multilateral solutions" and analysed the interaction of inequality with four megatrends: climate change, technological revolution, urbanisation, and international migration.[16] Moving constructively forward from here will require putting the basic and enhanced understandings of inequalities more at the centre of the response and ensuring the sustained attention and action, including the provision of funding,[17] of the key players in the multilateral system. This mean balancing preventive action during an acute at-risk phase across the necessary political dimensions, while laying the ground through inclusive and multisectoral partnerships today for the implementation of sustainable development practices in the future that will increase equality in these societies.

Inequality can be a marker of problems to come, and for the people of the Sahel not enough action has come early enough, but it is not too late to adjust current approaches.

Case study 3 – Prevention during a crisis: global health meets the economy in the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic spreading around the world in the first months of 2020 presents both potential international security implications in itself, and also when addressing the meeting of the outbreak and the local and global economies. Prevention efforts are thus in their most pressing phase, as Cliffe and Steven describe. We will see the manifestation of all aspects of the response, ranging from high-level political leadership, to various sectors combining their efforts and cooperating to achieve joined-up solutions, to interventions at the community and individual levels. These prevention efforts are changing rapidly as there are some issues that are clearly apparent while others we must anticipate.

First to the anticipatory side, where at least five possible international security implications can be identified: government leaders impacted and reduced functioning of civil services, limited contacts between countries on sensitive issues, an increase in existing tensions (e.g. countries in conflict and tensions with China), spreading disinformation, and other issues being neglected that need attention and action.[18] In addition, personal security is also impacted by the steps governments take to manage the virus. These steps require governments to take actions that restrict freedom of movement and people's right to assemble in groups, for example. While these restrictions are imposed to ensure the safety of individuals and more general public health and safety, they still need to respect individual rights and freedoms and be proportional to the threat being faced.[19]

Aside from the impact on the health sector, one of the earliest impacts of COVID-19 has been on the economic sector. The travel, restaurant, and hospitality areas have been particularly hard hit in the early stages as a result of travel restrictions and the cancellation of events. An airline in the United Kingdom was one of the first business sector victims of the steps taken to contain the virus: the discount airline Flybe announced on 5 March 2020 that it would cease operations. To address the security implications of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the interlinkages between the health and economic sectors, two dimensions will be addressed, human and state security. These relate closely to the attention required to preventing and minimising additional consequences during this ongoing crisis.

In terms of human security, the economic security of individuals is one the core features of the concept. This relates to an individual's ability to earn a wage through gainful employment to ensure adequate housing and other basic needs (food, clean water, etc.) for themselves and their families, while also having access to an effective social safety system. Those affected by COVID-19, albeit in a wide range of countries, could have their economic security imperiled in particular if they are in short-term or irregular types of employment (contract workers, the self-employed and other workers in the so-called gig economy). The health of many workers could be put at risk by the nature of their jobs if they are required to be in regular contact with the public. Other short-term jobs may not allow for sick days or the flexibility to care for sick and/or elderly relatives. Such workers, especially in countries without adequate social safety nets, could potentially find themselves in precarious situations where bills cannot be paid and job losses become an unfortunate reality. As the COVID-19 outbreak moves to countries with less developed health sectors, other pre-existing insecurities (e.g. high poverty rates) and in some cases either recent or

As the COVID-19 outbreak moves to countries with less developed health sectors, other pre-existing insecurities (e.g. high poverty rates) and in some cases either recent or ongoing conflicts could amplify the security implications of the pandemic.

The situation may make the international environment more unstable, with less inclination among countries for cooperative initiatives, despite the highly interconnected global economy.

ongoing conflicts could amplify the security implications of the pandemic. This could, for example, mean that individuals more quickly lose their access to goods and services to fulfil their basic needs and, more indirectly, that the risk of violence could be heightened. The duration, severity and geographical spread of the outbreak will be critical factors in this regard.

In terms of state security, the economic impact of COVID-19 could be longer term and far reaching. Illuminating data from China – the first country to be hit by the outbreak – is emerging. Almost two months into the outbreak, as numbers fall for those contracting the virus and with many returning to work, only 60 per cent of 143 major industrial sites had resumed work, according to numbers from the China Merchants Bank index, which used night-time satellite imagery to compile its data.[20] China produces many goods needed in supply chains around the world, thereby multiplying the impact of the pandemic. As the virus spreads beyond Asia, we are witnessing disruption to transportation systems that move goods globally and falling oil prices. Global equity markets are posting losses not seen since the 1980s, while the word "recession" is once again appearing in media headlines as a risk.

What makes us particularly vulnerable at the moment is the high connectivity and uniformity of large systems – financial ones included – that make such systems "far more susceptible to rapidly cascading change".[21] In such times countries will turn inwards to ensure that scarce resources are in the first instance allocated to their national health systems and will focus on bolstering their own economies. Already, economic stimulus packages are being rolled out in a number of countries. While these efforts should be welcomed, the situation may make the international environment more unstable, with less inclination among countries for cooperative initiatives, despite the highly interconnected global economy. One example of this that has already appeared is the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Russia over oil prices, where the coronavirus is not the main factor at issue, but may exacerbate the problem. Efforts by the major economies – the United States, China, and countries in the Eurozone – will be watched closely, as will be initiatives by the G7, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank to support global economic recovery. It is essential that such initiatives fully recognise the interconnectivity of the world's economic system.

Overall, some of the COVID-19-related issues presented above are more short term in nature, while others will be more long term; some will have a direct impact, while the effect of others will be more indirect; and we will only see hints of others at present, while only time will tell if they will continue to emerge and what precise form they will take. What may tie them together is the *speed* at which they appear and the *complexity* that is created by their presence. Leaders and policymakers must now design and deliver effective responses that will attempt to limit the damage that the pandemic and its effects will cause across a range of sectors amid the unfolding global health crisis.

Conclusion

While the COVID-19 crisis unfolds, the impact on the world economy reminds us that the complex interactions of a range of issues are at the centre of the policy challenges we face today. Some of these will constitute surprises (the so-called "black swan" events), while others are already apparent but little or nothing is being done about them (the so-called "black elephant" or "grey rhino" events). The surprises cannot be eliminated, but we can do better at considering the implications and exploring the policy responses of the crises we are already witnessing or have witnessed in the past.

What the first two cases studies (the Arctic and the Sahel) have in common is that they are issues that we recognise as problematic, but thus far have not acted early enough to address them. If we can develop an enhanced ability to anticipate problems (and opportunities) and analyse their complex interconnections earlier, interventions can be designed that avoid human suffering and deploy resources more efficiently. In the Sahel the situation is acute and the international community is either fire-fighting or playing catch-up, while in the Arctic there is still time to act before larger human or environmental consequences emerge. While the COVID-19 crisis is far from over, initial insights for policymakers in the international security sector can be identified and acted on. These include the need to:

- **invest in anticipation and act on the results** by adapting mindsets about how the future may unfold and by using strategic foresight tools and techniques;
- **address the interconnections among the various issues we face** by reaching out to actors in different domains and conducting analysis that maps out multiple issue intersections and their consequences for policy; and
- **acknowledge that vulnerabilities exist and be better prepared for surprises** by building capacity in crisis management within your organisation, broadening your perspective on the types of crises that could occur, and learning from the crises that do occur (resilience).

With more distance from the crisis that we now face – which only time will provide – we will be able to fully evaluate the current crisis and analyse other broader lessons from it. But we can use the current situation to help us adjust the way in which we see and understand other parts of the world and invest in prevention.

Note

This Strategic Security Analysis was last updated on 19 March 2020.

Endnotes

1. See, for instance, the United Nations (UN) and World Bank Group's *Pathways to Peace* report, which emphasises: (1) the important of early investments in sustainable development: "The best way to prevent societies from descending into crisis, including but not limited to conflict, is to ensure that they are resilient through investment in inclusive and sustainable development"; and (2) the value of early and unified action: "In order to achieve more effective prevention, new mechanisms need to be established that will allow greater synergy to be achieved much earlier among the various tools and instruments of prevention, in particular diplomacy and mediation, security, and development" (UN and World Bank Group, *Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, March 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict>).

2. UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General*, 18 January 2018, A/72/707-S/2018/43, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e.pdf>.

3. G. Herd et al., "Emerging Security Challenges: Framing the Policy Context", GCSP Policy Paper, July 2013, <https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/emerging-security-challenges-framing-policy-content>.

4. UN, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, 2015, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>.

5. S. Cliffe and D. Steven, *An Integrated Approach to Prevention: The Links between Prevention, the 2030 Agenda, and Sustaining Peace,* Center on International Cooperation, New York University, December 2017, <https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/integrated-approach-prevention-links-between-prevention-2030-agenda-and-sustaining>.

6. Ibid, p.7.

7. Ibid.

8. H. Conley, "The Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 May 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region>.

9. E. Klimenko, "Russia's Arctic Security Policy: Still Quiet in the High North?", SIPRI Policy Paper No. 45, February 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIPP45.pdf>.

10. UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2019,* p.6, <http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>.

11. However, it must be recognised that inequality is not confined to the least developed countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has noted that social and economic inequalities are also increasing in developed countries (W. Gbohoui et al., "A Map of Inequality in Countries", IMF, 6 November 2019, <https://blogs.imf.org/2019/11/06/a-map-of-inequality-in-countries/>). The consequences of such inequalities can be observed in populist politics in the United States and Europe, and street protests in many countries across the world. These cleavages in society are being addressed to varying extents with a range of economic and social measures.

12. G5 Sahel, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

13. A. Maiga, "The Private Sector Can Help Transform the Sahel", World Bank blog, 4 October 2019, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/private-sector-can-help-transform-sahel>; A. Antil, "The Mining Boom in the Sahel Region: Will the Development Last?", Institut français des relations internationales, February 2014, <https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/enotes/notes-de-lifri/mining-boom-sahel-region-will-development-last>.

14. J.-D. Crola, "Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges", Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/sahel-fighting-inequality-respond-development-and-security-challenges>.

15. See chapter 4 of the *Pathways to Peace* report for a discussion on the relationship between inequality and violent conflict (UN and World Bank Group, 2018).

16. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Social Report 2020: The Challenge of Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World,* 2020, p.14, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/world-social-report/2020-2.html>.

17. The UN Support Plan for the Sahel (May 2018) estimates that USD 140-157 billion per year will be required between 2018 and 2022 to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in the entire Sahel region.

18. For more on these five points, see the author's piece: "Anticipating the International Security Implications of COVID-19", 19 March 2020, <https://www.gcsp.ch/global-insight/anticipating-international-security-implications-covid-19>.

19. See the WHO guidelines on this issue in terms of international health regulations in general and the response to COVID-19 in particular: <https://www.who.int/ith/Repatriation_Quarantine_nCoV-key-considerations_HQ-final11Feb.pdf?ua=1>. See also Amnesty International, "Explainer: Seven Ways the Coronavirus Affects Human Rights", 5 February 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/explainer-seven-ways-the-coronavirus-affects-human-rights/> and R. Ratcliffe, "Health Experts Question Coronavirus Quarantine Measures on Cruise Ship", *The Guardian,* 18 February 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/18/global-health-experts-question-cruise-ship-coronavirus-quarantine-measures>.

20. T. Mitchell et al., "Coronavirus: China's Risky Plan to Revive the Economy", *Financial Times,* 10 March 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/396def8e-5d82-11ea-8033-fa40a0d65a98>.

21. T. Homer-Dixon, "Coronavirus Will Change the World. It Might Also Lead to a Better Future", *The Global and Mail,* 5 March 2020, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-coronavirus-is-a-collective-problem-that-requires-global/>.

Where knowledge meets experience

The GCSP Strategic Security Analysis series are short papers that address a current security issue. They provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and challenges, and propose policy recommendations.